Bangladesh’s reported interest in acquiring up to 32 JF-17 “Thunder” multirole fighters—a joint project of Pakistan and China—has triggered serious strategic concerns in New Delhi. This potential procurement is not just about Bangladesh upgrading its air force; for India, it signals a possible realignment in South Asia’s military landscape that could undermine its regional influence.
According to defence analysts, New Delhi is exploring diplomatic and strategic avenues to discourage or disrupt the deal. Indian policymakers see Bangladesh’s increasing military engagement with China and Pakistan as a challenge to its traditional sphere of influence, particularly in the Bay of Bengal. Some Indian officials have even described the potential sale as a “pincer move” by Beijing and Islamabad to encircle India strategically.
The JF-17 “Thunder” is a combat-proven platform developed by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) in collaboration with China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG). Already a staple in the Pakistan Air Force, the aircraft’s latest iteration—the Block III variant—features cutting-edge avionics, improved stealth characteristics, and advanced radar systems inspired by China’s J-20 stealth fighter.
With these enhancements, the JF-17 Block III provides formidable capabilities at a fraction of the cost of Western fighter jets. This affordability, coupled with operational flexibility, makes it an attractive option for air forces like Bangladesh’s, which are looking to modernize without being heavily reliant on Western suppliers.
For India, the prospect of Bangladesh acquiring such a capability raises several red flags. Dhaka’s potential purchase of JF-17s reflects a strategic shift, especially in light of recent political turmoil in the country.
Relations between India and Bangladesh have soured dramatically since August 2024, when Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was overthrown in a mass student-led uprising. The ousted leader, now living in exile under Indian protection, is facing serious criminal charges in Bangladesh, including corruption and murder. Dhaka has formally demanded her extradition, a request that India has refused, leading to a deep freeze in bilateral ties.
The new Bangladeshi government under Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus has taken a more independent approach to foreign policy, reducing Dhaka’s reliance on India and expanding military and economic cooperation with non-traditional partners, particularly China and Pakistan. This shift has alarmed New Delhi, which now sees Dhaka as drifting beyond its control.
A senior Indian defence official, speaking anonymously, warned that the sale of JF-17s to Bangladesh could mark the beginning of a significant realignment in South Asian geopolitics. “This is not just about aircraft. It’s about Bangladesh making a choice about its strategic future,” the official said.
The Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) is in urgent need of modernization. It currently operates outdated F-7 interceptors and MiG-29s, both of which suffer from aging airframes, spare parts shortages, and limited relevance in modern air combat. The ongoing war in Ukraine has further complicated the supply of Russian-origin equipment, prompting Dhaka to explore alternative options.
The JF-17 Block III, with its KLJ-7A Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, modern cockpit, and superior weaponry, presents an appealing alternative. The aircraft’s compatibility with China’s PL-10 short-range air-to-air missile and PL-15 beyond-visual-range missile would significantly enhance Bangladesh’s aerial combat capabilities.
If the deal goes through, Bangladesh would gain a potent force-multiplier in its air defence capabilities, particularly in light of growing tensions along its western border with India. Indian military planners are particularly concerned about the JF-17’s PL-15 missile, which has an estimated range of up to 300 kilometers—potentially surpassing India’s Astra Mk-1 and R-77 beyond-visual-range missiles.
India has been vocal in its opposition to Bangladesh’s growing defence cooperation with China and Pakistan. In an unprecedented move, Indian defence authorities recently warned that they would shoot down any Bangladeshi Bayraktar TB2 drones that approach Indian airspace.
Bangladesh has reportedly acquired 12 Bayraktar TB2 drones from Türkiye, of which six are currently active. These UAVs, operated by the 67th Brigade of the Bangladesh Army, have been conducting routine surveillance missions from Tejgaon Air Base. However, Indian officials view them as a potential intelligence-gathering threat.
“We have the capability to track and shoot down any drone that violates our airspace,” an Indian defence official stated, underscoring the heightened security posture along the Indo-Bangladesh border.
Bangladesh’s growing fleet of advanced UAVs and its potential acquisition of JF-17 fighters mark a significant evolution in its military doctrine. While the country has historically maintained a defensive posture, these acquisitions indicate a shift toward a more autonomous and assertive security strategy.
The renewed speculation about Bangladesh’s JF-17 interest gained momentum following a high-profile military delegation visit to Pakistan on January 15, 2025. The delegation, led by Lieutenant General SM Qamarul Hassan, engaged in discussions with Pakistan Air Force (PAF) leadership, including Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar.
During these talks, Lt. Gen. Hassan reportedly praised Pakistan’s indigenous defence capabilities, particularly highlighting the JF-17 as a platform of interest for the Bangladesh Air Force.
Pakistani media sources suggest that negotiations over the potential sale are at an advanced stage, with Dhaka considering the JF-17 as a replacement for its aging fleet. If finalized, this would mark the first time Bangladesh has procured frontline combat aircraft from Pakistan, further solidifying its growing military ties with Islamabad.
This comes at a time when Pakistan is actively seeking to expand its defence exports, with the JF-17 being a key component of its arms diplomacy. The fighter jet has already been exported to countries like Myanmar and Nigeria, and Bangladesh’s potential entry into the program would strengthen the aircraft’s credibility as an affordable yet capable combat solution.
China is playing an increasingly central role in Bangladesh’s defence modernization. Dhaka has already acquired several major Chinese military platforms, including Type 053H3 frigates, K-8 trainer jets, and VT-5 light tanks. The potential addition of the JF-17 to Bangladesh’s arsenal would further cement its reliance on Chinese defence technology.
Beijing’s interest in arming Bangladesh is not purely commercial. Strengthening Bangladesh’s military capabilities serves China’s broader strategic objective of counterbalancing India’s influence in South Asia. By deepening its defence ties with Dhaka, China gains a foothold in the Bay of Bengal, a region of growing strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific theatre.
India has long viewed China’s growing presence in its neighborhood as a direct challenge to its security. The construction of Chinese-built ports in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Pakistan—along with increasing defence sales to Bangladesh—has reinforced Indian fears of strategic encirclement, often referred to as China’s “String of Pearls” strategy.
If Bangladesh proceeds with acquiring the JF-17, it would mark a significant turning point in South Asia’s military landscape. For decades, India has maintained a dominant position in the region, with most of its smaller neighbors relying on it for security and economic support. However, Bangladesh’s recent shift towards China and Pakistan signals an erosion of this influence.
While India still enjoys considerable economic and trade leverage over Bangladesh, its inability to prevent Dhaka from exploring alternative defence partnerships highlights a changing geopolitical reality. The JF-17, therefore, represents more than just a fighter jet; it is a symbol of Bangladesh’s pursuit of strategic autonomy and a sign of shifting power dynamics in the region.
As tensions rise, India faces a strategic dilemma. Should it attempt to pressure Bangladesh into abandoning the deal, at the risk of further alienating Dhaka? Or should it recalibrate its regional approach to accommodate Bangladesh’s evolving defence priorities?
One thing is certain: Bangladesh’s military modernization, backed by China and Pakistan, is reshaping South Asia’s security order. Whether this leads to a more multipolar regional balance or fuels further tensions remains to be seen.
