Australia is heading toward a unique kind of defence dilemma—one that most militaries would envy. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) is set to operate one of the most advanced fleets of naval helicopters in the Indo-Pacific, with 36 highly capable Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawks—known as “Romeos”—soon in service. But there’s a problem: Australia doesn’t have enough warships to deploy them all.
With only ten current surface combatants—three Hobart-class destroyers and seven aging Anzac-class frigates—soon to be reduced to nine after the retirement of HMAS Arunta in 2026, a significant mismatch is emerging between air and sea platforms in the RAN.
In simple terms: too many helicopters, not enough ships.
Australia’s naval aviation capability is in the midst of a significant boost. The current fleet of 23 MH-60R Romeos is being expanded by an additional 13 under a $2.5 billion acquisition approved in 2022. These aircraft, to be delivered by the end of 2026, will replace the retired MRH90 Taipans and re-equip No. 808 Squadron.
This upgrade enhances Australia’s ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare, and logistics support missions. The Romeo is widely considered the most capable maritime combat helicopter globally, with high-end sensors, sonar systems, and weapons like torpedoes and Hellfire missiles.
By February 2025, the Romeo fleet had already surpassed 50,000 flying hours—a milestone that reflects how actively the helicopters have been used. But while the skies are increasingly busy, the seas may not be so accommodating.
Despite the excitement over the new helicopters, they have nowhere near enough warships to deploy from. Australia’s surface fleet simply doesn’t have the physical capacity to embark 36 helicopters simultaneously.
Each Hobart-class destroyer and Anzac-class frigate can carry only one MH-60R. Even factoring in amphibious and supply vessels—such as HMAS Canberra, Adelaide, and Supply—which can embark multiple helicopters, the numbers still don’t add up. Without a rapid increase in available ships, many of the Romeos will remain on land, used for training, maintenance, and rotational readiness instead of deployed operations.
Still, the Department of Defence sees no problem. A spokesperson said, “The fleet size of 36 Romeos is required to support a continuous cycle of operations, training, and maintenance.” The logic is that these aircraft will rotate between deployments, servicing, and training roles rather than all operating at sea at once.
It’s a reasonable explanation, but it doesn’t solve the underlying issue: Australia’s surface fleet is not growing fast enough to match its helicopter fleet’s operational potential.
While helicopters are arriving on time, new warships are years away.
The Force Structure Plan 2020 outlines an ambitious expansion to 26 major surface combatants.
- 3 existing Hobart-class destroyers
- 6 Hunter-class frigates (to begin arriving in the early 2030s)
- 11 new general-purpose frigates, expected to begin entering service from 2029
In theory, all these future warships will be MH-60R capable. But in practice, the timeline is uncertain and vulnerable to delays. Even under ideal circumstances, a fully modernised fleet won’t be afloat until the early to mid-2030s.
This gap—between helicopter readiness and ship availability—has triggered debate in strategic and defence circles about Australia’s planning priorities.
Australia’s investment in Romeos is strategic. It aligns with its growing focus on Indo-Pacific security and interoperability with allies, particularly the United States. Commodore Anthony Savage, Director General of Naval Aviation, praised the Romeo’s capabilities, calling it “arguably the most capable combat maritime helicopter in the world.”
At the Avalon Airshow in March 2025, US Brigadier General David Walsh, who oversees rotary wing programs for the US Navy, reinforced this sentiment. “The MH-60R programme is a model for international cooperation,” he said. He noted the helicopter’s increasing importance in an era of contested logistics and long supply lines.
For the US and Australia, operating near-identical platforms helps drive interoperability. The US Navy and RAN share training and logistical frameworks, even sending helicopters across oceans for joint maintenance. Australia recently performed maintenance on a US Navy Romeo, highlighting its growing capacity to contribute to alliance sustainment.
Lockheed Martin Australia is a key player in supporting the fleet, performing most maintenance from its facility in Nowra, NSW. The latest maintenance contract—worth A$313.5 million—secures long-term support and bolsters local defence industry capabilities.
This support model is efficient and is expected to scale even further as Australia introduces 40 UH-60M Black Hawks for the Army. Having common helicopters across services should reduce costs and streamline training and support logistics.
For now, though, the full potential of this synergy remains aspirational.
Australia was the first country outside the US to buy the MH-60R, placing its first order in 2011. Deliveries ran from 2013 to 2016. These helicopters now serve operationally with No. 816 Squadron, while No. 725 Squadron handles training.
The upcoming 13-aircraft order falls under Project Sea 9100 Phase 1, aimed at improving embarked logistics helicopter capability. The order includes a replacement for the Romeo lost in 2021 during operations in the Philippine Sea.
The new helicopters will likely come equipped with the latest enhancements, aligning them with US Navy Romeos. Australia plans to keep pace with US upgrades in sensors, communications, and survivability to combat emerging threats.
“We aim for them to be identical,” said Air Commodore Angus Porter. “Apart from the country names on the aircraft, we want these to be interchangeable.”
Australia’s Romeo fleet may soon have regional ripple effects. New Zealand is considering the MH-60R as a replacement for its aging SH-2G(I) Super Seasprites. While no decision has been made, interoperability with Australia could sway the choice.
Walsh hinted at this during the Avalon Airshow, saying, “The interoperability and interchangeability of the platform is really, really important to any of our partners.”
If New Zealand joins the MH-60R club, it would further solidify regional maritime cooperation. However, like Australia, New Zealand also faces fiscal and strategic constraints on how quickly it can grow its naval capabilities.
On the surface, Australia’s helicopter surplus might seem like a good problem. After all, it’s better to have too much than too little of a world-leading asset. But in military operations, capability mismatches can be more than inconvenient—they can be strategically costly.
Without enough ships, the Romeos cannot be used to their full potential. Each unused helicopter represents not just idle machinery but missed deterrence, reach, and responsiveness.
This imbalance also calls into question the synchronisation between procurement and planning. Defence acquisitions are complex, long-term projects, but aligning helicopter deliveries years ahead of ship construction introduces inefficiencies.
More fundamentally, it exposes the lag between ambition and execution in Australia’s naval modernisation agenda.
Australia is trying to navigate an increasingly contested region. Chinese naval expansion, regional instability, and maritime threats like submarine proliferation all raise the stakes. The MH-60R is well-suited for this environment. It’s fast, flexible, and proven.
But helicopters don’t fight alone. Without enough decks to take off from and return to, their presence becomes symbolic rather than operational.
The government’s challenge is to accelerate warship acquisition without compromising capability or budget. Interim measures—like more flexible helicopter deployment strategies, rotating embarkation on amphibious ships, or even partnering with allies for joint operations—may help.
Yet, these are patches, not fixes.
As of now, Australia is investing smartly in its future naval aviation capability. But the shortfall in available warships creates a bottleneck that could last a decade.
This isn’t just a matter of numbers—it’s about aligning platforms, doctrine, and strategy. Helicopters and warships are not independent; their value is interdependent.
