In a development that could reshape South Asia’s aerial balance, Pakistan’s announcement of a new export Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for its advanced JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter jet has triggered intense speculation that Bangladesh may be the undisclosed customer.
The declaration came at the high-profile Dubai Airshow 2025, where Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) officials confirmed signing an MoU with a “friendly nation” for JF-17 Block III exports. The announcement’s timing—during one of the world’s premier aerospace exhibitions—has amplified global interest in cost-effective, non-Western fighter platforms at a moment when Western jets remain financially out of reach for many mid-tier air forces.
Defence analysts quickly pointed toward Bangladesh as the most likely candidate behind the deal. Newly surfaced reports suggest Dhaka is accelerating its fighter modernisation efforts under Forces Goal 2030, with the JF-17 Block III emerging as a strategically and financially compatible option for the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF).
Bangladesh maintains a discreet approach to military procurement, typically revealing acquisitions only after contractual completion—further fuelling speculation after the Dubai Airshow announcement.
Delegations from Gulf, African, and Southeast Asian states viewed demonstrations of the JF-17 Block III during the expo. However, reports of high-level meetings between senior BAF officials and Pakistani counterparts on the sidelines of the airshow have intensified speculation regarding Bangladesh’s involvement.
Some industry sources suggest a separate MoU may have been signed in Dhaka between BAF representatives and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), possibly outlining an initial order of 16–24 aircraft worth USD 400–700 million, including training, spares, and lifecycle support.
Conflicting reports on whether the MoU was signed in Dubai or Dhaka indicate that negotiations could be occurring in multiple phases—common in defence deals involving sensitive geopolitical considerations.
If confirmed, Bangladesh would become the fourth international operator of the JF-17 after Myanmar, Nigeria, and Azerbaijan.
A potential purchase aligns directly with Bangladesh’s long-term Forces Goal 2030 program, which aims to build a modern, multi-dimensional, network-centric air force capable of addressing threats across the Bay of Bengal and wider Indo-Pacific region.
The BAF currently operates aging F-7BG/MBs, MiG-29s, and Yak-130 trainers. These aircraft provide limited beyond-visual-range (BVR) capability and insufficient maritime patrol coverage—critical gaps for a nation surrounded by contested air and naval environments.
Bangladesh reportedly began formal evaluation of the JF-17 Block III in early 2025, including feasibility studies, pilot orientation, and on-ground technical assessments.
The JF-17’s compatibility with Chinese weapons—already integrated within the BAF—offers logistical advantages. Bangladesh has traditionally sourced defence hardware from China and Russia, but recent global disruptions and sanctions risks have encouraged Dhaka to diversify its procurement portfolio.
The JF-17’s Sino-Pakistani origin presents a hybrid solution: modern capability, low operational cost, and reduced dependency on any single supplier.
The JF-17 Thunder program began in the late 1990s to provide Pakistan with an affordable, multi-role fighter capable of replacing older Mirage III/V and F-7 fleets. Developed jointly by Pakistan’s PAC and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), the aircraft has evolved through three major blocks:
Block I: Foundational multirole combat capability.
Block II: In-flight refuelling, upgraded avionics, and enhanced electronic warfare systems.
Block III: A significant technological leap, introducing a digital cockpit, AESA radar, advanced missiles, and enhanced survivability systems.
Over 150 units have been delivered to Pakistan, supporting its shift toward domestic manufacturing and operational self-reliance.
Operationally, the JF-17 has a combat record that includes counter-insurgency missions, precision strikes, and real-time interception engagements. Notably, it downed an Iranian drone in 2017 and was deployed during the 2019 Balakot crisis with India.
Some reports—though contested—have linked the JF-17 to neutralising elements of India’s S-400 air defence system in 2025, reflecting its perceived capability in contested environments.
The aircraft’s low operating cost, estimated at USD 5,000 per flight hour, sharply contrasts with Western fighters like the F-16 or Gripen, which cost four to seven times more to operate.
At the heart of the JF-17 Block III’s appeal is its advanced avionics and weapons package, positioning it as a 4.5-generation fighter at a mid-tier price.
AESA Radar: The KLJ-7A AESA offers detection ranges exceeding 170 km, multi-target tracking, and strong anti-jamming capabilities.
Engine & Performance: Powered by the RD-93 turbofan, the fighter reaches speeds of Mach 1.6–1.8 with a service ceiling of 50,000 feet.
Combat Radius: Approximately 1,200 km, extendable to over 3,400 km with drop tanks—ideal for Bay of Bengal patrol missions.
Weapons Suite:
PL-15 long-range BVR missile (200+ km)
PL-10 HOBS missile
C-802 anti-ship missile
CM-400AKG supersonic anti-surface missile
This weapons mix gives the Block III superior maritime strike capability—an increasingly vital requirement as naval activity intensifies in the Bay of Bengal.
Price Advantage
At an estimated USD 25–30 million per aircraft, the Block III is dramatically cheaper than comparable fighters:
F-16 Block 70: USD 60–80 million
Saab Gripen E: ~USD 85 million
The value proposition is particularly attractive for countries balancing capability with financial constraints.
A Bangladesh–JF-17 agreement would significantly shape regional power dynamics.
For Pakistan, the deal boosts its growing defence-export profile and strengthens ties with Dhaka—historically strained but warming in recent years. It also counters India’s push to market its Tejas fighter across South Asia.
For Bangladesh, the acquisition would sharply enhance deterrence, particularly against Myanmar, which already operates JF-17 Block III jets. Parity in air-power capability is crucial, given periodic border friction and maritime disputes between the two countries.
For China, the move strengthens its defence ecosystem in South Asia at a time when India and the U.S. are deepening Indo-Pacific cooperation.
However, integrating the JF-17 into Bangladesh’s existing Russian-heavy infrastructure may pose challenges. Pilot retraining, maintenance shifts, and potential diplomatic pressure from India are also considerations.
Bangladesh has simultaneously explored the Chinese J-10CE, indicating a balanced procurement strategy aimed at leveraging competitive offers.
Global projections suggest JF-17 exports could reach 300–400 units by 2030, with future upgrades—including thrust vectoring and advanced composites—already under discussion.
If Bangladesh finalises the purchase, it could open doors for co-production, technology transfer, and gradual expansion into local aerospace manufacturing—key ambitions under Forces Goal 2030.
At present, neither Dhaka nor Islamabad has formally confirmed the identity of the MoU’s recipient. Yet the convergence of indicators—strategic timing, capability alignment, discreet negotiation patterns, and BAF’s urgent modernisation needs—strongly point toward Bangladesh being the likely buyer.
As South Asia navigates escalating rivalries, shifting alliances, and rapid military modernisation, Bangladesh’s potential acquisition of the JF-17 Block III could dramatically reshape regional deterrence while underscoring the rise of non-Western fighter ecosystems in global defence markets.
