In war planning rooms across the Pentagon, a quiet revolution is underway. Faced with a rapidly modernizing People’s Liberation Army and an increasingly contested Western Pacific battlespace, US strategists are rethinking how airpower, ground fires and maritime maneuver can survive — and prevail — inside China’s expanding missile envelope.
At the center of that rethink is a proposal to merge US Air Force operations with the US Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept and the US Army’s multi-domain fires architecture. The idea is deceptively simple: distribute combat power across dozens of austere locations, use mobile missile systems and runway-independent insertion, relocate constantly, and strike in coordinated pulses that overwhelm Chinese targeting cycles before dispersing again.
It is an attempt to get “inside” China’s kill chain — the sequence of detection, targeting, decision and strike — and to sustain combat power in a region where fixed bases and large concentrations of aircraft have become dangerously vulnerable.
But dispersion, critics warn, is not a free lunch.
For decades, US airpower in the Western Pacific relied on a small number of major bases: Kadena in Okinawa, Andersen in Guam, Osan and Kunsan in South Korea. These installations were efficient hubs for sortie generation and logistics. They were also highly visible, precisely mapped and well within range of China’s growing arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.
China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture — anchored by systems such as the DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship and intermediate-range ballistic missiles — is designed to hold US bases, carriers and forward concentrations at risk. In any Taiwan contingency or broader regional crisis, US planners expect these facilities to be targeted early and heavily.
The US Air Force’s response has been Agile Combat Employment (ACE), a concept that emphasizes dispersal of aircraft to multiple smaller airfields, rapid movement between locations, lean teams and flexible logistics. Rather than generating dozens of sorties from a single large base, ACE envisions smaller detachments operating from highways, island strips and partner-nation facilities.
The Marine Corps’ EABO concept parallels this shift. Under EABO, small Marine units deploy to temporary “stand-in” bases across island chains, employing anti-ship missiles, sensors and air-defense systems to complicate enemy movement. The US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs), meanwhile, field long-range precision fires and integrated air and missile defense to influence the battlespace across land, sea, air, space and cyber domains.
The proposal gaining traction inside US defense circles seeks to fuse these efforts into a unified operational architecture: Air Force aircraft dispersed across ACE sites; Marines establishing expeditionary advanced bases with anti-ship missiles and sensing nodes; Army units providing long-range fires and air defense; all networked into a resilient command-and-control web capable of pulsed strikes and rapid repositioning.
The goal is not merely to survive initial missile barrages but to sustain combat power deep into a conflict — to deny China the quick, decisive knockout blow it might seek.
Some analysts describe this redesign as a layered “Edge–Pulsed–Core” force structure.
The “Edge” consists of dispersed forward elements: Marines on island chains, Air Force fighters on austere strips, Army missile batteries tucked into jungle clearings. These units provide sensing, localized fires and immediate response capability. They are intentionally small, mobile and difficult to target.
The “Pulsed” component refers to periodic surges of concentrated firepower — bomber raids, coordinated missile salvos, cyber and electronic attacks — launched from more secure rear areas or from stealth platforms penetrating contested airspace. These pulses aim to disrupt Chinese operational tempo, destroy high-value assets and reset the battlespace.
The “Core” comprises larger, more survivable hubs beyond the densest missile threat rings: hardened facilities in places such as Hawaii and Alaska, rotational bomber forces in Australia, and potentially expanded infrastructure in Guam and Japan. The core sustains logistics, maintenance, munitions storage and command functions that cannot easily be duplicated at the edge.
Advocates argue that such a layered force trades fragile forward mass for survivable dispersion. Instead of concentrating aircraft wingtip-to-wingtip at Kadena, the Air Force might operate in clusters of four or six jets across a dozen locations. Instead of relying solely on carrier strike groups to project power, the US could employ land-based anti-ship missiles from dispersed island positions.
The architecture aims to present China with a targeting nightmare: too many nodes to strike simultaneously, too much mobility to track reliably, too many overlapping fires to suppress easily.
Yet significant doubts remain about whether dispersion can outpace technological realities.
In a September 2025 article for Wild Blue Yonder, analyst Amanda Molina warned that Agile Combat Employment lacks sufficient organic air and missile defense to protect widely dispersed forces. Spreading aircraft and personnel across numerous sites may reduce the payoff of any single strike, but it also multiplies the number of locations requiring protection.
Traditional air defense systems — Patriot batteries, THAAD interceptors — are expensive and limited in number. Deploying them to every austere airstrip is neither feasible nor affordable. Smaller systems, such as NASAMS or short-range interceptors, offer some protection but may be overwhelmed by massed missile salvos.
China’s missile forces are not static. The PLA Rocket Force fields a mix of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of saturating defenses. If dispersed sites lack robust protection, they may still be vulnerable — particularly if Chinese intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems can rapidly identify their locations.
Molina’s critique highlights a central tension: dispersion reduces the attractiveness of targets but increases the demand for defensive coverage. Without sufficient air and missile defense, ACE sites could become isolated and exposed.
Michael Blaser, writing in a July 2024 issue of Proceedings, questioned another assumption underpinning ACE: that US sortie generation can outpace China’s kill chain.
The concept presumes that by moving aircraft frequently and generating sorties rapidly, US forces can strike Chinese assets before being struck themselves. But Blaser argues that advances in artificial intelligence could compress China’s targeting cycle to less than 24 hours — perhaps far less.
