Canada’s fighter-jet debate is entering a new phase as Swedish defence and aerospace company Saab moves to turn its offer of domestic manufacturing, technology transfer and sovereign control into a concrete industrial proposition. By selecting three major Canadian aerospace companies as prospective partners, Saab is strengthening its campaign to persuade Ottawa to reconsider its commitment to the American-made F-35A Lightning II fighter.
The announcement, made on October 27, sets out a potential industrial framework involving CAE, IMP Aerospace & Defense and Magellan Aerospace. If the Canadian government chooses the Gripen E, Saab says the companies would help establish a domestic ecosystem for aircraft assembly, component manufacturing, pilot and technician training, maintenance and long-term fleet support.
The move comes as the government continues to review its planned purchase of 88 F-35A fighters from Lockheed Martin, a programme that has become increasingly sensitive amid trade and diplomatic tensions between Canada and the United States.
For Saab, the challenge is no longer simply to demonstrate the Gripen’s operational capabilities. It is to convince Canadian policymakers that choosing the Swedish fighter could deliver greater industrial returns, more national control over military technology and less dependence on a single foreign supplier.
Saab’s proposed arrangement assigns distinct responsibilities to three established Canadian aerospace companies, creating a framework that could distribute manufacturing and support work across several regions.
IMP Aerospace & Defense, based in Halifax, Nova Scotia, would establish and operate a final-assembly line for the Gripen in Canada. It would also manufacture electrical assemblies and provide in-service support for the Royal Canadian Air Force’s fleet.
The company already works in military aviation maintenance, repair and overhaul, fleet management, aircraft modernisation, engineering, systems integration and manufacturing. Those capabilities would provide a potential foundation for supporting the aircraft throughout its service life.
Mississauga, Ontario-based Magellan Aerospace would manufacture advanced aerostructures, composite structures and other structural assemblies. The company’s existing aerospace manufacturing activities include aircraft engines and complex structural components, while its wider business encompasses maintenance services, rocket motors and space systems.
Montreal-based CAE would provide advanced training for fighter pilots and technicians, alongside mission-systems engineering and support and sustainment services. A global supplier of simulation and training technologies, CAE has experience developing military training systems and simulators for defence customers.
Together, the proposed roles cover several stages of the aircraft’s lifecycle, from manufacturing and final assembly to training, maintenance and upgrades.
Saab argues that these arrangements would strengthen Canada’s sovereign defence capabilities while developing advanced aerospace and engineering expertise. The partnerships also give the company a more specific answer to a central question surrounding its offer: how much of the economic and technological benefit would actually remain in Canada?
The agreements do not, by themselves, mean that production will begin or that a Gripen contract has been awarded. Their significance lies in demonstrating that Saab has identified potential domestic industrial partners and outlined how they could contribute if Ottawa selects the aircraft.
The industrial argument is central to Saab’s campaign. The company has repeatedly promoted the prospect of creating approximately 10,000 Canadian jobs through its proposed fighter programme, with the potential for additional employment if other defence systems, including the GlobalEye airborne surveillance aircraft, are included in a wider industrial package.
The proposed benefits extend beyond the number of jobs created. Saab has offered local production, technology transfer, access to mission-system source code, sovereign control of operational data and greater Canadian independence in maintenance and future upgrades.
These commitments address a longstanding concern among defence planners: whether a country operating sophisticated foreign-built combat aircraft can maintain and adapt its fleet without depending excessively on the manufacturer or its government.
Access to source code and technology, however, depends on the precise contractual terms, intellectual-property arrangements and security restrictions ultimately agreed. The proposed partnerships should therefore be understood as an industrial framework rather than proof that every element of Saab’s technology-transfer offer has been contractually guaranteed.
The Canadian government has increasingly emphasised industrial participation, regional economic development and domestic sustainment when considering major defence purchases.
