For decades, the United States military built its battlefield dominance around a simple assumption: superior technology could overwhelm any adversary quickly and decisively. Precision-guided bombs, stealth aircraft, advanced drones, and missile defense systems became the centerpiece of American warfare after the Cold War. This doctrine worked remarkably well in short campaigns against weaker opponents such as Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, and insurgent groups across the Middle East.
However, the wars in Ukraine and Iran have exposed a brutal reality of modern combat: expensive high-tech systems alone are insufficient for sustaining prolonged, high-intensity wars against near-peer adversaries. The battlefield is increasingly dominated by attrition, industrial capacity, and the ability to mass-produce weapons cheaply and quickly.
The old Soviet maxim often attributed to Joseph Stalin — “Quantity has a quality all its own” — is proving relevant once again.
The Pentagon now appears to be fundamentally rethinking its military procurement philosophy. Recent announcements from the Department of War (DoW) reveal an aggressive shift toward low-cost, scalable stand-off strike weapons and attritable drones that are affordable enough to lose in large numbers.
This change is not cosmetic. It reflects a growing recognition that future wars against powers such as Russia or China would likely become prolonged industrial struggles where production capacity matters as much as technological sophistication.
The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated how rapidly modern warfare consumes weapons stockpiles. Artillery shells, drones, missiles, and air-defense interceptors are being expended at rates unseen since World War II. Both Russia and Ukraine have relied heavily on cheap unmanned systems and mass fires to wear down the other side.
Iranian-designed Shahed drones have become one of the clearest examples of this new battlefield economy. These drones are relatively primitive compared to advanced Western systems, but they are inexpensive, easy to manufacture, and available in large numbers.
That creates a dangerous cost imbalance for defenders.
A Patriot missile interceptor costs roughly US$4 million per shot, yet it is often used to destroy Shahed drones costing between US$20,000 and US$35,000. While the Patriot system remains highly effective, using such expensive interceptors against swarms of cheap drones creates a mathematically unsustainable model in a long war.
An adversary capable of mass-producing low-cost drones can drain advanced missile inventories far faster than the United States and its allies can replenish them.
The same lessons emerged during the Iran conflict. Expensive American systems, especially high-end drones and precision munitions, proved vulnerable to increasingly capable air defenses and electronic warfare.
The Pentagon has now accepted that future combat environments will involve heavy operational losses. Instead of attempting to preserve every asset, the new philosophy emphasizes producing systems cheap enough to sacrifice when necessary.
In one of the clearest signs of this doctrinal transformation, the Pentagon recently unveiled plans to procure more than 10,000 low-cost cruise missiles over the next three years.
The Department of War announced framework agreements with Anduril, CoAspire, Leidos, and Zone 5 Technologies under the Low-Cost Containerized Missiles (LCCM) program. Simultaneously, Castelion received support for scaling production of the Blackbeard hypersonic missile.
According to the Pentagon, the agreements are designed to create “rapid and repeatable production of high-volume, lethal strike capabilities.”
Unlike traditional procurement programs that often require years of development and testing before production begins, these new agreements are modeled on commercial manufacturing principles. The focus is on speed, scalability, affordability, and continuous production.
The Pentagon specifically emphasized “future firm-fixed-price production contracts,” a clear attempt to control spiraling procurement costs that have long plagued major American weapons programs.
The goal is ambitious: procure over 10,000 low-cost cruise missiles in just three years beginning in 2027.
One of the most significant aspects of the Pentagon’s strategy is its reliance on newer defense technology companies instead of the traditional defense giants.
For decades, major weapons procurement in the United States was dominated by the so-called “Big Five” contractors: Lockheed Martin, RTX (formerly Raytheon), Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics.
While these firms remain central to American military power, many of their systems are extremely expensive, technologically complex, and slow to manufacture.
The Pentagon now appears eager to diversify its industrial base by working with commercial innovators capable of moving faster and building cheaper systems.
Anduril, one of the most prominent new defense firms, has already announced a production agreement to deliver 3,000 Surface-Launched Barracuda-500M missiles. The company said it would produce at least 1,000 rounds annually for three years, with deliveries beginning in the first half of 2027.
Leidos also confirmed plans to produce 3,000 Low-Cost Containerized Munitions using technology derived from its AGM-190A Small Cruise Missile, known as Black Arrow.
The company stated that its new missile would feature modular architecture and open-system design principles that allow rapid upgrades and easier integration with different launch platforms.
