China and Japan traded sharp words over Taiwan and wartime history this week, exposing once again the deep mistrust that continues to shape relations between Asia’s two largest economies.
Tokyo lodged what it described as a “stern demarche” with Beijing after China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, accused Japan of being haunted by the “ghosts of militarism” and warned that “far-right forces” were seeking to revive the country’s imperial past.
Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in Germany, Wang used unusually strong language to criticize Japan’s current political trajectory, particularly in light of comments by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Taiwan.
“Japanese people should no longer allow themselves to be manipulated or deceived by those far-right forces, or by those who seek to revive militarism,” Wang said. “All peace-loving countries should send a clear warning to Japan: if it chooses to walk back on this path, it will only be heading toward self-destruction.”
He went further, warning that if Japan did not “truly repent for its wrongdoing,” history could repeat itself. “If you go back down that old road, it will be a dead end. If you try gambling again, the loss will be faster and more devastating,” Wang said.
The remarks were delivered against the backdrop of rising tensions over Taiwan. Just weeks into her term, Takaichi said Japan would intervene militarily in the event of an attack on Taiwan — a self-ruled democratic island that Beijing claims as part of its territory and has vowed to reunify, by force if necessary.
Beijing reacted angrily to those comments, viewing them as direct interference in what it considers an internal matter. Wang’s speech in Munich was the most forceful articulation yet of China’s displeasure.
Tokyo responded swiftly. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed Wang’s claims as “factually incorrect and ungrounded” in a statement posted on social media. It emphasized that Japan’s efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities were a response to “an increasingly severe security environment” and “not directed against any specific third country.”
Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi reiterated that position in a separate session at the Munich forum and later summoned Chinese officials through diplomatic channels to lodge a formal protest.
Takaichi, Japan’s first woman prime minister, came to office in October with a reputation as a China hawk. Following her resounding electoral victory, she pledged to bolster Japan’s defenses and “steadfastly protect” its territory. Japan hosts approximately 60,000 U.S. military personnel under its security alliance with Washington, a presence that Beijing views with suspicion.
Wang also contrasted Japan’s post-war record with that of Germany, arguing that Tokyo has failed to fully reckon with its militaristic past. “Japan still enshrines Class-A war criminals in a shrine and reveres them as ‘heroic souls,’” he said, referring to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. He claimed that Japan harbors lingering ambitions regarding Taiwan and that “the ghosts of militarism are still haunting the country.”
The shrine in question, Yasukuni Shrine, honors Japan’s war dead, including 14 convicted Class A war criminals from the Second World War. Visits there by senior Japanese politicians have long angered China and South Korea, both of which suffered under Japanese occupation.
Former prime ministers such as Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe made high-profile visits to the shrine, sparking diplomatic protests from Beijing and Seoul.
Critics also point to Japanese school textbooks that allegedly downplay wartime atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and the coercion of so-called “comfort women.” Revisionist voices in Japan have gained prominence in recent years, portraying the country less as an aggressor and more as a victim — particularly of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Hiromichi Moteki, chairman of the Tokyo-based Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact, has argued that China and South Korea use history as a political weapon. “There are very few people alive today who experienced the war in any of these countries, but I do not think they will ever stop talking about it because it is an effective tool with which to bash Japan,” he said in a previous interview.
The group promotes a narrative that denies or minimizes Japan’s wartime atrocities, arguing that World War II was not a war of aggression but an act of self-defense against Western colonial powers, and that Imperial Japan “liberated” parts of Asia from European rule.
Yet the broader historical and constitutional picture is more complex than Beijing’s rhetoric suggests.
Japan’s post-war Constitution, particularly Article 9, is widely regarded as one of the most pacifist charters in the world. It explicitly renounces war as a sovereign right and states that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” Although Japan maintains Self-Defense Forces, they have long operated under strict constraints.
This pacifist framework goes further than the post-war arrangements of Germany or Italy. While Germany’s Basic Law prohibits wars of aggression, it allows for a defensive military and participation in collective security. Italy’s Constitution similarly rejects aggressive war but permits armed forces. Both countries are members of NATO and participate in collective defense under Article 5.
Japan, by contrast, is not a NATO member. It relies on its bilateral security treaty with the United States. While that alliance has been a cornerstone of regional stability, doubts have surfaced about Washington’s long-term commitment under shifting U.S. political dynamics.
Moreover, Japan adopted the “three non-nuclear principles” — not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons — rooted in its experience as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombings. Unlike Germany and Italy, which host U.S. nuclear weapons under NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, Japan has eschewed such deployments.
Even as China, North Korea, and Russia expanded and modernized their ballistic missile and nuclear arsenals — including the development of intercontinental and hypersonic systems — Japan refrained from pursuing offensive ballistic missile capabilities. Instead, it invested heavily in layered ballistic missile defense systems.
Tokyo also long resisted exporting offensive weapons, despite possessing advanced technological capabilities. Only in recent years has it begun to relax restrictions on defense exports as part of a broader shift in security policy.
Still, Japan’s strategic environment has deteriorated. China has rapidly expanded its military capabilities, increased its presence around Taiwan, and stepped up patrols near disputed islands in the East China Sea. North Korea continues to test missiles, and Russia’s war in Ukraine has heightened concerns about territorial revisionism.
Japan has territorial disputes with both China and Russia, rooted in post-war settlements and competing historical claims. These tensions contribute to a growing sense of insecurity within Japan’s political establishment.
Against this backdrop, calls to revise or reinterpret Article 9 have grown louder. Supporters argue that Japan must adapt to contemporary threats, especially in light of Taiwan’s strategic importance to Japanese security. Critics warn that such moves risk eroding the pacifist identity that has defined Japan since 1945.
Wang’s invocation of Germany as a moral contrast resonates in some quarters but overlooks key differences. Germany’s defeat in World War II resulted in the collapse of the Nazi regime and the country’s partition into East and West Germany. Italy’s fascist regime and Turkey’s Ottoman Empire similarly collapsed following their defeats.
Imperial Japan, by contrast, surrendered following atomic bombings but retained its imperial institution and much of its governmental structure under Allied supervision. The continuity of the monarchy and elements of the state apparatus meant that Japan’s post-war transformation unfolded differently from that of Germany.
This continuity may partly explain why certain symbols, including Yasukuni Shrine, remain politically potent and controversial. For many Japanese, the shrine represents remembrance of war dead; for many Chinese and Koreans, it symbolizes unrepentant militarism.
As tensions over Taiwan intensify, historical memory is once again being weaponized in contemporary geopolitics.
Beijing sees Tokyo’s increasingly explicit alignment with Taiwan and the United States as evidence of a strategic shift. Tokyo sees China’s military buildup and assertive rhetoric as justification for strengthening its defenses.
The war of words in Munich underscores how unresolved historical grievances continue to intersect with present-day security dilemmas. Whether the current flare-up remains rhetorical or escalates into deeper diplomatic strain may depend on how both sides manage the delicate balance between memory and modern security realities. The exchange highlights a stark reality: in East Asia, the past is never entirely past.
