Bangladesh and China have shared a strategic partnership since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1975. Over the decades, this relationship has evolved from political goodwill to a deep economic and infrastructural engagement, particularly after Bangladesh joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2016. As Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus prepares for his visit to China from March 26 to 28 to attend the Boao Forum in Hainan, diplomatic observers are closely analyzing the trajectory of Dhaka-Beijing ties, especially in light of recent geopolitical shifts.
Dr. Yunus’s trip signals Dhaka’s growing interest in strengthening ties with Beijing, particularly in the areas of trade, infrastructure, and defense. However, the move also raises critical questions about Bangladesh’s long-term geopolitical positioning and the challenges it must navigate to maintain a balanced foreign policy.
China is Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $20 billion annually. However, the trade balance is heavily tilted in China’s favor, with Bangladesh importing far more than it exports. To address this issue, China has granted tariff exemptions on 98% of Bangladeshi products, but concerns remain about whether these measures will significantly narrow the trade gap.
China has expressed its willingness to increase imports of Bangladeshi goods such as mangoes, jute, and ready-made garments. However, for Bangladesh to take full advantage of these opportunities, it must diversify its exports and improve quality standards to meet China’s regulatory requirements.
A major point of contention is Beijing’s push for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Bangladesh by 2026. While an FTA could boost exports, many Bangladeshi policymakers fear it could also flood the market with Chinese goods, undermining local industries. The government must carefully negotiate the terms to ensure that any agreement supports rather than stifles domestic manufacturing.
Beyond trade, China’s role in Bangladesh’s infrastructure development has been substantial. Beijing has funded and built key projects, including bridges, roads, and power plants, significantly contributing to Bangladesh’s economic progress. However, allegations of inflated costs and corruption under the previous government have cast a shadow over these collaborations. Ensuring transparency and accountability in future projects will be crucial to maintaining public trust and securing continued Chinese investment.
Bangladesh’s strengthening ties with China have not gone unnoticed by its neighbors and global powers. India, which has traditionally enjoyed close relations with Dhaka, views this shift with suspicion, particularly given its own border tensions with Beijing. The United States and its allies are also monitoring Bangladesh’s engagement with China, concerned about Beijing’s expanding influence in South Asia.
The interim government’s cautious approach to China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) reflects its efforts to maintain a diplomatic balance. While China has encouraged Bangladesh to participate in these initiatives, Dhaka has deferred any commitments until an elected government assumes power. This hesitation underscores Bangladesh’s strategic effort to avoid alienating India and the West while keeping its options open with China.
The visit of Dr. Yunus is expected to clarify Bangladesh’s stance on regional cooperation frameworks, including those related to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Bangladesh has already benefited from BRI projects, but concerns over debt sustainability and strategic autonomy remain pressing. The government must ensure that future engagements with China align with its long-term economic and political interests without compromising its sovereignty.
China has emerged as Bangladesh’s largest supplier of defense equipment, providing submarines, fighter jets, and naval vessels. While military ties between the two countries have grown, they remain a sensitive issue given India’s security concerns.
China’s offer to deepen defense cooperation presents both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, strengthening military capabilities could enhance Bangladesh’s security and regional standing. On the other, closer defense ties with China could strain Dhaka’s relations with India and other Western partners. The government must tread carefully, ensuring transparency in its defense procurement decisions to avoid unnecessary diplomatic tensions.
One of the most pressing issues on Dr. Yunus’s agenda will be the Rohingya crisis. With over a million refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh has struggled to find a sustainable solution. China, as a key ally of Myanmar, holds significant influence over the situation and has positioned itself as a mediator in past negotiations.
Dhaka hopes that Beijing will use its leverage over Naypyidaw to facilitate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees and address the root causes of the crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. While China has expressed support for a resolution, progress has been slow. Dr. Yunus’s visit provides an opportunity to push for more concrete commitments from Beijing on this front.
Amid India’s recent visa restrictions on Bangladeshis, which have affected patients seeking medical treatment in Indian hospitals, China has stepped in with a new initiative. Beijing has dedicated major hospitals in Kunming for Bangladeshi patients and pledged to build state-of-the-art healthcare facilities in Bangladesh.
The first group of Bangladeshi patients arrived in Kunming on March 10, marking a significant development in bilateral ties. If costs remain competitive, China could emerge as an attractive alternative to India for medical treatment. However, affordability will be a key factor in determining whether this initiative succeeds in the long run.
Teesta River Project
The Teesta River Comprehensive Management Project is another major issue expected to be discussed during Dr. Yunus’s visit. The previous government’s decision to exclude China from the project after prolonged negotiations sparked controversy and raised questions about transparency.
With mounting pressure from communities in the Teesta River basin for a concrete resolution, the interim government faces a difficult decision. Re-engaging China in the project could bring technical and financial support, but it also risks escalating tensions with India, which has its own interests in Teesta’s water-sharing arrangements. Managing this delicate issue will require skillful diplomacy and a clear assessment of Bangladesh’s long-term water security needs.
The Teesta River Comprehensive Management Project remains a contentious issue. The previous government’s decision to exclude China from the project despite lengthy negotiations raised questions about transparency. With pressure from local communities for a resolution, the interim government faces a tough choice:
- Re-engaging China could provide financial and technical support, accelerating the project’s implementation.
- Avoiding friction with India remains a priority, as Delhi has its own interests in the river’s water-sharing arrangements.
Bangladesh’s ability to navigate this issue diplomatically will determine the success of the Teesta project while maintaining a stable regional balance.
As Bangladesh and China prepare to mark 50 years of diplomatic relations, the opportunities and challenges in their partnership are more evident than ever. Dr. Yunus’s visit underscores the importance of bilateral cooperation in shaping Bangladesh’s economic and geopolitical future.
However, deepening ties with China will require Dhaka to address trade imbalances, ensure transparency in development projects, and carefully navigate regional rivalries. The road ahead is complex, but with strategic planning, Bangladesh can strengthen its relationship with China while safeguarding its national interests.