Zone 5 Technologies, another participant in the LCCM initiative, highlighted affordability and scalability as central objectives of the program.
Meanwhile, Castelion is developing the Blackbeard hypersonic missile, with the Pentagon seeking authorization to eventually purchase more than 12,000 missiles over five years.
This emphasis on industrial scalability marks a major departure from earlier procurement philosophies focused almost exclusively on technological superiority.
Most existing American long-range strike systems are highly advanced but expensive and difficult to manufacture at scale.
Weapons such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Tomahawk cruise missile, and Patriot interceptors remain formidable capabilities, but they require lengthy production timelines and substantial financial investment.
In a major war against China or Russia, stockpiles of these exquisite systems could be exhausted quickly.
The Pentagon now appears increasingly concerned with “kinetic mass” — the ability to launch overwhelming numbers of missiles and drones continuously over long periods.
This reflects a broader understanding that industrial endurance may determine the outcome of future wars.
China already possesses enormous manufacturing capacity and has heavily invested in mass missile production. Russia, despite sanctions and economic constraints, has still managed to sustain large-scale missile and drone attacks throughout the Ukraine war.
The United States, by contrast, has often prioritized smaller quantities of extremely advanced systems.
The new procurement strategy seeks to balance quality with affordability and production volume.
The Pentagon’s shift is also visible in its drone strategy.
The US Air Force has now finalized requirements for a replacement to the MQ-9 Reaper, one of America’s most recognizable unmanned aerial vehicles.
For years, the MQ-9 served as the backbone of American counterterrorism and surveillance operations. It proved highly effective in permissive environments where adversaries lacked sophisticated air defenses.
But modern battlefields have become far more dangerous.
The MQ-9 costs more than US$35 million per unit and is increasingly vulnerable against capable adversaries. During the recent Iran conflict, as many as 24 Reapers were reportedly shot down, representing losses exceeding US$800 million.
Even Yemen’s Houthi rebels managed to destroy multiple Reapers during operations last year.
These incidents underscored a harsh truth: expensive drones designed for uncontested airspace struggle to survive in modern integrated air-defense environments.
Instead of building another costly high-end platform, the Air Force now wants a drone that is cheaper, easier to manufacture, more modular, and “attritable” — meaning affordable enough to lose during combat operations.
Maj. Gen. Christopher Niemi, acting head of Air Force Futures, recently told lawmakers that the new drone should leverage modern manufacturing technologies to allow mass production at lower cost.
The Air Force’s industry survey described a system capable of conducting around 100 missions while remaining relatively inexpensive.
This marks a profound philosophical shift.
For decades, the US military attempted to minimize operational losses by investing in increasingly sophisticated and survivable systems. Now the Pentagon appears to accept that future wars will inevitably involve heavy losses, making affordability and replaceability just as important as survivability.
The Pentagon’s evolving doctrine is ultimately shaped by concern over future conflict with near-peer adversaries.
A war with China over Taiwan or a direct confrontation with Russia in Europe would likely involve enormous missile exchanges, sustained drone warfare, cyber attacks, electronic warfare, and heavy attrition over months or even years.
In such conflicts, the side capable of replenishing weapons stockpiles fastest may gain a decisive advantage.
The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated that modern industrial warfare favors nations capable of sustaining production under pressure.
The United States still maintains major technological advantages, but the Pentagon increasingly recognizes that technology alone cannot compensate for insufficient manufacturing depth.
This explains the new focus on commercial manufacturing methods, modular weapons designs, open architectures, and large-scale production contracts.
The strategy also reflects concern about America’s shrinking defense-industrial capacity after decades of consolidation and outsourcing.
By bringing in newer firms such as Anduril and Castelion, the Pentagon hopes to stimulate competition, accelerate innovation, and create more resilient production networks.
The Pentagon’s latest procurement decisions represent more than a simple modernization effort. They signal a deeper transformation in how the United States views future warfare.
For years, American military doctrine emphasized precision, technological dominance, and small numbers of highly advanced platforms.
The wars in Ukraine and Iran have challenged those assumptions.
Cheap drones, mass missile attacks, and industrial-scale attrition have reshaped the battlefield. Expensive systems remain important, but they can no longer form the entire foundation of military strategy.
The United States is now adapting to a world where affordable stand-off weapons, rapid manufacturing, and operational attrition define combat effectiveness.
The Pentagon’s new low-cost missile programs and plans for an attritable MQ-9 successor reveal a military preparing for prolonged, high-intensity conflicts where production volume may matter just as much as battlefield sophistication.
