China is rapidly expanding its reach across the Indo-Pacific, deploying a shadow fleet of nominally civilian fishing vessels as a covert extension of the People’s Liberation Army Navy — the world’s largest naval force by hull count.
By weaponizing hundreds of thousands of fishing boats alongside the People’s Liberation Army Navy and the China Coast Guard, Beijing has developed a gray zone militia strategy that threatens to complicate — and potentially blockade — American and allied naval forces should a Taiwan contingency or conflict in the South China Sea erupt.
Both the PLAN and the China Coast Guard have conducted sustained gray zone operations around disputed islands and territorial waters claimed by Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. At the cutting edge of this campaign is a vast maritime militia embedded within China’s fishing industry, serving as the operational tip of a hybrid warfare doctrine designed to encroach on neighboring territory while evading direct military confrontation.
A central pillar of this strategy is the so-called “iron triangle” around the Philippines — a coordinated operating structure in which fishing vessels, coast guard ships and naval forces operate in layered formation.
In disputed waters, maritime militia vessels typically appear first, clustering around reefs, shoals or contested islets. If challenged, they are reinforced by the China Coast Guard. Over the horizon, PLAN warships remain on standby, providing overwatch and deterrence. The result is a seamless blending of civilian and military presence that blurs legal thresholds and strategic intent.
Given the degree of coordination between these nominally civilian vessels and the People’s Liberation Army Navy, Western governments argue there are solid grounds to designate the fishing militia as a de facto extension of China’s naval forces.
Rather than deploying gray-hulled warships directly to form barriers or simulate blockades — moves that would risk immediate diplomatic and military escalation — Beijing relies on fishing vessels as operational cover. The United States Naval Institute has estimated that China commands some 200,000 fishing vessels that could be mobilized for state-directed missions.
While not all are militia units, even a fraction constitutes a formidable maritime swarm capable of overwhelming regional coast guards and disrupting naval maneuver space.
According to a January 2026 report by the United States Congress, Washington has documented evidence that Beijing’s fishing fleet is used systematically to expand Chinese influence, monopolize sea lanes and pressure Indo-Pacific nations toward economic dependency.
The report notes that China’s military command structure — the People’s Liberation Army — and the ruling Chinese Communist Party under President Xi Jinping maintain oversight of maritime militia activities. Fishing vessels are equipped with satellite communications, reinforced hulls and, in some cases, intelligence-gathering systems. Crews often include party members trained in paramilitary coordination.
The shadow fleet is typically activated in disputed waters during periods of heightened tension — near Japan’s southwestern islands or in the vicinity of Philippine-claimed features in the South China Sea — and then withdrawn before allied diplomatic responses can fully coalesce.
This surge-and-retreat pattern complicates collective action and allows Beijing to test thresholds without triggering formal defense treaties.
More than US$5 trillion in global trade transits the Asia-Pacific annually. The sea lanes threading through the East and South China Seas are critical arteries for energy shipments, semiconductor supply chains and manufactured goods.
Any sustained disruption would ripple across the economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States — not to mention Southeast Asia.
By embedding militia vessels among civilian traffic, China effectively obscures the boundary between commerce and coercion. PLAN and coast guard deployments can be masked by flotillas of fishing boats, creating legal and operational ambiguity that slows foreign military responses.
Analysts have drawn parallels to Russia’s use of “little green men” during its 2014 seizure of Crimea. In a maritime context, China’s fishing militia has been dubbed “little blue men” — irregular actors capable of establishing presence and facts on the water while preserving plausible deniability.
Flashpoints such as Japan’s Ryukyu island chain and Philippine-claimed islets could serve as testing grounds for such tactics in a crisis.
The scale of recent maneuvers underscores the seriousness of the threat.
On December 25, 2025, more than 2,000 Chinese fishing vessels reportedly deployed to the East China Sea, assembling in a reverse L-shaped formation resembling a mock blockade. Two weeks later, on January 14, 2026, another 1,400 vessels conducted a similar maneuver in the same waters.
