Boeing’s decision to formally terminate its pursuit of selling the F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet to Indonesia marks a defining inflection point in Jakarta’s long-term airpower modernisation trajectory. What was once envisioned as a cornerstone programme to elevate the Indonesian Air Force’s high-end combat capability has now collapsed, signalling not just the failure of a single procurement effort but a broader reckoning with the realities of defence planning in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific security environment.
Confirming the strategic reversal at the Singapore Airshow, Boeing Defense Vice President for Business Development and Strategy Bernd Peters stated bluntly, “I will tell you it is no longer an active campaign for the Boeing company.” The remark underscored a decisive shift in U.S. defence-industrial engagement with Southeast Asia’s largest military and highlighted the growing friction between strategic ambition and procurement reality.
For Indonesia, the collapse of the F-15EX campaign effectively ends aspirations to field a heavy, long-range air superiority platform capable of reshaping regional air dominance. These ambitions had gained renewed momentum under President Prabowo Subianto’s administration, which sought to position the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) as a credible Indo-Pacific power projection force aligned with advanced Western combat aviation standards.
Originally structured around a 2023 memorandum of understanding (MoU) for up to 24 F-15EX aircraft valued at approximately US$13.9 billion—including training, weapons, logistics, and sustainment—the proposed acquisition was framed as a strategic leap toward enhanced interoperability with U.S. and allied air forces operating across the Indo-Pacific theatre. The deal, had it materialised, would have represented one of the most significant defence procurements in Indonesian history.
The timing and venue of Peters’ confirmation amplified the geopolitical significance of Boeing’s withdrawal. Delivered at Asia’s premier aerospace exhibition, the announcement signalled not merely a stalled procurement but a broader recalibration of U.S. defence export priorities amid intensifying competition with China for strategic influence across ASEAN air forces.
For Jakarta, the end of the F-15EX pursuit represents more than a failed transaction. It exposes structural vulnerabilities in Indonesia’s defence procurement ecosystem, where budget constraints, bureaucratic inertia, and geopolitical balancing increasingly collide with urgent operational demands imposed by South China Sea tensions and persistent airspace incursions near the Natuna Islands.
The episode also reinforces enduring scepticism within Southeast Asian defence circles regarding the reliability of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) pathways for high-end combat aircraft. For non-treaty partners like Indonesia, U.S. arms transfers are often entangled in complex political sensitivities, export controls, and congressional oversight that can stretch timelines indefinitely and inject uncertainty into long-term force planning.
Critically, Boeing’s exit deprives Indonesia of a platform optimised for long-range strike, payload flexibility, and advanced sensor fusion—capabilities uniquely suited for archipelagic defence across more than 17,000 islands. In such a geography, airpower endurance, rapid response, and the ability to carry large and diverse weapons loads are decisive factors in sovereignty enforcement.
Indonesia’s inability to translate strategic intent into contractual finality also underscores a deeper misalignment between declaratory defence ambitions and the institutional capacity to execute complex, high-value acquisitions involving stringent foreign oversight and politically sensitive export-control regimes.
From a military-operational perspective, the loss of the F-15EX option constrains Indonesia’s ability to generate a credible high-end deterrent layer above its existing mixed fleet. This limits options for long-range air policing, deep maritime strike, and high-payload missions essential for shaping adversary calculations in contested air and sea spaces.
At a geostrategic level, Boeing’s withdrawal subtly signals a recalibration in Washington’s risk calculus toward non-allied partners. Commercial opportunity is increasingly weighed against political friction, congressional scrutiny, and the strategic imperative to prioritise treaty allies facing more acute and immediate Chinese military pressure.
For Southeast Asia more broadly, the episode reinforces a growing perception that access to top-tier Western combat aircraft is no longer purely a function of military need or financial capacity. Instead, it is increasingly conditioned by alignment politics, human rights considerations, and long-term strategic reliability as perceived in Washington.
Ultimately, the collapse of Indonesia’s F-15EX ambitions may accelerate a structural shift in Jakarta’s airpower strategy toward diversified, non-Western, or co-development pathways. Such a shift could reshape the future balance of influence within the regional fighter aircraft market while redefining how Indonesia hedges its sovereignty amid intensifying great-power competition.
Indonesia’s interest in the F-15EX emerged in the early 2020s as Jakarta confronted the accelerating obsolescence of its Sukhoi Su-27SK, Su-30MK, and legacy F-16 fleets. This drove the search for a heavy multirole fighter capable of sustaining air dominance across vast maritime approaches and contested exclusive economic zones.
The F-15EX Eagle II, an advanced derivative of the proven F-15 lineage, offered an unmatched combination of payload capacity, extended combat radius, digital backbone architecture, and open mission systems designed to integrate next-generation weapons, electronic warfare suites, and advanced AESA radar technologies.
From a doctrinal standpoint, the platform aligned closely with Indonesia’s evolving airpower concept, which prioritised deterrence through reach. The F-15EX would have enabled TNI-AU to conduct persistent patrols over the Natuna Sea while retaining the ability to rapidly mass combat power in response to coercive grey-zone activities.
