Brazil’s Drone Dilemma: Seeking ITAR-Free UAVs as Iran Showcases Kaman 22 at LAAD2025

Iran UCAV Kaman 22
  • Strategic Shift in Latin America’s Defense Landscape

Brazil has signaled its intent to acquire armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) free from U.S. export restrictions, while Iran showcased its latest drone offerings at a major Latin American defense exhibition. This development raises questions about shifting alliances, technological competition, and the evolving military procurement landscape in a multipolar world.

According to a post on X by SA Defense in late March, Brazil is actively seeking UAVs with combat capabilities that are not subject to the stringent regulations imposed by the U.S. State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This move reflects Brazil’s growing desire for strategic autonomy, allowing it to procure advanced weaponry without Washington’s oversight.

Brazil’s military is reportedly interested in Category-3 UCAVs armed with either four rockets or two missiles and a range of at least 186 miles (300 kilometers). The request suggests that Brazil is looking for drones that can conduct both reconnaissance and strike missions without relying on manned aircraft.

Meanwhile, at the LAAD2025 exhibition in Rio de Janeiro, Iran presented its Kaman 22 drone—a system that bears a striking resemblance to the American MQ-9 Reaper. The Iranian delegation emphasized the drone’s ability to operate for over 24 hours, cover a range of approximately 1,864 miles (3,000 kilometers), and carry a payload of up to 661 pounds (300 kilograms).

Developed by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), the Kaman 22 is designed for reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and precision strikes. It features external pylons for mounting bombs and missiles, and images from the exhibition suggest it may be capable of deploying laser-guided munitions similar to the U.S. GBU-12 Paveway.

Iranian officials have touted the Kaman 22 as a homegrown achievement, but its striking similarities to the MQ-9 Reaper—a mainstay of U.S. military operations—have raised eyebrows.

While Iran’s Kaman 22 represents a leap forward in the country’s UAV capabilities, it still lags behind the MQ-9 Reaper in several key areas. The Reaper, produced by General Atomics, boasts:

  • Maximum endurance: 27 hours
  • Operational range: 1,150 miles (1,850 kilometers)
  • Payload capacity: 3,850 pounds (1,746 kilograms)

In contrast, the Kaman 22 has a longer range but a significantly smaller payload, limiting its ability to carry sophisticated weapons. However, what Iran’s drone lacks in raw capability, it makes up for in accessibility—offering an ITAR-free alternative to U.S. systems.

Iran’s emergence as a drone supplier has been decades in the making. The country’s UAV program dates back to the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, when it deployed rudimentary surveillance drones. After the 1988 Operation Praying Mantis, in which U.S. naval forces decimated much of Iran’s conventional air and sea capabilities, Iran’s military-industrial complex pivoted toward self-reliance.

Iran’s drone development has benefited from reverse-engineering captured Western technology. The Shahed-129, unveiled in 2012, was modeled after the Israeli Hermes 450 and the U.S. MQ-1 Predator. The Kaman 22 represents the next step in Iran’s efforts to close the gap with Western UAVs.

For Brazil, the pursuit of ITAR-exempt drones is more about strategic pragmatism than technological preference. The country’s vast Amazon rainforest presents a logistical challenge for military operations, necessitating advanced UAVs for surveillance, border security, and counter-narcotics operations.

Additionally, regional instability—particularly Venezuela’s military buildup, which includes Russian S-300 air defense systems and Chinese K-8W trainers—has influenced Brazil’s defense planning. While a direct conflict is unlikely, Brazil seeks to modernize its military without being constrained by U.S. export controls.

The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) framework, administered by the U.S. State Department, governs the export of defense articles listed on the United States Munitions List (USML). While ITAR is designed to protect U.S. national security interests, it often delays or restricts arms sales to countries unwilling to align closely with Washington.

Brazil has historically balanced its military procurements between Western and non-Western suppliers. As a member of BRICS (alongside Russia, India, China, and South Africa), Brazil has diversified its arms imports, seeking independence from U.S. oversight.

Iran’s presence at LAAD2025 underscores a growing trend: non-Western arms manufacturers are gaining a foothold in Latin America. While the U.S. has traditionally dominated the region’s defense market, countries like Turkey, China, and now Iran are offering cost-effective, ITAR-free alternatives.

  • Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2, which played a decisive role in Nagorno-Karabakh, has a range of 186 miles (300 kilometers) and a payload of 330 pounds (150 kilograms).
  • China’s CH-4 Rainbow boasts an impressive 40-hour endurance and a 3,107-mile (5,000-kilometer) range, though it remains largely untested in combat.
  • Iran’s Kaman 22, despite its unproven battlefield performance, could attract countries looking for affordable armed drones without political restrictions.

The possibility of Brazil acquiring Iranian drones poses a diplomatic challenge for Washington. The U.S. has long viewed Latin America as its strategic backyard, reinforcing its influence through military aid, defense sales, and security partnerships.

If Brazil moves forward with an Iranian UAV deal, the U.S. could respond in several ways:

  • Easing ITAR restrictions: The U.S. may consider allowing Brazil access to systems like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, a less restricted cousin of the Reaper, to dissuade it from purchasing Iranian drones.
  • Diplomatic pressure: Washington could warn Brazil of the risks of engaging with a sanctioned state, though such warnings may have limited impact if Brazil prioritizes independence.
  • Economic leverage: The U.S. might use trade or military aid incentives to steer Brazil toward Western suppliers.

For decades, American and European firms dominated the global arms trade. However, the rise of low-cost, ITAR-free alternatives from Turkey, China, and Iran is reshaping military procurement worldwide.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, with its $80 million price tag per unit, exemplifies the Western approach to high-tech defense. In contrast, Iran’s drones, while less advanced, are cheaper and more accessible. The Shahed-136, for instance, has been used effectively by Russia in Ukraine and Houthi forces in Yemen, proving that low-tech solutions can still be strategically valuable.

Brazil’s interest in Iranian drones does not necessarily indicate an alliance shift but rather a desire for procurement flexibility. The Amazon’s vast, ungoverned spaces, coupled with regional security concerns, make UAVs an attractive investment.

However, Iran’s drones come with potential risks, including quality control issues, reliance on sanctioned components, and possible backlash from the U.S.. The Kaman 22’s range of 1,864 miles (3,000 kilometers) suggests that Brazil may also have ambitions beyond its immediate defense needs—perhaps signaling a desire to project power within the BRICS framework.

Brazil’s flirtation with Iranian drones and Iran’s bold presence at LAAD2025 highlight a changing world where military power is increasingly decentralized. Whether this development leads to an actual Brazil-Iran arms deal remains uncertain. However, the mere possibility forces Washington to reassess its defense export policies.

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