The U.S. Air Force is intensifying efforts to protect its most vulnerable yet indispensable aircraft — aerial refueling tankers and heavy airlifters — by exploring a new class of “kinetic” self-defense systems designed to physically destroy incoming missiles rather than merely confuse or jam them.
Senior officials say the concept, still under development, would act as a final protective layer for high-value airborne assets such as the KC-46 Pegasus, KC-135 Stratotanker, C-17 Globemaster III, C-5M Super Galaxy, and C-130 Hercules. These aircraft form the backbone of American global power projection, enabling fighter jets and bombers to operate across vast distances while delivering cargo and troops into contested regions.
But as adversaries field longer-range and more sophisticated anti-air weapons, the survivability of these large, non-stealthy platforms is increasingly in question.
Kevin Stamey, the Air Force’s Program Executive Officer for Mobility and Director of the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s Mobility Directorate, recently outlined the service’s interest in kinetic self-protection during an official interview.
“Some technology that we are really looking at is kinetic self-protection for our high-value airborne assets,” Stamey said. “Because the threat is evolving, we are trying to develop a capability to protect the tanker that is independent of that threat.”
He described the concept as a “last line of protection” — a capability that would engage a missile physically if electronic countermeasures fail.
“If all else fails and a threat somehow breaks the kill chain, we’ll still have a means to protect the tanker,” he explained. “Whether it’s an IR seeker or a radar seeker, if we have a means of taking it out kinetically, we don’t have to electronically attack it or use decoys that are effective against some things, but not others.”
The remarks reflect growing concern inside the Air Force that traditional defensive tools — such as electronic warfare (EW) jamming, flares, and towed decoys — may not be sufficient against emerging missile technologies.
For decades, tankers and airlifters have relied on layered defensive systems that disrupt or mislead incoming missiles. These include radar warning receivers, chaff and flare dispensers, and directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) that use lasers to blind heat-seeking missiles.
Laser-based DIRCM systems are already deployed across portions of the tanker and airlift fleet. However, these systems are designed to confuse infrared-guided threats rather than destroy them. They are ineffective against radar-guided missiles and do not physically eliminate the incoming weapon.
The problem is compounded by the rapid evolution of missile seeker technologies.
Imaging infrared seekers, for example, are resistant to radiofrequency jamming and radar cross-section reduction techniques. They are passive sensors, meaning they do not emit signals that can be detected by the target aircraft. Radar-guided missiles, meanwhile, increasingly employ advanced signal modulation techniques that complicate jamming efforts.
Air forces worldwide are racing to develop cognitive electronic warfare systems capable of adapting in real time to new threat waveforms. The “holy grail,” as defense officials often describe it, would be a self-learning system that autonomously counters unfamiliar threats mid-mission.
Yet even the most advanced EW suite may eventually be outpaced. That possibility is driving renewed interest in kinetic solutions.
The Air Force has experimented with miniature missile-based self-defense concepts for more than a decade.
In 2015, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) publicly revealed a project known as the Miniature Self-Defense Munition (MSDM). The concept envisioned an “extremely agile, highly-responsive” interceptor roughly one meter long — about a third the size of an AIM-9X Sidewinder.
The missile would use a low-cost passive seeker and be small enough to carry in multiple numbers aboard large aircraft.
AFRL initially awarded contracts to Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for development work. In 2020, Raytheon received additional funding to produce a flight-test-ready miniature self-defense missile, suggesting the effort remained active.
While few details have emerged publicly, analysts believe such a system would operate similarly to hard-kill active protection systems used on armored vehicles — detecting an incoming projectile and launching a small interceptor to destroy it before impact.
In 2017, Northrop Grumman patented a kinetic aircraft protection concept centered on miniature interceptors, reinforcing the idea that industry sees potential in this approach.
The U.S. Navy also explored similar territory in 2018 with a call for information on a Hard Kill Self Protection Countermeasure System for transport and tanker aircraft.
Missile interceptors are not the only kinetic concept under consideration.
In recent years, the Air Force has tested the ability of KC-135 tankers to deploy small drones from standardized Common Launch Tubes. These drones could serve multiple functions, including acting as decoys, extending sensor coverage, or even engaging incoming threats.
