The latest round of US-Iran diplomatic engagement took place in Geneva on Tuesday, February 17, 2026, in an unconventional format described as “indirect talks.” Lasting between three and four hours, these discussions involved US envoys and Iranian representatives communicating via Omani diplomats acting as intermediaries. No direct meetings occurred between the American and Iranian delegations. Instead, each side conveyed proposals, concerns, and responses through Omani intermediaries, underscoring both the delicacy and complexity of the current negotiation environment.
According to Iranian sources, the US delegation, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, may have tentatively agreed to a so-called “framework” deal. If this assessment is accurate, the proposed framework would depart from the Trump-Rubio “pillars” concept, a set of negotiating principles long endorsed by top US officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and, publicly, President Donald Trump. The framework reportedly focuses narrowly on Iran’s nuclear program, particularly uranium enrichment, and does not extend to issues such as ballistic missiles, regional proxy forces, or human rights concerns within Iran.
Iranian authorities claim that the Geneva discussions produced “broad agreement” on guiding principles. These principles are reportedly limited to nuclear issues, with uranium enrichment forming the centerpiece. Iranian officials have linked potential progress on this issue to the lifting of US sanctions. In essence, any deal on uranium enrichment would require the United States to remove or gradually ease sanctions, though specifics regarding a timeline or phased removal were not provided.
Crucially, Iran appears unwilling to discuss other contentious topics during these indirect talks. This includes the nation’s ballistic missile arsenal, the sponsorship of armed groups in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza, and domestic human rights issues, including the treatment of dissidents and executions. The selective focus on nuclear issues represents a significant departure from the comprehensive approach championed by the Trump-Rubio pillars framework.
If the Iranian assessment is correct, the decision now rests with President Trump. He must determine whether to authorize continued engagement based solely on uranium enrichment or insist on maintaining a broader set of negotiating objectives. Reports suggest that Witkoff and Kushner may have already signaled willingness to move forward under the narrower framework, potentially minimizing the Trump-Rubio pillars in practice. Such a step would place Witkoff in a politically delicate position, potentially facing resistance from both Rubio and Trump, depending on internal calculations and public messaging.
Secretary of State Rubio has consistently emphasized that any successful Iran deal must extend well beyond the nuclear program. He has repeatedly articulated four core pillars for negotiations:
- Nuclear program – Ensuring a permanent blockade on the development of nuclear weapons.
- Ballistic missiles – Limiting the range, payload, and capabilities of Iran’s missile forces.
- Regional proxies – Ending the sponsorship and support of armed groups across the Middle East.
- Human rights – Addressing Iran’s internal repression and treatment of its citizens.
President Trump, while less publicly explicit, has broadly endorsed a similar stance. On February 10, he reiterated the need for a “good deal” that includes no nuclear weapons and no expansion of missile or proxy capabilities, echoing the Trump-Rubio pillars in informal language. The pillars framework has remained a cornerstone of US negotiating policy with Iran, reflecting the administration’s broader strategic goals in the region.
The Geneva talks put US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner in a precarious position. According to the Iranian assessment, Witkoff may have agreed in principle to a framework that significantly reduces the scope of the Trump-Rubio pillars. Should this interpretation hold, Witkoff will face the challenge of convincing President Trump to proceed with a narrow focus on uranium enrichment.
This would not be the first instance in which Witkoff has appeared to commit to a deal only to face a reversal from the President. On January 6, 2026, during a meeting in Paris on Ukraine, Witkoff reportedly prepared to sign a European proposal that would have closed off potential negotiations with Russia. Trump, however, intervened at the last moment and instructed him not to sign, illustrating the dynamic tension between diplomatic readiness and executive decision-making in the Trump administration.
The Geneva discussions underscore the delicate balance Witkoff and Kushner must maintain. Aligning with Iranian expectations could risk friction with Secretary Rubio and, potentially, the President, while failing to engage constructively could stall negotiations entirely.
The diplomatic maneuvering is unfolding against the backdrop of a substantial US military presence in the Middle East. As of February 17, 2026, the United States has approximately 50,000 troops deployed across the region, a significant increase from the 34,000–40,000 baseline maintained over recent years. This surge was ordered by the Trump administration as leverage during the Geneva negotiations, signaling Washington’s readiness to act militarily if talks fail.
The US aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford is en route to the Arabian Sea but is not expected to arrive on station until the first week of March. Meanwhile, other naval assets have already repositioned to the region. At least eight Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, including the USS Delbert D. Black, are forward-deployed. These ships are equipped with the Aegis Baseline 9 system, capable of tracking and intercepting ballistic missiles while simultaneously countering drone swarms.
The destroyers carry Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors, which are capable of hitting ballistic missiles in space, and SM-6 missiles for over-the-horizon defense against maneuvering cruise missiles. The US also maintains a robust network of land-based missile defenses, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries in Jordan, Israel, and reportedly Saudi Arabia, as well as Patriot systems at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Ali Al-Salem in Kuwait.
Air operations in the region are extensive. Three squadrons of F-15E Strike Eagles, including the 494th Fighter Squadron from RAF Lakenheath in the UK, are operating out of Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. In addition, six F-35As have recently staged at RAF Lakenheath, with others at Morón Air Base in Spain, preparing for potential redeployment to the Middle East.
