A senior architect of Washington’s most controversial Afghanistan policy shift is signaling a political comeback — reigniting debate over accountability, diplomacy, and America’s future posture toward Taliban-ruled Kabul.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, is reportedly seeking renewed influence under a potential second Trump administration, despite enduring criticism that the 2020 Doha Agreement he negotiated paved the way for Afghanistan’s collapse into Taliban control.
The 73-year-old American-Afghan diplomat’s re-emergence comes at a delicate moment in US policy circles, as lawmakers advance legislation aimed at cutting off US taxpayer funds from indirectly benefiting the Taliban regime. The proposed No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act — approved last month by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — would strengthen restrictions on financial flows into Afghanistan and seek to claw back funds suspected of reaching Taliban-controlled institutions.
Khalilzad’s critics trace Afghanistan’s political implosion to the February 29, 2020 Doha Agreement between the United States and the Taliban. Negotiated in Qatar without the participation of the Afghan government, the deal outlined a US troop withdrawal timeline in exchange for Taliban security assurances.
The agreement triggered a phased US withdrawal that culminated in the chaotic August 2021 evacuation from Kabul under President Joe Biden. As provincial capitals fell rapidly to Taliban forces, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces disintegrated with startling speed. President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and the Taliban declared the restoration of their Islamic Emirate.
To supporters, the Doha deal was a pragmatic recognition of battlefield realities after nearly two decades of war. To detractors, it was a unilateral concession that legitimized the Taliban, demoralized Afghan institutions, and sidelined the elected Afghan government.
Darius Nasimi, founder of the UK-based Afghanistan Government in Exile (AGiE), has been among Khalilzad’s most vocal critics.
“The attempt to rehabilitate Zalmay Khalilzad’s political standing is deeply alarming,” Nasimi said in a recent statement. “He was central to a process that dismantled the Afghan Republic, legitimised the Taliban, and stripped the Afghan people of any meaningful political voice.”
Nasimi argues that any renewed diplomatic role for Khalilzad would represent “a profound failure to reckon with responsibility.”
Khalilzad has also reportedly opposed aspects of the No Tax Dollars for Terrorists Act, alongside his former deputy Tom West, who succeeded him in 2021 as Washington’s special envoy on Afghanistan.
West, now working at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since April 2025, has been involved in internal deliberations regarding US engagement with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities. Supporters of continued diplomatic engagement argue that humanitarian coordination requires dialogue with Taliban officials to prevent economic collapse and mass starvation.
Opponents counter that engagement risks entrenching a regime that has rolled back women’s rights, suppressed media freedoms, and carried out reprisals against former security personnel.
The legislation now heading to the full Senate reflects a growing bipartisan impatience with what some lawmakers describe as “indirect normalization” of Taliban governance.
Beyond policy disputes, scrutiny has intensified over Khalilzad’s longstanding connections to Afghan telecom magnate Ehsan Bayat and the Bayat Group, whose subsidiaries include Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC) and Telecommunications Systems International (TSI).
Since at least 2009, Khalilzad has been associated with initiatives linked to the Bayat Foundation, a US-registered philanthropic arm of the Bayat Group. According to a 2024 annual report obtained by Asia Times, Alliance for the Restoration of Cultural Heritage (Arch Inc.) — a Virginia nonprofit where Khalilzad serves as director and his wife Cheryl Benard serves as president — transferred $18,000 to the Bayat Foundation.
Bayat’s companies have operated in Afghanistan since the 1990s and reportedly maintained commercial arrangements with the Taliban during their first period in power. In 1998, Bayat entered into a joint venture with the Taliban government to establish wireless infrastructure — an arrangement later ratified by Afghanistan’s interim authorities after 2001.
Critics argue that these ties raise ethical questions about potential conflicts of interest, particularly as AWCC has continued operating under Taliban rule.
Ariana News, another Bayat subsidiary, has faced accusations from media watchdogs of moderating coverage critical of the Taliban and removing archival material perceived as politically sensitive — allegations the company has not publicly confirmed.
Khalilzad’s record of advocating engagement with the Taliban dates back decades.