While no shots were fired and no formal exclusion zone declared, the message was unmistakable: Beijing can marshal vast numbers of hulls on short notice, shaping the maritime environment through sheer density.
The context is particularly sensitive in Japan, where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has sharpened Tokyo’s stance on Taiwan. Ending decades of strategic ambiguity, Takaichi has publicly stated that Japan would defend Taipei in the event of Chinese aggression.
Her remarks triggered a sharp diplomatic rupture with Beijing. In response, the Chinese Communist Party has reportedly combined economic pressure — including restrictions affecting tourism and labor flows — with information campaigns targeting the Takaichi administration.
Fishing vessel deployments near Japan’s southwestern waters have emerged as an additional tool of intimidation.
China’s use of nominally civilian fishing vessels serves not only as coercion but also as a legal shield.
Under the International Maritime Organization framework known as the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), naval vessels are generally obligated to avoid interfering with boats actively engaged in fishing.
This provides Beijing maneuver space. Should a U.S. or allied warship attempt to disperse a dense fishing formation, China could accuse it of violating international maritime safety rules — a tactic analysts describe as “lawfare.”
In a scenario where Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines directly engages maritime militia vessels, Beijing could invoke COLREGs in international legal forums while retaliating economically.
China’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the world’s second-largest economy enhances its ability to deflect condemnation and impose countermeasures.
At the same time, Beijing selectively references the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea when advantageous, even as it rejects arbitration rulings that contradict its expansive territorial claims.
As China’s maritime strategy grows more sophisticated, the United States and regional allies face the challenge of countering gray zone tactics without triggering open conflict.
One avenue is enhanced diplomatic coordination on fishing rights, maritime domain awareness and legal enforcement under UNCLOS. Clear, unified messaging can reduce Beijing’s ability to exploit divisions among Indo-Pacific states.
Intelligence sharing is another priority. Identifying the ports and bases where maritime militia units stage operations — as well as mapping command structures linked to the People’s Liberation Army — could enable targeted sanctions against commanders and associated enterprises.
Strengthening regional coast guards offers a more calibrated response. Unlike navies, coast guards operate in the law enforcement domain, making them better suited to counter civilian-flagged vessels.
Joint patrols have already expanded, with Japan coordinating more closely with European partners such as France and the United Kingdom. Increased multinational presence complicates China’s surge tactics and raises the diplomatic cost of harassment.
A graduated warning system could also be established. In a wartime scenario — whether a Taiwan contingency or a South China Sea armed clash — Beijing could be formally notified that fishing vessels operating in coordination with the PLAN will be treated as auxiliary naval units after repeated warnings.
By issuing clear dispersal notices and documenting compliance or refusal, allied forces could undermine China’s reliance on legal ambiguity.
China’s maritime militia strategy is calculated and patient. It leverages economic scale, legal gray zones and numerical superiority to shift the balance incrementally.
Yet the approach carries inherent risks.
The more overt and coordinated the militia’s activities become, the harder it is for Beijing to sustain plausible deniability. Large-scale mock blockades and synchronized deployments with coast guard and naval forces erode the distinction between civilian and military actors.
If a collision or miscalculation were to occur — a coast guard cutter ramming a militia vessel, or a fishing boat blocking a carrier strike group — escalation could unfold rapidly.
For Beijing, the gray zone offers a pathway to reshape maritime norms without firing a shot. For Washington and its allies, the challenge is to respond proportionally, maintaining deterrence while avoiding entrapment in China’s preferred domain of ambiguity.
As tensions sharpen around Taiwan and contested islands across the East and South China Seas, the shadow fleet stands as both symbol and instrument of China’s maritime ambitions.
Whether the “little blue men” remain a tool of coercive signaling or become the opening move in a broader confrontation may depend less on the number of hulls in the water — and more on the clarity of allied resolve to confront them.