Unlike a one-shot miniature missile, a drone could loiter and potentially engage multiple targets. It could reposition after launch and even re-engage if necessary, reducing the risk of wasting interceptors in a complex attack scenario.
However, magazine depth — the number of defensive shots available — remains a major challenge. Aircraft have limited space and weight capacity. Reloading in flight is difficult, though larger platforms like tankers offer more flexibility than fighters.
Future solutions may blend interceptors, drones, and directed energy systems into a layered defensive ecosystem.
Directed energy weapons, particularly high-energy lasers, are often discussed as a solution to the magazine depth problem because they theoretically offer deep or near-unlimited shots constrained only by power supply.
However, while ground-based laser systems have matured significantly, airborne laser weapons capable of reliably destroying incoming missiles have proven far more challenging. Power generation, cooling requirements, and beam control at altitude remain technical hurdles.
For now, operational airborne lasers in U.S. service are limited to DIRCM systems that blind infrared seekers rather than destroy the missile outright.
The push for kinetic self-defense is closely linked to the Air Force’s evolving operational concepts.
Future conflicts, especially in the Indo-Pacific, are expected to feature adversaries with long-range anti-air capabilities extending hundreds or even thousands of miles. China’s People’s Liberation Army has invested heavily in extended-range air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles designed specifically to target enabling assets such as tankers and airborne early warning aircraft.
“Our adversaries are building long-range threats specifically to push assets like our tankers further back,” Stamey noted. “They believe it’s easier to target and shoot a tanker than an F-35 or F-47.”
That calculation is central to modern anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies. By forcing tankers to operate farther from the fight, adversaries reduce the effective range and persistence of U.S. fighters, including stealth aircraft such as the F-35 Lightning II and the emerging F-47 sixth-generation platform.
If tankers can survive closer to contested airspace — inside what planners call the “weapons engagement zone” — they can dramatically enhance operational flexibility.
The Air Force’s exploration of kinetic self-protection also feeds into the broader debate about the Next Generation Air Refueling System (NGAS).
Air Mobility Command chief Gen. John Lamontagne has described NGAS as a wide-ranging examination of future tanker concepts, from traditional large aircraft to business-jet-based platforms, blended-wing designs, and even signature-managed or stealthy tankers.
Central to those discussions is how much survivability should be built into the platform itself versus added through defensive systems.
A stealth tanker could reduce detection risk, but stealth comes at significant cost and design trade-offs. Alternatively, a conventional tanker equipped with advanced connectivity, sensors, electronic warfare, and kinetic self-defense might achieve acceptable survivability at lower cost.
The optimal mix remains under study.
A kinetic interceptor is only as effective as the sensors that cue it.
Detecting a high-speed incoming missile — potentially traveling at Mach 4 or faster — requires advanced infrared search and track systems, radar coverage, and rapid data processing.
The Air Force is investing heavily in distributed sensing and networking, enabling aircraft to share threat data in real time. Loyal wingman drones or escort aircraft could contribute to a shared defensive picture, providing earlier warning and better engagement geometry.
Such networking would be crucial in a saturation attack scenario, where multiple missiles approach from different angles.
The renewed emphasis on kinetic self-protection reflects a broader shift in airpower thinking. For decades, the United States operated largely uncontested in the air domain. Tankers and airlifters rarely faced sophisticated long-range threats.
Peer competitors are fielding advanced missile systems, over-the-horizon sensors, and integrated air defense networks capable of reaching far beyond traditional front lines.
In that environment, high-value support aircraft can no longer rely solely on distance for protection.
By adding a kinetic “hard kill” layer to their defenses, tankers may gain a fighting chance against even the most advanced threats — preserving the mobility backbone that underpins U.S. global operations.
While significant technical and integration challenges remain, Stamey’s remarks make clear that the Air Force sees kinetic self-protection not as a futuristic luxury, but as an emerging necessity.
As adversaries continue to extend the reach and lethality of their anti-air arsenals, the contest between missile and countermeasure is entering a new phase — one in which the tanker itself may soon be armed to shoot back.