In a 1996 Washington Post op-ed, he argued that the Taliban did not practice “anti-US-style fundamentalism” akin to Iran’s theocratic model. His comments came months after Osama bin Laden had relocated to Afghanistan under Taliban protection.
“We should … be willing to offer recognition and humanitarian assistance,” Khalilzad wrote at the time, urging Washington to re-engage.
In 1997, while advising oil company Unocal, he participated in hosting Taliban representatives in Texas for discussions related to a proposed trans-Afghan pipeline project.
Despite those early views, Khalilzad later served as US ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations under President George W. Bush. He returned to prominence in 2018 when President Donald Trump appointed him to negotiate directly with the Taliban.
One of the most contentious elements of the Doha negotiations was the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners. Many of those freed later rejoined the insurgency during the Taliban’s final offensive in 2021.
Khalilzad also pressed for the release of convicted narcotics trafficker Haji Bashir Noorzai, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 2008 in the Southern District of New York for heroin trafficking.
Noorzai was arrested in 2005 during a US sting operation and accused of smuggling tens of millions of dollars’ worth of heroin into the United States. Federal prosecutors and the Drug Enforcement Administration had successfully opposed his release during earlier legal proceedings.
In September 2022, however, Noorzai was freed as part of a prisoner exchange that secured the release of an American detainee held by the Taliban.
Since returning to Afghanistan, Noorzai has reportedly become an influential economic intermediary within Taliban circles, facilitating foreign investment — particularly Chinese interest in Afghanistan’s mineral and energy sectors, including projects in the Amu Darya basin.
He is widely regarded as a close ally of the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada.
Khalilzad formally stepped down as special envoy in October 2021. Yet his involvement in Afghan affairs has not ceased.
According to regional diplomatic sources, he has visited Afghanistan multiple times since 2023, receiving public welcomes from senior Taliban officials. In March 2025, he was reportedly present during unofficial US-Taliban discussions concerning hostage negotiations.
The State Department has repeatedly clarified that Khalilzad holds no formal government position. In 2023 and again in 2025, officials emphasized that he does not speak on behalf of the administration.
Nevertheless, his presence at sensitive diplomatic encounters has fueled speculation that he may serve as an informal backchannel should a new Trump administration prioritize renewed engagement.
Within the Afghan diaspora, Khalilzad’s legacy remains sharply divisive.
Some argue that the Doha process, while flawed, was the only realistic path toward ending America’s longest war. They note that US public opinion had shifted decisively against prolonged military involvement and that Afghan political fragmentation limited viable alternatives.
Others contend that the exclusion of the Afghan government from negotiations fatally undermined the Republic’s legitimacy. They accuse Khalilzad of conceding too much too quickly and of misjudging the Taliban’s intentions.
Calls from activist groups for international legal action against Khalilzad and former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reflect deep frustration but face significant legal and political hurdles.
As US policymakers debate the future of engagement with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Khalilzad’s potential return underscores broader strategic tensions.
Humanitarian agencies warn that isolating Afghanistan financially could worsen economic collapse and exacerbate mass poverty. Security analysts caution that disengagement risks ceding influence to China, Russia, and regional actors eager to expand their footprint.
Conversely, human rights advocates argue that sustained pressure — including financial restrictions — remains the only leverage capable of forcing concessions on women’s education, political inclusion, and counterterrorism assurances.
For now, Khalilzad’s ambitions remain unofficial. But his reappearance in diplomatic corridors signals that Afghanistan policy — long overshadowed by crises in Ukraine and the Middle East — is re-emerging as a fault line in US political debate.
Whether he can rebuild credibility in Washington, or among Afghans who view Doha as capitulation, will depend not only on partisan dynamics but on the unresolved question that has haunted US strategy since 2001: how to balance realism with accountability in dealing with insurgent power turned governing authority.
As the Senate prepares to vote on legislation targeting Taliban financing, and as Washington contemplates its long-term posture in South and Central Asia, the figure of Zalmay Khalilzad once again stands at the center of a deeply polarizing chapter in America’s foreign policy history.
