A “quiet but deliberate encroachment,” China is reportedly moving to establish a deeper military footprint in South Asia—this time not through Pakistan, but via Bangladesh. Indian intelligence sources have confirmed that Chinese military officials recently visited the World War II-era airbase at Lamonirhat, a district just 20 kilometers from the Indian border and about 130 kilometers from the sensitive Siliguri Corridor, also known as India’s “Chicken’s Neck.”
The airfield, inactive for decades, has suddenly become the epicenter of regional geopolitical tension. Indian agencies are closely watching what appears to be the revival of this long-dormant strategic asset, now backed by Chinese support. The situation has drawn immediate concern from Indian military planners who fear a two-front pressure strategy—China from the north and now potentially from the east through Bangladesh.
The Lamonirhat airbase was constructed in 1931 and played a key role in World War II, when Allied forces launched missions from there to fight in Burma and Southeast Asia. Its expansive infrastructure includes a 4-kilometer-long runway, large tarmac area, and taxiways. After Bangladesh gained independence in 1971, the site was briefly considered for use as a Bangladesh Air Force headquarters, but the plan was never executed.
Now, more than 90 years later, Lamonirhat is being given a new lease on life—this time under the close gaze of Beijing.
The Assam Tribune recently quoted intelligence reports that confirm China’s interest in the site, with the official line from Dhaka being that it is seeking Chinese “assistance” to redevelop the airfield. The project was formally unveiled in March 2025.
Geographically, Lamonirhat’s location gives it outsized strategic value. It lies alarmingly close to the Siliguri Corridor—a narrow stretch of Indian territory just 22 kilometers wide that connects mainland India to its eight northeastern states. These include Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Nagaland. Four of these states—Tripura, Mizoram, Assam, and Meghalaya—share borders with Bangladesh.
The vulnerability of this “Chicken’s Neck” region has long been a source of concern for Indian defense planners. Should any hostile force disrupt this corridor, India’s entire northeast could be effectively cut off. That scenario is no longer just theoretical with Chinese interests now emerging in Bangladesh—especially in Lamonirhat, barely 130 kilometers from the vital choke point of Siliguri.
Adding to the intrigue, Indian intelligence intercepted reports that a senior Pakistani intelligence official visited Lamonirhat in January 2025—months before the Chinese visits were confirmed. The sequence has raised alarms about a possible China-Pakistan axis operating within Bangladesh.
China and Pakistan have long shared a strategic partnership, most notably in military technology. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China supplied 82% of Pakistan’s arms imports between 2019 and 2023. Islamabad field-tested many of these systems during confrontations with India.
That a Pakistani intelligence operative visited Lamonirhat just before Chinese military officials lends credence to concerns that the location could evolve into a joint outpost, serving as a forward surveillance or even strike platform.
“This has obvious adverse implications if Bangladesh allows access to PLAAF [People’s Liberation Army Air Force] or to PAF [Pakistan Air Force],” said Lt Gen Anil Ahuja (Retd), former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff for the Indian Army, said.
Lt Gen Ahuja emphasized that while China already has a significant ability to project power toward India’s northeast from its existing bases, the addition of a low-altitude, well-located airbase like Lamonirhat would expand their range and challenge India’s air defense capacity.
“Access to air bases in Bangladesh gives PLAAF reach till Andaman & Nicobar Islands, which otherwise China does not have. This will have implications for our dominance of the Bay of Bengal,” he said.
His concerns were echoed by Lt Gen Subrata Saha (Retd), former Deputy Chief of Army Staff, who said that while peacetime operations from such a base might allow surveillance, during hostilities the same base becomes a potential launchpad for strikes or intelligence-gathering missions.
One of the most critical strategic angles in this unfolding situation is maritime. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, a vital sea route through which nearly 40% of China’s total trade passes. Until now, China has had limited access to this region, relying on long-distance naval deployments from the South China Sea or Gwadar Port in Pakistan.
With access to Lamonirhat or any other Bangladeshi airbase, China could project air power directly into the Bay of Bengal. This would severely compromise India’s ability to monitor and dominate maritime activity in one of the world’s most critical trade routes.
India’s Integrated Defence Command, tasked with defending these islands, is reportedly considering increased surveillance and rapid deployment protocols in light of the new threat.
This isn’t the first time China has tried to gain strategic depth through military exports. Since 2009, Beijing has been the largest arms supplier to Bangladesh, contributing an estimated 82% of Dhaka’s military inventory.
- Ming-class diesel-electric submarines
- Shadhinota-class C13B corvettes
- MBT-2000 Type 90-II and VT-5 light tanks
- HQ-7 SAM systems
- 36 F-7BGI fighter jets
- Multiple surface-to-air and air-to-surface missile systems
Additionally, China has offered technical know-how and licensed production of small arms, including assault rifles and grenades. This arms buildup, funded through concessional loans and military aid, has turned Bangladesh into another node in China’s regional strategy.
Beyond the military infrastructure, there’s a worrying political current. Aides of Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel laureate and influential figure in Bangladesh’s politics, have reportedly made veiled references to India’s northeastern states in public speeches. Some statements suggested territorial claims or cultural unity arguments that dangerously flirt with revanchist ideas.
While the Bangladeshi government has officially denied any hostile intent, the political atmosphere in Dhaka has grown increasingly nationalistic and less receptive to Indian concerns.
There’s also growing unease in New Delhi about Bangladesh’s increasing economic and infrastructural reliance on China. From port construction to rail connectivity, Beijing has poured billions into the country under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With military collaboration now entering the frame, India’s diplomatic capital in Bangladesh may be fast eroding.
India has historically prepared for a two-front war scenario—China in the north and Pakistan in the west. But the developments in Lamonirhat suggest that the eastern front may now require just as much attention. A Chinese-supported Bangladesh, armed with Chinese hardware and providing logistical support to China or Pakistan, changes the strategic equation entirely.
Even if no formal agreement is signed for stationing Chinese forces in Bangladesh, the sheer presence of infrastructure capable of dual-use—civilian and military—presents a latent threat. Airfields, radar systems, and fuel depots are easily adaptable for wartime operations.
New Delhi is reportedly considering a multi-pronged response:
- Military Posturing: Strengthening the Siliguri Corridor with more permanent deployments, air-defense systems, and mobility corridors.
- Diplomatic Outreach: Pushing for diplomatic channels to engage Dhaka directly and convey red lines clearly.
- Regional Partnerships: Enhancing maritime cooperation with Indonesia, Australia, and the United States under the Quad to contain Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean.
- Economic Strategy: Revisiting trade and water-sharing agreements with Bangladesh as leverage.
- Counter-Influence Measures: Boosting development projects in the northeast to ensure stability and prevent secessionist narratives from gaining traction.
The Lamonirhat airbase may be a single installation, but its implications echo far beyond the boundaries of a 1930s-era airstrip. It signifies a deliberate shift in China’s regional strategy—quietly establishing leverage not just through direct confrontation, but through encirclement, partnership, and strategic ambiguity.
India’s strategic community must now grapple with a more complex threat environment—one that demands not just firepower, but foresight. Bangladesh, meanwhile, finds itself caught in a great power rivalry with profound consequences for its sovereignty and future.
