Turkish armoured vehicle manufacturer FNSS has unveiled a new heavy unmanned amphibious combat platform designed to operate at the front of amphibious assault formations and undertake some of the most dangerous missions before troops and crewed vehicles reach a defended shoreline.
The company publicly introduced its U-MAV Multi-Purpose Modular Unmanned Amphibious Vehicle at TEKNOFEST Mavi Vatan 2026, held at the Gölcük Naval Shipyard Command in Kocaeli, Türkiye, from August 20 to 23.
The eight-tonne-class platform has been developed around a relatively simple operational concept: send an unmanned vehicle into the most heavily contested part of an amphibious landing before committing personnel.
U-MAV is intended to operate ahead of FNSS’s Marine Assault Vehicle (MAV), also known as ZAHA, which is already in service with the Turkish Naval Forces Command. Under a manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) concept, the unmanned vehicle can conduct reconnaissance, mine clearance, obstacle reduction, fire support, electronic warfare and other missions while operators remain at a safer distance.
The approach reflects a broader transformation in modern military operations, where unmanned systems are increasingly being assigned missions traditionally performed by crewed platforms in areas where the probability of casualties is high.
Amphibious operations remain among the most complicated military missions because an attacking force must move from a maritime environment onto land while facing an opponent that has had time to prepare its defences.
A defended coastline can contain mines, anti-tank obstacles, trenches, barriers, concealed firing positions, anti-tank guided missiles, machine guns, artillery and unmanned surveillance systems. These defensive measures are designed not only to destroy attacking vehicles but also to slow their advance and channel them into areas where defenders can concentrate their fire.
The first minutes of an amphibious assault are therefore particularly critical.
Every delay at the shoreline can provide defenders with additional time to identify incoming forces, establish firing solutions and reinforce threatened sectors. A landing force that loses momentum can find it increasingly difficult to establish and expand a viable beachhead.
U-MAV has been designed specifically for this environment.
Rather than sending crewed MAV/ZAHA vehicles directly into the most dangerous portions of the landing area, commanders could deploy U-MAVs first to identify threats, clear obstacles and mines, mark routes and perform other tasks required to create access for the main assault force.
Depending on its configuration, the vehicle could also provide fire support, conduct electronic warfare or counter hostile drones.
The objective is not necessarily to make U-MAV a disposable system. Instead, FNSS has designed the platform to remain useful after the initial breach and continue supporting the assault force as the beachhead is secured and expanded.
One of the central characteristics of U-MAV is its modular architecture.
FNSS says the vehicle’s mission payload can be replaced in approximately 40 minutes under field conditions. This allows the same basic platform to be rapidly configured for different operational requirements rather than requiring a separate specialised vehicle for every mission.
The company has identified 10 planned operational configurations: fire support, mine clearance, combat engineering, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, deception, counter-drone operations, navigation and obstacle marking, logistics support, and casualty evacuation.
This creates the possibility of deploying a mixed formation of U-MAVs during an amphibious assault.
For example, mine-clearance and combat-engineering vehicles could work together to create passages through obstacles. Reconnaissance variants could move farther forward to identify defensive positions, while navigation and obstacle-marking variants could establish safer routes for following vehicles.
Fire-support variants could provide additional protection, while counter-drone and electronic-warfare configurations could attempt to disrupt the surveillance and communications systems used by defenders.
Once a beachhead has been established, the same platform could be reconfigured for logistics or casualty evacuation.
A logistics-configured U-MAV could transport supplies across exposed areas without putting another crewed vehicle at risk. A CASEVAC configuration could retrieve wounded personnel from positions where sending a conventional vehicle might expose additional troops.
The modular approach could also simplify maintenance, training, spare-parts requirements and battlefield sustainment because multiple roles would be based on a common vehicle architecture.
U-MAV has been designed to maintain mobility during the transition from water to land, a particularly demanding requirement for an amphibious combat vehicle.