AI-enhanced data fusion from satellites, drones and maritime sensors could enable faster detection and targeting of dispersed forces. Automated decision-support systems might accelerate strike authorization. Long-range fires could then be synchronized in coordinated salvos.
If China’s kill chain operates at machine speed, the window for safe dispersal and relocation narrows dramatically. Units may find themselves perpetually reacting rather than shaping the fight.
Blaser contends that ACE, as currently envisioned, risks being premised on a race the US may not win — particularly if Chinese long-range fires remain synchronized and resilient.
Zachary Hughes, in an October 2024 article for Joint Force Quarterly, adds another layer of complexity: efficiency.
Modern high-tech aircraft and missile systems require specialized maintenance tools, software diagnostics and trained technicians. Dispersing small detachments across multiple sites means either accepting higher risks of equipment failure or duplicating support equipment at each location.
Duplicating that equipment is costly and logistically burdensome. Transporting it between sites consumes precious airlift and sealift capacity. And in a contested environment, supply lines themselves are at risk.
Hughes argues that dispersion can erode efficiency. Aircraft grounded for lack of spare parts or specialized tools undermine the very sortie generation ACE seeks to preserve. Units may be forced to choose between mobility and sustainability.
This logistical dilemma is not theoretical. Even in peacetime exercises across the Pacific, moving maintenance packages and munitions between islands has proven challenging. In wartime, under missile threat and cyber disruption, those challenges would intensify.
Beyond operational debates lies a political reality: dispersed operations require access.
Operating from highways in Japan, from small airstrips in the Philippines, or from temporary sites in Micronesia depends on host-nation consent. Political sensitivities, domestic opposition and diplomatic calculations shape what is possible.
The United States has made strides in expanding access agreements — including enhanced defense cooperation arrangements with the Philippines and rotational deployments to northern Australia. But access is not uniform, and wartime permissions may differ from peacetime agreements.
Some partners may hesitate to allow offensive operations from their territory for fear of retaliation. Others may impose restrictions on the types of weapons or missions conducted. Even the perception of escalation can complicate basing negotiations.
Without a robust and politically sustainable network of locations, dispersion risks becoming theoretical. The Edge–Pulsed–Core model depends on a web of allied and partner facilities stretching across the first and second island chains.
If forward dispersion is the edge, long-range bombers form a crucial part of the pulse and core.
Bombers operating from more secure bases — including the continental United States — can deliver standoff munitions without relying on vulnerable forward airfields. The B-2, B-1 and B-52 fleets, soon to be joined by the B-21 Raider, provide deep-strike capability that complements dispersed fighters and ground-based missiles.
However, bomber capacity is finite. The US inventory is smaller than during the Cold War, and maintenance demands are high. Scaling bomber operations to sustain repeated pulses in a high-intensity conflict would require sufficient munitions stockpiles, tanker support and hardened basing.
Expanding infrastructure in Guam and investing in hardened shelters, runway repair and missile defenses are part of that effort. Yet these measures take time and funding, and they remain vulnerable to concentrated missile attack.
Proponents of the Edge–Pulsed–Core approach argue that the alternative — clinging to concentrated forward mass — is untenable in the face of China’s missile arsenal.
They contend that dispersion, combined with layered air defenses, resilient communications and long-range strike, offers the best path to deterrence. By demonstrating the ability to absorb initial strikes and continue fighting, the US signals that a quick victory is unlikely.
To make that signal credible, several gaps must be closed.
First, air and missile defense must be scaled and diversified. Mobile, affordable interceptors; directed-energy systems; and improved sensor integration could provide distributed protection without requiring a Patriot battery at every strip.
Second, the kill chain must be hardened and accelerated. Resilient satellite constellations, mesh networks and AI-assisted decision tools are essential to maintain command and control under attack.
Third, logistics must be reimagined. Prepositioned stocks, autonomous resupply platforms and modular maintenance packages could reduce vulnerability. Exercises must stress-test these systems under realistic conditions.
Fourth, munitions production must expand. Pulsed strikes depend on ample inventories of precision weapons. Industrial capacity, often overlooked in peacetime, becomes decisive in protracted conflict.
Finally, political groundwork with allies must be deepened. Transparent dialogue, shared threat assessments and equitable burden-sharing can strengthen the basing network required for dispersion.
At its core, the debate over dispersion versus concentration is about deterrence credibility.
China’s military modernization aims to shift the regional balance, to make US intervention in a Taiwan contingency costly and uncertain. If US forces appear vulnerable and easily suppressed, deterrence weakens.
A layered Edge–Pulsed–Core force seeks to restore balance by denying China the prospect of rapid success. It signals that even after absorbing missile strikes, US forces can relocate, reconstitute and strike back.
Yet dispersion alone does not guarantee survivability. Without adequate defenses, logistics and political access, it may simply spread vulnerability.
The emerging consensus among many defense analysts is pragmatic: the US Air Force and joint force must redesign around survivable dispersion and deep-strike pulses, but with sober recognition of the trade-offs.
Concentration invites catastrophic loss. Dispersion invites complexity and cost.
The strategic question is whether the United States can integrate air, land and maritime fires into a coherent architecture faster than China can compress its kill chain; whether it can build and sustain the infrastructure and alliances required; and whether it can adapt its industrial base to the demands of high-end conflict.
The Western Pacific is no longer a sanctuary for large, static bases. It is a dynamic, contested theater where mobility, resilience and integration define success.