The August 2023 MoU signed during U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s visit to Jakarta was publicly framed by then–Defence Minister Prabowo as a “milestone” in bilateral defence cooperation. Expectations were high that the F-15EX would serve as a strategic anchor for deeper U.S.–Indonesia military alignment.
For Boeing, the Indonesian campaign represented a critical opportunity to expand its defence footprint in Southeast Asia, positioning the F-15EX as a “game-changer” that could anchor follow-on sustainment, training, and industrial cooperation pipelines over multiple decades.
However, the absence of a binding contract, coupled with unresolved financing structures and competing procurement priorities, steadily eroded momentum. By mid-2025, the lack of tangible progress increasingly signalled that Indonesia’s strategic intent had collided with structural constraints, setting the conditions for Boeing’s eventual disengagement.
At the core of the F-15EX collapse lies the hard arithmetic of Indonesia’s defence spending. The 2026 defence budget is estimated at approximately US$9.5 billion, making the US$13.9 billion F-15EX package fiscally disproportionate within Jakarta’s multi-year procurement envelope.
The scale of the proposed acquisition inevitably competed with Indonesia’s parallel commitment to acquire 42 Dassault Rafale fighters valued at roughly US$8.1 billion—a deal already consuming a significant share of available capital expenditure capacity.
Indonesia’s post-pandemic fiscal recovery, combined with heavy investments in infrastructure, social programmes, and industrial development, further constrained defence capital allocations. This intensified internal scrutiny over high-cost, single-platform acquisitions with limited domestic industrial spillover.
Compounding these pressures, the FMS framework subjected the deal to prolonged approval cycles. Political risk and uncertainty were exacerbated by persistent U.S. congressional sensitivities regarding Indonesia’s internal security operations, particularly in Papua.
These dynamics created a widening gap between operational urgency and procurement execution, frustrating Indonesian planners while simultaneously diminishing Boeing’s confidence in securing a timely and bankable contract.
The termination of the F-15EX pursuit leaves the Indonesian Air Force reliant on a heterogeneous fleet of 33 upgraded F-16s, 11 Su-30MKs, five Su-27SKs, and FA-50 light fighters. This force structure is increasingly strained by maintenance complexity, interoperability challenges, and divergent sustainment ecosystems.
Operationally, the absence of a heavy air superiority platform constrains Indonesia’s ability to project credible airpower across extended maritime distances, particularly in scenarios involving simultaneous airspace incursions and maritime coercion near the Natuna Exclusive Economic Zone.
The Rafale acquisition, with initial aircraft delivered in 2025 and squadron transition underway in early 2026, partially mitigates this gap. Indonesian Air Force Chief Marshal Fadjar Prasetyo has stated that “the Rafale will enhance our operational readiness and sovereignty in the skies,” reinforcing confidence in the platform’s multirole versatility.
However, Rafale alone cannot replicate the payload and endurance advantages envisioned under the F-15EX concept, necessitating supplementary solutions to sustain long-range deterrence and air dominance.
Alternative pathways remain constrained. Revisiting Russia’s Su-35 is complicated by sanctions risk under U.S. CAATSA legislation, while accelerating participation in South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae programme faces funding disputes and technology transfer friction.
Emerging interest in cost-effective platforms such as Pakistan’s JF-17 Thunder Block III reflects pragmatic recalibration. As one analyst observed, “The JF-17 Thunder gives Indonesia a modern, independent, and flexible fighter jet,” highlighting its sanctions-free profile and manageable lifecycle costs—even if it lacks the high-end performance of Western heavy fighters.
Boeing’s withdrawal reverberates beyond Indonesia, raising questions about the durability of U.S. defence influence in ASEAN as regional states increasingly diversify suppliers to hedge against political conditionality and procurement uncertainty.
In the South China Sea, Indonesia’s airpower modernisation delays risk weakening collective deterrence dynamics, particularly as neighbouring states accelerate fighter acquisitions to counter China’s expanding air and naval footprint.
For the United States, the loss of the F-15EX campaign highlights structural limitations within its export model when engaging partners unwilling or unable to absorb prolonged approval cycles and political oversight. Despite this setback, Boeing remains focused on a projected US$65 billion Asia-Pacific defence market, with Peters emphasising that “despite this, we see tremendous opportunities.”
Ultimately, Indonesia now faces a decisive strategic moment. Boeing’s withdrawal could become a catalyst for diversified self-reliance and multi-vendor hedging, or it could leave a lingering vulnerability within one of the Indo-Pacific’s most contested security environments.
More broadly, the unraveling of the F-15EX campaign reinforces a perception within ASEAN defence establishments that U.S. arms transfers increasingly carry strategic strings that complicate long-term force planning. This is encouraging regional air forces to pursue diversified procurement strategies as insurance against political disruption or export control reversals.
From an Indo-Pacific security architecture perspective, Indonesia’s stalled high-end fighter modernisation weakens the cumulative airpower balance that underpins regional deterrence—at a time when air and maritime coercion are becoming more frequent, more sophisticated, and more consequential.