With a combat weight of approximately eight tonnes, the vehicle can reportedly reach a swimming speed of around seven knots. Once ashore, it can accelerate to a maximum land speed of approximately 70 km/h.
Its propulsion system uses a combined 300-horsepower powerpack, giving the vehicle a power-to-weight ratio of roughly 37.5 horsepower per tonne.
The power available is intended to support movement across different surfaces, including water, soft beach terrain and harder ground farther inland.
An independent suspension system contributes to manoeuvrability, while selectable tyre configurations allow the vehicle to be adapted to different terrain and operational requirements.
Another important characteristic is that U-MAV does not require a separate transfer platform to cross the water-land boundary. It can move directly from the maritime environment onto the shore and continue inland.
That uninterrupted mobility could be important during an assault because the shoreline itself can become a major bottleneck. Large numbers of vehicles concentrated at the waterline can become vulnerable to artillery, missiles, drones and direct fire.
By moving directly through the surf and onto the beach, unmanned platforms could help reduce congestion and allow the assault force to maintain momentum.
U-MAV can operate in several modes, including autonomous operation, remote control and hybrid control.
The system uses an encrypted mesh communications network together with an integrated navigation architecture. FNSS says the navigation system combines GNSS and inertial navigation, while an Identification Friend or Foe capability contributes to situational awareness and coordination.
The inertial navigation system is particularly relevant to operations in electronically contested environments.
Satellite navigation can be degraded or denied through jamming and other forms of electronic warfare. An inertial navigation system allows the vehicle to continue estimating its position without relying exclusively on satellite signals.
FNSS states that U-MAV has a standard line-of-sight communications range of approximately three kilometres. That range can potentially be extended through an unmanned aerial vehicle acting as a communications relay.
Such a relay architecture could enable operators positioned on ships, behind the immediate frontline or elsewhere outside the danger area to maintain communications with U-MAVs operating close to hostile defensive positions.
The vehicle also incorporates procedures for communications loss.
If the datalink is interrupted, U-MAV initially enters a safe-hold state instead of continuing uncontrolled movement. Depending on the configuration and mission, it can subsequently return to base through a pre-programmed route or continue an assigned navigation task.
Such functionality is important because electronic warfare is increasingly treated as a normal feature of modern battlefields rather than an unusual disruption.
Another major element of the U-MAV concept is its use of artificial intelligence-enabled image processing.
FNSS has designed the system to process sensor imagery locally instead of continuously transmitting large amounts of raw video to remote operators.
This is an example of edge processing, in which computing tasks are performed onboard the platform. The approach can reduce bandwidth requirements and allow the vehicle to continue generating useful information even when communications networks are congested or degraded.
The onboard mission computer can analyse camera imagery and identify potential objects and threats before transmitting relevant information to operators.
Detected objects can be classified according to type, status and assessed threat level and then displayed through visual overlays and intelligence cards.
The purpose is to reduce the cognitive burden on operators who may otherwise have to monitor continuous video feeds from several unmanned vehicles simultaneously.
Automatic target detection can highlight potentially important objects, allowing human operators to focus attention on the most relevant threats.
The system can also track detected targets and record them with timestamps, helping to maintain a continuously updated tactical picture of activity around the landing zone.
New target categories and engagement rules can reportedly be introduced into the image-processing system as operational circumstances change.
This could become particularly useful in an amphibious environment where defenders may employ a mixture of concealed personnel, anti-tank teams, armoured vehicles, drones and other systems.
Importantly, the AI architecture is intended to support rather than completely replace human decision-making. Operators remain involved in controlling and employing the platform, while automated detection and classification are intended to accelerate the process of identifying threats.
The central military value of U-MAV is its ability to move some of the physical risk associated with an amphibious assault from people to machines.
Conventional amphibious vehicles place crews and troops inside platforms that may be required to cross mined or obstructed terrain under direct fire.
An unmanned vehicle can undertake at least some of these missions without placing a crew directly inside the danger zone.
That does not eliminate risk for the assault force. U-MAV itself remains vulnerable to mines, missiles, artillery, drones, electronic warfare and other defensive systems.
