Fighter jets usually hog the limelight. Public fascination with sleek combat aircraft ensures that every small or big deal involving them is closely tracked, debated on primetime television, and dissected by defense analysts for its strategic implications.
However, equally significant acquisitions in the domains of AWACS, AEW&C, transport aircraft, aerial refuelers, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), and ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) platforms often pass with comparatively little attention.
A case in point is India’s recent defense procurement trajectory.
When New Delhi green-lit the acquisition of 114 additional Rafale fighter jets, the announcement generated widespread coverage. The deal followed India’s initial 2015 contract for 36 Rafale jets and a subsequent 2025 order for 26 Rafale M carrier-based fighters. With the latest decision, India is poised to become the second-largest operator of the Dassault Rafale after France.
Yet, running almost parallel to these headline-grabbing fighter deals is another acquisition that could arguably carry even deeper strategic weight: India’s follow-up order for six additional Boeing P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft.
Like the Rafale program, this marks India’s third follow-on order for the Poseidon. The first contract, signed in 2009, covered eight aircraft. A second order in 2016 added four more. With the latest procurement of six additional jets, India’s fleet will rise to 18 aircraft, making it the second-largest operator of the Poseidon platform after the United States Navy.
Despite the symmetry between the Rafale and Poseidon acquisition paths, media coverage of the maritime patrol aircraft has been far more subdued. This relative silence obscures the fact that the Poseidon deal could carry far-reaching consequences—not only for India’s maritime security posture but also for China’s strategic calculations and the broader U.S.-led Indo-Pacific architecture.
In many ways, just as the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II has become the linchpin of allied airpower integration, the Poseidon is emerging as the backbone of maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific.
According to Boeing, more than 200 P-8 aircraft are either in service or on contract worldwide. As of mid-2025, 169 have already been delivered. Apart from the United States, eight other countries operate the platform: Australia, India, the United Kingdom, Norway, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Germany, and Canada.
Of these, four—India, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea—are Indo-Pacific nations. Three are European, and one is North American.
Crucially, the Indo-Pacific region hosts the second- and third-largest Poseidon operators after the United States. India currently operates 12 P-8I aircraft and is set to expand to 18. Australia fields 12 P-8As and has two more on order. New Zealand operates four, while South Korea has six. Collectively, these four Indo-Pacific nations will soon field 42 Poseidons.
The United States, for its part, operates approximately 125 P-8A aircraft, many of which are forward-deployed to the Indo-Pacific theater.
U.S. Navy Poseidons are regularly assigned to the U.S. Seventh Fleet, monitoring maritime activity across the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Squadrons such as VP-16 and VP-47 have operated under Commander, Task Force 72 in Guam, with frequent rotations through Kadena Air Base in Japan and facilities in Singapore.
This means that, in addition to national fleets in India, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand, Poseidons are also consistently present in Japan, Singapore, and Guam. The result is a dense web of maritime surveillance coverage spanning key Indo-Pacific sea lanes.
The P-8A is widely regarded as the world’s most advanced “submarine hunter.” Designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), it also performs anti-surface warfare, maritime reconnaissance, and broad ISTAR missions.
For China, whose naval modernization has heavily emphasized a growing submarine fleet—including nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and attack submarines (SSNs)—the proliferation of Poseidons in the region presents a serious challenge.
Beijing has repeatedly criticized U.S. deployments of the P-8A in disputed areas of the South China Sea. In 2024, Chinese officials publicly accused Washington of using submarine-hunting aircraft to destabilize regional security. Chinese fighter jets have conducted multiple interceptions of U.S. and Australian Poseidons, sometimes in close and risky proximity.
In one 2023 episode, China dispatched 26 combat aircraft in response to a U.S. Navy P-8A transit through the Taiwan Strait—underscoring how sensitive Beijing is to the platform’s presence.
The aircraft’s ability to detect submerged submarines using advanced sonobuoys, radar, electronic intelligence suites, and magnetic anomaly detection systems makes it particularly threatening to China’s sea-based deterrent. Submarines are meant to operate stealthily; the Poseidon is purpose-built to unravel that stealth.
India’s use of the P-8I variant illustrates the platform’s versatility.
While its core mission is maritime patrol over the Indian Ocean, New Delhi has repeatedly deployed the aircraft for land-focused ISR missions against China.
During the 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020 Galwan Valley crisis along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Indian P-8Is reportedly provided real-time imagery and surveillance data on Chinese troop movements in the Himalayas.
Retired Indian Navy officer Captain D.K. Sharma noted that during Doklam, the aircraft live-streamed data to support decision-making. Former Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat later acknowledged the Navy’s deployment of the P-8I for surveillance during the crisis.
Following the 2019 Pulwama attack in Jammu and Kashmir, India also used the P-8I to enhance ISR coverage along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.
These examples demonstrate that the Poseidon is not merely a maritime patrol aircraft; it is a flexible, networked ISR asset capable of supporting joint operations across domains—sea, land, and potentially air.
One of the Poseidon’s most potent attributes is interoperability.
The aircraft is equipped with secure data links that enable real-time information sharing with ships, submarines, aircraft, and ground command centers. Its AN/APY-10 multi-mode radar, featuring synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and inverse SAR (ISAR) modes, allows for detailed imaging of maritime and land targets in all weather conditions.
When multiple nations operate the same platform, they can more easily integrate operations. This is particularly relevant for groupings such as the Quad (United States, India, Australia, and Japan) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Common platforms reduce training barriers, simplify logistics, and facilitate shared tactical procedures. For China—whose alliance network is comparatively limited—the emergence of a Poseidon-centered ISR web across the Indo-Pacific complicates operational planning.
A Poseidon flown by India in the Indian Ocean, by Australia in the Coral Sea, or by the United States in the South China Sea can contribute to a broader maritime domain awareness picture. Information can be fused into a larger network, giving commanders a near-real-time operational map stretching across vast distances.
Developed by Boeing Defense, Space & Security and derived from the Boeing 737-800 airliner, the P-8 platform combines commercial reliability with military capability.
It has a range of approximately 1,200 nautical miles with four hours on station and can remain airborne for up to 10 hours. This endurance enables persistent coverage over critical choke points such as the Strait of Malacca.
The aircraft can carry more than 120 sonobuoys to detect and track submarines. Its weapons load includes torpedoes and air-to-surface missiles. With the High-Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare Weapon Capability (HAAWC), the P-8A can deploy MK-54 torpedoes from altitudes as high as 30,000 feet, allowing it to engage submarines without descending into vulnerable low-altitude flight profiles.
Engineered to withstand harsh maritime environments, the Poseidon is designed for 25 years or 25,000 flight hours of service. Its open-architecture design allows for continuous upgrades to sensors, weapons, and mission systems, ensuring relevance against evolving threats.
When a country buys F-35s, headlines follow. Stealth fighters symbolize power projection and technological edge.
When a country buys Poseidons, the coverage is quieter.
Yet, in an era of integrated naval warfare, the ability to see, track, and target—across thousands of miles of ocean—may prove just as decisive as the ability to shoot.
In the Indo-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces define strategic competition, the Poseidon is emerging as a cornerstone of allied coordination and a persistent headache for China’s undersea ambitions.
As more nations field the platform and weave their surveillance networks together, the balance of maritime awareness may increasingly tilt toward a coalition of democracies.
Fighter jets may dominate the spotlight. But in the shadows—over open oceans and contested straits—the steady hum of the Poseidon could shape the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.
