The extraordinary virtual summit of BRICS, convened on 8 September 2025 under Brazil’s rotating presidency, offered both a reaffirmation of the bloc’s multipolar ambitions and a sobering reminder of its enduring internal asymmetries. While the grouping — now enlarged and increasingly diverse — continues to project itself as a vanguard of a fairer, multipolar world order, its ability to deliver tangible outcomes remains constrained by diverging strategies, competing political systems, and uneven economic power among its members.
From its early days as BRIC — an acronym coined in 2001 for Brazil, Russia, India, and China — to its present form encompassing South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, BRICS has come to represent 55 per cent of the global population and over a quarter of global GDP. It is widely viewed as the primary geopolitical counterweight to the G7, advocating for an alternative to the Western-led order. Yet, as the 8 September virtual summit revealed, BRICS’ internal complexities may hinder its capacity to move from symbolism to substance.
The Rio de Janeiro–hosted summit was billed as “extraordinary,” convened to address the challenges facing the emerging multipolar order and to craft a unified response to renewed U.S. tariffs and trade restrictions. In tone and ambition, the summit sought to underscore BRICS’ collective vision of a more inclusive world order. But in practice, it reflected widening differences over how such an order should be achieved.
China and Russia, facing international isolation and economic pressure from the West, continue to see BRICS as a strategic platform to counterbalance U.S. dominance. Their shared vision is one of systemic contestation — building parallel financial and governance institutions to challenge Western hegemony. Brazil and India, by contrast, adopt non-aligned and cautious approaches, focusing on reforming existing multilateral structures rather than replacing them outright.
“BRICS is at a crossroads,” noted an analyst from the Brazilian Center for International Relations. “It wants to lead the new multipolar order, but its members disagree on what that order should look like.”
Since its founding, BRICS has been marked by power asymmetries — both economic and political. China’s GDP is larger than those of all other members combined, and its global infrastructure push under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) grants it substantial influence. This imbalance was evident during the summit, where Chinese President Xi Jinping outlined a sweeping vision structured around three pillars: multilateralism, openness through inclusive globalisation, and solidarity through cooperation in trade, finance, and technology.
Xi framed BRICS as a “bulwark against hegemonism,” implicitly positioning China as the leader of a new global South movement. Beijing also reaffirmed its commitment to expand the New Development Bank (NDB) and accelerate work on alternative payment systems, especially after Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT in 2022.
Russia, meanwhile, used the summit to advocate for deeper intra-BRICS trade and investment ties, particularly in energy and technology. Yet Moscow’s partial release of President Vladimir Putin’s remarks — reportedly omitting references to Ukraine — hinted at diplomatic caution amid Western scrutiny.
India’s participation stood out for its restraint. Represented by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar rather than Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi’s delegation emphasised rules-based multilateralism, fair supply chains, and climate action. India refrained from endorsing more radical ideas — such as aggressive de-dollarisation or a BRICS common currency — which could antagonise the United States, a key strategic partner.
“India values BRICS as a forum for South-South cooperation,” Jaishankar stated, “but multipolarity must not mean the replacement of one dominance with another.” His remarks subtly underscored India’s discomfort with China’s growing preponderance in the grouping.
The bloc’s recent expansion — adding the UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia — has both amplified its global profile and intensified its internal contradictions. Iran, aligning closely with Russia and China, pressed during the summit for the introduction of a common BRICS currency to rival the U.S. dollar. In contrast, the UAE and Indonesia, whose economies are deeply integrated with Western markets, displayed reluctance toward any policy that might threaten their financial stability or relations with Washington.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi openly challenged the bloc’s endorsement of a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, calling it “unrealistic” and urging an “inclusive one-state model.” His intervention highlighted the ideological fissures within the enlarged grouping — between democratic and authoritarian members, and between pragmatic and ideological foreign policies.
The inclusion of non-democratic states has also reignited debates about the bloc’s identity and credibility. Some members, particularly Brazil and India, worry that admitting states with authoritarian systems could undermine BRICS’ legitimacy as a voice of the Global South.
“The challenge is not expansion itself,” said a South African diplomat familiar with the discussions. “It’s whether BRICS can speak with one voice when its members view democracy, development, and sovereignty in fundamentally different ways.”
Despite these tensions, the bloc retains some pragmatic cohesion. India and China — despite their border disputes and strategic rivalry — have maintained limited cooperation within BRICS, including reciprocal support for each other’s upcoming summits. Russia and India’s engagement also serves as a counterbalance to a fully China-dominated grouping, giving BRICS a semblance of multipolar equilibrium.
Russia’s economic dependence on China has grown since Western sanctions took hold, yet Moscow continues to project independence through multi-platform diplomacy, including its outreach to Africa and Latin America. Brazil, under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has sought to restore its leadership credentials by championing South-South cooperation and resisting binary alignments.
India, meanwhile, has leveraged the forum to advocate for secure critical mineral supply chains, indirectly pointing to China’s dominance in rare earths processing. The proposal reflects New Delhi’s attempt to recast BRICS as a forum for practical economic cooperation, not just geopolitical posturing.
Among BRICS’ tangible achievements, the New Development Bank (NDB) remains the most significant. Established in 2014 to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects, the NDB has approved more than US$35 billion in loans. Yet questions persist over its operational autonomy and the disproportionate influence of Chinese capital.
Efforts to establish alternative financial mechanisms — such as the BRICS Pay system and proposed cross-border digital currency frameworks — continue, but progress has been uneven. Brazil and India favour gradual reform within existing global systems, while Russia and China push for more radical detachment from Western institutions.
Beyond institutional reform, BRICS has become a political symbol for many developing countries seeking greater representation. Its emphasis on equitable global governance, trade inclusivity, and climate justice resonates with states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America frustrated with Western-dominated financial systems.
However, the bloc’s effectiveness as a collective negotiating platform remains uncertain. While it champions “Global South solidarity,” its members’ trade patterns and investment flows remain heavily dependent on Western markets and technologies. This dependence limits the bloc’s ability to act independently in the global economic arena.
Still, there have been modest diplomatic dividends. The Iran–UAE bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the 2024 summit marked a rare thaw in regional tensions, illustrating BRICS’ potential as a mediating platform for intra-South disputes.
As the extraordinary virtual summit concluded, leaders reaffirmed their shared vision of multilateralism, free trade, and inclusivity. Yet the fundamental question persists: can BRICS convert its rhetoric of multipolarity into real influence?
