The growing vulnerability of hardened underground facilities to modern precision weapons is forcing a reassessment of how nations protect their most sensitive infrastructure. After recent United States bunker-buster strikes exposed weaknesses in deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran, analysts say China is accelerating efforts to move critical energy, military and industrial assets deeper beneath the earth’s surface.
Chinese energy and defense planners are increasingly advocating for a vast network of subterranean infrastructure across the country’s interior. The proposal, discussed in February in the Bulletin of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, outlines a strategy for embedding key facilities far underground in western China to shield them from surveillance, missile strikes and potential wartime disruption.
According to reporting by the South China Morning Post, Chinese researchers argue that strategic reserves of oil, gas, rare metals and other critical resources should be stored in underground complexes connected by a layered logistics network stretching across the country’s western regions.
The concept represents a major evolution in China’s long-standing strategy of using geography, depth and dispersion to preserve national power in wartime.
One of the leading voices behind the proposal is Zhang Shishu, chief technical expert at the state-owned engineering giant Power Construction Corporation of China, often known as PowerChina.
Zhang and his colleagues argue that key infrastructure — particularly hydropower installations in southwestern China and oil and gas fields in the northwest — should be integrated into a subterranean system capable of storing energy resources while also functioning as hardened logistics nodes.
Their proposal envisions a multi-tiered structure of underground facilities: large central storage complexes linked to smaller regional depots and forward logistics sites near sensitive border areas.
Such a network would stretch through frontier regions including Tibet and Xinjiang, forming what researchers describe as an “underground strategic corridor and covert support system.” The goal would be to reinforce China’s border defense posture while also protecting critical national resources from attack or disruption.
Supporters say the network could strengthen China’s wartime resilience by ensuring the uninterrupted supply of fuel, rare metals and other essential materials even under conditions of intense military pressure.
The idea also reflects a broader shift in Chinese strategic planning — the relocation of vital infrastructure away from densely populated coastal areas that could be vulnerable in a conflict involving naval blockades or long-range strikes.
China’s eastern seaboard, home to megacities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, has long served as the country’s economic engine. But these areas also sit within reach of advanced missile and air strike capabilities possessed by the United States and its regional allies.
As a result, Chinese planners have increasingly emphasized the development of inland “strategic hinterlands” that could sustain national power if coastal infrastructure were damaged or blockaded.
Research from the China Aerospace Studies Institute describes this concept as central to China’s evolving defense planning.
Analyst Xiaoke Qi notes that several inland regions are viewed as ideal rear areas capable of supporting national defense during wartime.
Among them is Sichuan province, whose mountainous geography surrounds the fertile Sichuan Basin. The natural enclosure created by these mountains can complicate surveillance, missile targeting and aerial attack, providing a degree of passive protection.
Similarly, Tibet’s high altitude and rugged terrain present formidable obstacles for large-scale military operations, while the immense size of Xinjiang provides strategic depth far from China’s densely populated eastern coast.
In this framework, these western territories are not merely remote frontier regions but essential strategic buffers capable of sustaining China’s war economy and command structure.
The renewed emphasis on underground infrastructure has been reinforced by developments in modern precision warfare.
In particular, the United States’ recent strike on Iranian nuclear facilities during Operation Midnight Hammer drew significant attention among Chinese military analysts.
The operation demonstrated Washington’s ability to conduct long-range precision attacks against hardened underground targets using advanced bunker-busting weapons.
According to a report by John Van Oudenaren of the China Aerospace Studies Institute, Chinese commentators expressed concern about the implications of such strikes.
The operation highlighted how improvements in intelligence, surveillance, satellite targeting and long-range munitions could threaten facilities that once seemed nearly invulnerable beneath layers of rock and reinforced concrete.
For countries that rely heavily on underground complexes to safeguard critical assets, the episode served as a reminder that technological advances are steadily eroding the protective advantages of depth alone.
China’s underground strategy extends beyond resource storage and logistics networks.
Over the past decade, analysts have identified a growing number of subterranean military facilities designed to maintain command and control during major conflict.
One of the most prominent is the massive underground command complex sometimes referred to as “Beijing Military City.”
According to research by Cindy Hurst of the US Foreign Military Studies Office, the facility is being built southwest of Beijing and could become one of the largest underground military command centers in the world.
Spanning roughly six square kilometers — an area far larger than the Pentagon in Washington — the complex is believed to house hardened command bunkers capable of protecting China’s top leadership.
The facility is expected to serve the wartime needs of the Central Military Commission, the body that oversees China’s armed forces, as well as senior government officials including President Xi Jinping.
If completed as envisioned, the complex would replace older command facilities in the Western Hills outside Beijing while providing stronger protection against modern bunker-buster weapons and possibly even nuclear attack.