However, losing an unmanned platform does not produce the same immediate human cost as losing a crewed assault vehicle.
This creates the possibility of commanders accepting greater operational risk during reconnaissance, route clearance and obstacle reduction.
A U-MAV could move forward to determine whether a route is accessible, investigate a suspected defensive position or attempt to clear an obstacle before committing more valuable crewed systems.
The concept therefore changes the risk calculation associated with the first wave of an amphibious assault.
FNSS has also sought to reduce U-MAV’s visual, thermal and acoustic signatures.
Signature management could be particularly important because an unmanned vehicle operating ahead of an assault force may have to conduct reconnaissance or electronic-warfare missions close to enemy defensive positions.
Reducing the vehicle’s detectability could make it harder for defenders to identify and classify the platform before it completes its mission.
The vehicle also provides internal volume that can be allocated to different mission equipment, logistics payloads or casualty-evacuation systems.
Its modular design means that the vehicle’s physical configuration can change according to the mission without requiring an entirely different platform.
This flexibility is particularly relevant for expeditionary forces that must adapt quickly to changing battlefield conditions.
FNSS has designed U-MAV to fit into conventional military transportation systems.
The platform can be transported by road, rail and sea and is also designed for movement by heavy-lift helicopters and military transport aircraft.
The stated aircraft compatibility includes the CH-47F Chinook, Mi-26, C-130 Hercules, A400M, C-17 Globemaster III, C-5 Galaxy, An-124 and Il-76.
This range of transport options could provide expeditionary forces with greater flexibility when moving U-MAV units between theatres.
The ability to transport the platform by air is particularly significant because amphibious forces may need to deploy unmanned systems rapidly to a crisis area rather than wait for an entire amphibious task force to reposition.
U-MAV is not intended to replace the Turkish Navy’s crewed MAV/ZAHA.
Instead, FNSS has designed the two platforms to complement each other under the MUM-T concept.
ZAHA provides the protected mobility and combat capability required to carry Marines through the amphibious assault, while U-MAV can move ahead of the crewed vehicles and perform missions that expose conventional crews to greater danger.
The result could be a layered assault formation in which unmanned systems perform reconnaissance, route clearance, obstacle reduction and other high-risk tasks before crewed vehicles advance.
Once the initial breach is established, U-MAVs could continue providing fire support, electronic warfare, counter-drone protection, logistics and casualty evacuation.
This gives the platform relevance beyond the first minutes of a landing.
The unveiling of U-MAV comes as militaries increasingly explore how unmanned systems can alter the traditional relationship between personnel and machines on the battlefield.
Unmanned aerial vehicles have already transformed reconnaissance, targeting and strike operations. Ground and maritime unmanned systems are now being developed to perform increasingly complex missions in environments where human exposure is considered unacceptable.
U-MAV extends this trend into one of the most technically demanding areas: heavy unmanned amphibious operations.
For Türkiye, the platform also builds on FNSS’s experience developing the MAV/ZAHA and reflects the country’s broader investment in indigenous unmanned and autonomous military technologies.
FNSS CEO and Board Member Selim Baybaş said the programme combines the company’s engineering experience, lessons from the MAV programme and continuing investment in unmanned and autonomous systems.
Baybaş also argued that only a limited number of companies worldwide have the industrial and engineering capabilities required to develop an unmanned amphibious vehicle of U-MAV’s size and operational capability.
He pointed to FNSS’s more than 35 years of experience and its ability to manufacture multiple platforms simultaneously as factors supporting the company’s position among a limited group of NATO suppliers capable of developing such a system.
The U-MAV programme therefore represents more than the introduction of another armoured vehicle.
Its significance lies in the way it attempts to redesign the opening phase of an amphibious assault around manned-unmanned cooperation. By placing autonomous and remotely controlled platforms ahead of crewed assault vehicles, the concept seeks to identify threats earlier, reduce personnel exposure and maintain momentum across the sea-to-shore transition.
