Azerbaijan may have quietly acquired the Chinese HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system to reinforce its air defense network, signaling a deepening military relationship with Beijing and a shift away from exclusive reliance on Russian weapon systems. The reported acquisition, yet to be officially confirmed by either government, would mark Azerbaijan’s second major procurement of a Chinese defense platform after the JF-17 Block III fighter jet co-developed by China and Pakistan.
Rumors of the purchase intensified after photos and videos surfaced on November 4 showing what appeared to be a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicle associated with the HQ-9BE air defense system during nighttime rehearsals in Baku. The rehearsal preceded the upcoming military parade commemorating the fifth anniversary of Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020.
The images, widely shared on social media, showed a vehicle bearing the distinct configuration of the HQ-9BE TEL, sparking intense discussion among military watchers. Analysts noted that this was the first public sighting of the system in Azerbaijan, suggesting that Baku may have recently taken delivery of the Chinese missile system.
Neither Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense nor Chinese defense authorities have commented on the images or confirmed any sale. The EurAsian Times and other outlets could not independently verify the authenticity of the footage. However, defense analysts say that if the deployment is genuine, Azerbaijan would become the fourth known international operator of the HQ-9 system, after Pakistan, Morocco, and Egypt.
Azerbaijan currently fields a layered air defense architecture composed of Soviet- and Russian-origin systems, including the S-300PMU-2 Favorit, Tor-M2E, and Buk-M1 platforms, supplemented by Israeli-made Spyder and Barak short- and medium-range systems. The introduction of the HQ-9BE would significantly enhance Azerbaijan’s ability to defend against long-range threats, providing coverage over Baku, the Caspian coast, and critical energy infrastructure such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
With an estimated range of 200–260 kilometers, the HQ-9BE offers extended interception capability against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. This would force the Armenian Air Force’s Su-30SM fighters to operate well beyond Azerbaijani airspace and provide a credible countermeasure to Armenia’s Russian-supplied Iskander missiles.
The HQ-9 family of missile systems, developed by China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), represents Beijing’s most sophisticated export-grade air defense technology. Drawing on design concepts from Russia’s S-300 series and incorporating indigenous improvements, the HQ-9 series entered service in the early 2000s.
The HQ-9B variant, first deployed by the People’s Liberation Army in 2014, features upgraded guidance and radar systems capable of tracking up to 100 targets simultaneously using the HT-233 3D phased-array radar. The system’s Track-via-Missile (TVM) guidance combines inertial navigation, mid-course uplink, and terminal active or semi-active radar homing, allowing simultaneous engagement of up to 10 aerial threats.
The HQ-9B is a mobile, truck-mounted system using an 8×8 Taian TAS-5380 chassis, providing high mobility and rapid deployment across varied terrain. Its cold-launch mechanism enables 360-degree firing without launcher orientation, enhancing survivability in dynamic combat environments.
Each HQ-9B battery comprises 48 launch vehicles, six control and targeting radar vehicles, and multiple support units, offering a formidable area-defense capability. Chinese media often compare the HQ-9B to the U.S.-made Patriot system and Russia’s S-400 Triumf, underscoring its ability to intercept low-flying and hypersonic threats under electronic warfare conditions.
Interestingly, Azerbaijan’s reported move comes as Armenia has bolstered its own air defenses with India’s Akash surface-to-air missile system. Both systems were reportedly tested in combat conditions during the Indo-Pakistan border skirmishes in May 2025, when Indian and Pakistani forces clashed following a drone strike incident.
Indian defense media claimed that the HQ-9B suffered from jamming and deception vulnerabilities during the conflict, while the Akash system performed efficiently in neutralizing aerial threats. Though unverified, these accounts have raised questions about the HQ-9B’s electronic warfare resilience.
If confirmed, the Azerbaijani acquisition could mark a new chapter in the South Caucasus arms race, with both Baku and Yerevan aligning with different emerging defense partners — China and India, respectively.
The possible HQ-9B purchase aligns with Azerbaijan’s broader military modernization and diversification strategy. Once heavily dependent on Soviet and Russian equipment, Azerbaijan has in recent years expanded its procurement network to include Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and now China.
This shift reflects both strategic and political motivations. Azerbaijan’s growing mistrust toward Moscow, stemming from Russia’s perceived favoritism toward Armenia and its waning reliability as a defense supplier amid the ongoing Ukraine war, has accelerated Baku’s search for alternative partners.
Russia’s production bottlenecks, delivery delays, and sanctions-induced constraints have pushed several of its former arms clients — including Azerbaijan — to explore non-Russian suppliers offering shorter delivery timelines and competitive pricing.
China, in this context, has emerged as an attractive option. While SIPRI data up to 2024 showed minimal Chinese arms exports to Azerbaijan, the appearance of HQ-9BE launchers indicates that Beijing is now entering the Caucasus defense market, potentially at Russia’s expense.
The HQ-9B would be Azerbaijan’s second major Chinese defense system after the JF-17 Block III multirole fighter jet, jointly developed by China and Pakistan. In September 2024, Azerbaijan formally showcased the JF-17 during a ceremony attended by President Ilham Aliyev at Heydar Aliyev International Airport, confirming the country’s intent to modernize its air force with cost-effective, next-generation aircraft.
The JF-17 Block III features an AESA radar, modern electronic warfare suites, and the PL-15 beyond-visual-range missile, giving Azerbaijan a substantial boost in aerial combat capability. With the HQ-9B complementing these fighters, Baku appears intent on developing a layered, networked defense grid integrating Chinese radar and missile technologies with existing Israeli and Turkish platforms.
If the acquisition is confirmed, Azerbaijan’s HQ-9BE deployment would alter the regional military balance by extending its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) umbrella over the Caspian Sea and parts of Armenia and Georgia.
The move could also reinforce China’s foothold in the strategically vital South Caucasus, where Beijing has steadily expanded its presence through investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The introduction of Chinese air defense systems into the region could pave the way for broader defense cooperation, including training, maintenance, and technology transfer.
For Russia, the growing Chinese defense footprint in what Moscow traditionally regards as its “near abroad” may be viewed as both a challenge and a symptom of its diminishing influence. Similarly, Western observers will likely watch closely how China’s weapons exports reshape military alignments across Eurasia.
Though unconfirmed, the HQ-9B’s possible entry into Azerbaijan’s arsenal underscores a strategic realignment in Baku’s defense procurement. By blending Turkish drones, Israeli radar systems, Pakistani-Chinese fighters, and potentially Chinese long-range SAMs, Azerbaijan is crafting a diversified military posture less dependent on any single nation’s supply chain.
This approach enhances not only Azerbaijan’s operational flexibility but also its geopolitical autonomy amid an increasingly multipolar global order.