China’s subterranean strategy also extends to the storage and deployment of nuclear weapons.
Research by nuclear analysts including Hans Kristensen has identified a central underground warhead storage complex hidden in the Qinling Mountains in Shaanxi province.
The site is believed to be operated by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, specifically Base 67, which oversees the storage and maintenance of China’s nuclear warheads.
In addition to this central facility, smaller regional storage locations are thought to exist near operational missile brigades throughout the country.
Satellite imagery and open-source research have also revealed several large intercontinental ballistic missile deployment zones.
Among the most prominent are silo fields near Yumen in Gansu province, Hami in Xinjiang and Yulin near Ordos in Inner Mongolia.
These complexes contain large numbers of missile silos believed to house modern intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking targets thousands of kilometers away.
Meanwhile, China’s primary nuclear testing site at Lop Nur continues to show signs of new tunnels and underground facilities.
Together, these installations form a dispersed and heavily fortified network designed to ensure the survivability of China’s nuclear arsenal.
The effectiveness of underground facilities depends largely on their depth and structural design.
Research by strategic analyst James Acton suggests that some Chinese command bunkers may be buried as deep as 700 meters below ground.
At such depths, even specialized nuclear earth-penetrating weapons would struggle to destroy them outright.
Missile silos, however, are typically much shallower.
According to estimates by analyst Jason Faust, silos designed to house China’s modern intercontinental ballistic missiles may be roughly 25 meters deep.
That depth is sufficient to protect missiles from many conventional weapons, but it may not be enough to withstand the most powerful bunker-busting bombs.
One example is the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a U.S. weapon designed specifically to destroy hardened underground targets.
The bomb can reportedly penetrate more than 60 meters of earth or reinforced concrete before detonating — potentially enough to destroy shallow missile silos.
Technological advances are further narrowing the protective margin provided by underground facilities.
Research by analyst Ryan Snyder published in the journal Science and Global Security suggests that modern precision conventional weapons could be capable of destroying hardened missile silos with high reliability.
Weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile can be guided with extraordinary accuracy, allowing them to strike small targets from long distances.
Modeling indicates that these weapons might achieve single-shot kill probabilities exceeding 90 percent against certain types of silos under favorable conditions.
Such performance approaches the destructive reliability once associated only with nuclear counterforce strikes.
If conventional weapons can destroy hardened silos with similar effectiveness, they could potentially replace nuclear weapons in certain strategic missions — fundamentally changing the dynamics of nuclear deterrence.
These technological trends may also influence China’s nuclear doctrine.
For decades, China has maintained a policy known as No-First-Use policy, pledging that it would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict.
Under this doctrine, China’s nuclear forces are intended primarily as a retaliatory deterrent.
But increasing vulnerability of fixed missile silos could create pressure for a more rapid response posture.
One possibility discussed by analysts is a shift toward launch-on-warning, a strategy in which missiles are launched immediately after an incoming nuclear attack is detected but before enemy warheads reach their targets.
Although technically compatible with No-First-Use — since the response still occurs after detection of an attack — such a posture significantly reduces decision time for political leaders.
It also increases the risks associated with false alarms or misinterpreted early-warning signals.
To function effectively, a launch-on-warning system may require pre-delegation of launch authority or highly automated command processes, both of which could weaken the political restraint embedded in China’s current doctrine.
While the strategic logic behind deeper underground infrastructure is compelling, the engineering challenges are formidable.
Chinese researchers note that advances in ultra-deep drilling and geological monitoring now make projects reaching depths of 3,000 meters technically feasible.
However, the geology of western China is complex, with seismic fault lines, fragile ecosystems and difficult terrain.
Environmental concerns also pose obstacles, particularly in ecologically sensitive areas such as the Tibetan Plateau.
In addition, China’s legal and regulatory frameworks governing underground space remain fragmented, complicating the approval and coordination of massive multi-province infrastructure projects.
Despite these challenges, the momentum behind underground development appears to be growing.
Throughout history, military planners have sought refuge underground to escape the destructive power of new weapons.
From Cold War missile silos and command bunkers to vast tunnel networks built by guerrilla forces, subterranean infrastructure has long been a tool for survival in high-intensity conflict.
Today, however, the stakes are far higher.
As precision-guided weapons become increasingly accurate and powerful, even hardened facilities buried beneath rock and concrete may no longer be secure.
China’s emerging underground infrastructure strategy reflects both an adaptation to these technological realities and an attempt to preserve strategic resilience in an uncertain geopolitical environment.
By dispersing and burying critical assets across its vast interior, China hopes to ensure that its energy supplies, military command structure and nuclear deterrent can survive even the most sophisticated attacks..