A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft, known for close air support and their durability, are active in the Gulf, recently conducting exercises with the USS Santa Barbara. F-16 squadrons provide versatile multi-role support, while “dozens” of KC-135 and KC-46 refueling tankers maintain a continuous tanker bridge, enabling 24/7 flight operations.
Surveillance and intelligence operations are equally robust. E-2D Hawkeye early-warning planes and MQ-9 Reaper drones monitor Iranian troop movements and the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Combined, these assets provide the US with unprecedented situational awareness, ensuring that military options remain on the table should diplomacy fail.
Internal Pentagon assessments reveal constraints in US missile defense stockpiles. Patriot interceptors are in short supply, with the US unable to supply them to other strategic partners—including Ukraine, Taiwan, and Korea—for the next two years. THAAD interceptors are also limited. During Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, between 150 and 250 THAAD interceptors were reportedly fired to defend Israel and regional US bases against Iranian ballistic missile volleys, representing roughly 25% of the total US inventory of THAAD interceptors. Not all remaining interceptors are operational, compounding the strain on missile defense capacity.
These limitations underscore the careful balance between diplomacy and military readiness. The US has significant forward-deployed assets but remains dependent on logistics and inventory management to maintain sustained operations. This may influence the timing and scale of any potential military action if negotiations do not progress.
The next steps in the US-Iran dialogue remain uncertain. Reports indicate that additional meetings could occur “in a few days,” contingent on feedback from Witkoff and Kushner to President Trump. The President’s decision will hinge on multiple factors.
- The credibility of the Iranian assessment regarding the “framework” deal.
- Whether Witkoff can persuade Trump that a narrow focus on uranium enrichment is a viable path forward.
- The administration’s tolerance for deviation from the Trump-Rubio pillars.
- Geopolitical considerations, including the readiness and positioning of US military assets in the Middle East.
If Trump does not approve the framework, it is likely that at least one more round of talks will occur before any military option is seriously contemplated. Analysts note that full-scale military operations are unlikely until the Gerald R. Ford carrier group is on station and additional long-range bomber assets, including B-2 and B-52 aircraft, are redeployed closer to the region. This suggests that early March could mark the earliest feasible window for military action if diplomacy collapses.
The Geneva talks, even in their indirect format, represent a pivotal moment in US-Iran relations. The narrow focus on uranium enrichment, if accurately reported, would mark a significant shift from prior US negotiating principles, potentially isolating other critical issues such as missile development, regional influence, and human rights.
Such a development could produce tension within the Trump administration. Secretary Rubio has consistently argued that a deal limited to nuclear issues would be insufficient, while Witkoff and Kushner appear to be testing the waters of a narrower engagement. The dynamic mirrors past instances in which the President has intervened to alter the course of negotiations, highlighting the high-stakes and fluid nature of US foreign policy under Trump.
Iran, for its part, has leveraged these talks to press for sanction relief, linking economic incentives directly to uranium enrichment. The approach reflects Tehran’s prioritization of economic and technological goals while resisting external pressure to address regional or domestic issues.
The military buildup serves as both deterrent and leverage. With 50,000 US troops deployed, carrier groups en route, and robust air and missile defenses in place, Washington has created a scenario in which diplomatic negotiations are underscored by credible force. This dual-track strategy—diplomacy underpinned by military readiness—is consistent with prior US approaches in the Middle East but comes at a time of constrained missile defense inventory and logistical challenges.
The Middle East continues to witness heightened geopolitical tensions. Iran’s relationships with proxy forces in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza remain a point of concern for US and regional allies. While these issues were not directly addressed in the Geneva talks, they remain key elements in the broader strategic calculus. The US military posture—including the deployment of advanced aircraft, missile defenses, and naval assets—serves as both a deterrent and a means to rapidly project power should Iranian actions threaten regional stability or US interests.
Allies in the region are closely watching US decisions. Jordan hosts forward-deployed F-15E squadrons and THAAD systems; Israel and Saudi Arabia maintain integrated missile defenses that can complement US operations; and coalition partners are preparing to coordinate if hostilities escalate. The convergence of diplomacy, sanctions policy, and military readiness is designed to maximize leverage over Tehran while keeping options open for a wide spectrum of contingencies.
The indirect US-Iran talks in Geneva represent a critical juncture in ongoing efforts to address the Iranian nuclear program. While the reported framework focuses narrowly on uranium enrichment, the path forward is contingent on President Trump’s assessment and the ability of envoys Witkoff and Kushner to navigate internal administration dynamics.
Simultaneously, the US military buildup in the Middle East underscores Washington’s readiness to act should diplomacy fail. The deployment of carrier groups, forward air squadrons, missile defense systems, and surveillance assets signals that the United States is preparing for multiple scenarios, from continued negotiation to full-scale military engagement.
The coming days and weeks will reveal whether the narrow nuclear-focused framework can serve as a foundation for broader engagement or whether the Trump administration will insist on a comprehensive approach in line with the Trump-Rubio pillars. Either path carries significant implications for regional stability, US military planning, and the prospects for US-Iran relations over the coming year.
