Greens senator David Shoebridge has raised doubts over whether China would seek to shut key maritime trade routes with Australia, while warning against what he described as a strategic “warpath with Washington”, as debate intensifies over the future of the AUKUS submarine agreement.
His comments on Sunday come amid renewed scrutiny of the defence pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, including fresh internal pressure within Labor ranks after it emerged Australia is now expected to receive three second-hand US Virginia-class submarines rather than an earlier plan involving two used vessels and one newly built boat.
The shift has intensified questions over delivery timelines, industrial capacity constraints in the United States and United Kingdom, and whether Australia will ultimately secure the capability in the form originally promised under the decade-long security arrangement.
The agreement—formally known as the AUKUS agreement—has become one of the most consequential and politically contested defence policies in Australia’s recent history, with critics questioning both its strategic assumptions and its financial burden.
Speaking to the ABC, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Senator Shoebridge argued that Australia should take a more regionally grounded approach to China rather than aligning too closely with US strategic priorities.
“We should be looking at what our region is doing, which is trying to come up with a balanced approach to China and not go down a warpath with Washington,” he said.
Shoebridge pointed to China’s military expansion in the South China Sea, but said this should not lead Australia into a binary alignment in which policy decisions are effectively dictated by Washington’s strategic calculus.
“The warpath with Washington is one of the most dangerous responses we can have to the growing of a significant regional power,” he said, adding that Australia should maintain “a complex relationship with China” that is not “entirely managed through Washington’s bottom line”.
His comments reflect a longstanding position within the Greens, who have been critical of deepening US defence integration under AUKUS, arguing it risks narrowing Australia’s diplomatic autonomy in the Indo-Pacific.
Pressed on whether China might seek to close sea lanes critical to Australia’s export economy, Shoebridge questioned the premise of deliberate Chinese disruption of routes that are also vital to its own economic interests.
“Why would China shut down the sea lanes linking Australia and China, which delivers critical and essential materials into the Chinese economy?” he said.
He argued that while any major military power has the capacity to project force, the more realistic risk scenario is not unilateral Chinese action against Australian trade routes, but a broader systemic breakdown in the event of great power conflict.
“Well, I think if there was a conflict between the US and China, well, then indeed global trade is at risk,” he said.
“I think we should be very frank about that. If there is a significant conflict between the US and China, well, then not only are sea lanes at risk, our entire region is at risk and the world’s economy is at risk.”
The remarks reflect growing debate in Australian strategic circles about the extent to which contingency planning should assume a high-intensity conflict scenario in the Indo-Pacific, particularly involving the United States and China, and what that would mean for Australia’s trade-dependent economy.
Turning to Australia’s defence needs, Shoebridge said the country should focus on protecting its maritime approaches and maintaining credible defensive capacity across air and sea domains.
“We need to be able to defend continental Australia. We need to be able to defend our air and sea domain,” he said.
However, he questioned the logic of Australia assuming a broader security role across global shipping lanes.
“The idea that an economy the size of Australia can have a global policing role on sea lanes…” he said, leaving the sentence unfinished before emphasising the limits of national capacity.
Australia’s submarine capability has been central to defence planning for decades, with successive governments arguing that submarines provide stealth, deterrence and intelligence-gathering capabilities essential for an island continent with vast maritime approaches.
Under the current plan, Australia intends to acquire nuclear-powered submarines as part of the AUKUS framework, replacing its ageing diesel-electric fleet.
But Shoebridge challenged the emphasis on crewed nuclear submarines, suggesting alternative force structures may be more appropriate in a rapidly evolving technological environment.
He said submarines were “one option” among many and argued Australia should consider a mix of manned and unmanned platforms.
“I think the question of very expensive, vulnerable crewed submarines is an open question in defence circles,” he said.
However, he also distanced himself from direct procurement responsibility, saying decisions on capability acquisition should rest with the defence portfolio.
“It’s not my job to work out the defence portfolio purchases,” he said.
His strongest criticism came when addressing nuclear-powered submarines directly.
“I can tell you one thing, nuclear submarines are a disaster on pretty much every front,” he said.
“Why are we inviting ourselves to a US war with China?”
Shoebridge’s comments come at a time of mounting political scrutiny over the AUKUS deal across multiple parties, including within the governing Labor Party.
Former Labor minister Peter Garrett has announced a public inquiry into the agreement, adding further institutional weight to concerns that have been building since the pact was first announced.
The inquiry is expected to examine strategic assumptions underpinning the agreement, as well as industrial feasibility and delivery timelines.
At the same time, concerns have been raised about the ability of US and UK shipbuilding industries to meet existing domestic and allied demand, particularly given capacity constraints and long backlogs in submarine production.
Defence analysts have also questioned whether Washington would ultimately be willing or able to transfer vessels to Australia under shifting geopolitical conditions, especially if US strategic priorities evolve in response to a crisis in the Indo-Pacific.
One of the most persistent criticisms of the AUKUS arrangement has been the question of sovereign control over any submarines ultimately delivered to Australia.
Critics argue that in the event of a US-China conflict, operational control and maintenance dependencies could complicate Australia’s ability to independently deploy its fleet.
These concerns have intensified debate over whether Australia could find itself strategically entangled in a conflict not of its own choosing, particularly if its most advanced military assets rely on US nuclear propulsion technology, maintenance infrastructure and weapons systems integration.
The issue has become a focal point for critics who argue that deeper integration into US defence systems may reduce Australia’s operational autonomy in a crisis scenario.
Within Labor, there is also growing unease, with backbencher Ed Husic calling for a rethink of the agreement this week.
Husic’s intervention adds to a broader pattern of internal questioning over long-term defence planning, industrial policy, and the strategic assumptions underpinning Australia’s most expensive defence procurement project.
While the government has remained committed to AUKUS, insisting it is central to Australia’s future deterrence posture, the debate has become increasingly complex as delivery timelines stretch into the 2030s and 2040s.
At the heart of the current debate is a fundamental question about Australia’s strategic environment: whether it is better served by deep integration into US-led defence architecture or by a more independent, regionally balanced posture that reduces reliance on great power blocs.
Supporters of AUKUS argue that the pact significantly enhances Australia’s deterrence capabilities at a time of rising regional tensions and ensures access to cutting-edge submarine technology that would otherwise be unattainable.
Critics, however, warn that the arrangement risks locking Australia into a long-term strategic dependency and potentially aligning it too closely with US military planning in any future conflict with China.
Shoebridge’s remarks reflect this broader tension, particularly his warning against what he characterised as a narrowing of Australia’s strategic autonomy.
“The idea that an economy the size of Australia can have a global policing role on sea lanes,” he said, underscores his scepticism about the scale of ambition embedded in current defence planning.
As political pressure mounts, and as inquiries and internal party debates continue, the future trajectory of the AUKUS agreement remains firmly in the centre of Australia’s defence and foreign policy debate.