“We think that we can use military procurement to get more,” Industry Minister Mélanie Joly said in November 2025 while discussing the potential employment benefits of fighter programmes. “That is why we’re looking, indeed, at the Gripen.”
Joly also indicated that the government would examine what Lockheed Martin could offer Canada, suggesting that the industrial competition would not be limited to comparing Saab’s promises with the existing F-35 contract.
The October 27 announcement strengthens Saab’s position by attaching its proposals to companies with established Canadian operations and relevant aerospace expertise. It could also make the prospective benefits more tangible for provincial governments, local communities and lawmakers concerned about where defence spending will generate employment.
The competition between the two aircraft manufacturers dates back to March 28, 2022, when Lockheed Martin prevailed over Saab in Canada’s fighter procurement competition. The resulting programme was valued at approximately C$27.7 billion for 88 F-35A Lightning II aircraft, with an initial commitment covering 16 fighters.
Saab challenged the outcome, arguing that the procurement process had disadvantaged its proposal. The Swedish company maintained that its aircraft and industrial offer represented better value, while questioning the transparency and competitiveness of the selection process.
The political context changed significantly after Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a review of the F-35 purchase in March 2025, amid worsening tensions with the administration of US President Donald Trump.
The review placed greater emphasis on whether Canada should continue relying so heavily on American suppliers for critical military capabilities. Trade disputes and diplomatic disagreements have reinforced concerns about the risks of concentrating defence procurement, maintenance and technological dependence within a single foreign industrial ecosystem.
In August 2026, Stephen Fuhr, secretary of state for defence procurement, said a sole-source military contract awarded to an American company could be difficult to defend politically under the prevailing circumstances.
“That’s just me reading the room,” Fuhr said in an interview, adding that the public might not welcome such a decision, particularly following recent developments in the Canada-US relationship.
Fuhr also stressed the importance of avoiding a situation in which Canada puts all its eggs in one basket. He argued that Ottawa needed to develop additional strategic partnerships or strengthen its capacity to manufacture defence equipment independently, while continuing to recognise the United States as a crucial defence ally.
Saab’s offer directly addresses these concerns. Domestic assembly, Canadian maintenance facilities and a wider industrial network could give Ottawa more influence over the availability and long-term operation of its fighter fleet.
Yet reducing dependence on foreign suppliers is not the same as eliminating it. Even an aircraft assembled in Canada would depend on supply chains, specialised components, software arrangements and international cooperation. The extent of any resulting sovereignty would depend on the final agreement and the practical control Canada secured over critical systems.
Despite the political momentum behind Saab’s proposal, abandoning the F-35 programme would carry substantial strategic implications.
The F-35A is a fifth-generation stealth fighter designed to combine low observability, advanced sensors, electronic warfare and data-sharing capabilities. Its ability to operate within a network of allied platforms makes it particularly relevant to Canada’s continental defence responsibilities and cooperation with the United States through the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD.
The aircraft is also designed to operate alongside allied forces that are increasingly investing in advanced combat aviation and integrated air-defence systems. Canadian defence planners must consider potential operations against sophisticated adversaries, including China and Russia, whose military capabilities include advanced aircraft, long-range weapons and increasingly complex air defences.
For supporters of the F-35, its stealth characteristics and integration with allied systems offer advantages that cannot be assessed solely through domestic job creation or aircraft acquisition costs.
The Gripen E, meanwhile, is a modern multirole fighter designed around a different operational and industrial model. Saab has emphasised its maintenance approach, operational flexibility, dispersed basing potential and the possibility of building a substantial support infrastructure in Canada.
Its proponents argue that a domestically supported Gripen fleet could provide Canada with greater control over readiness and sustainment. But the aircraft would still need to satisfy Canadian requirements for Arctic operations, weapons integration, interoperability, training and the broader defence mission.
The central question is therefore whether the industrial and operational benefits offered by Saab would outweigh the strategic advantages Canada expects from the F-35. That calculation requires a detailed assessment of capability, lifecycle costs, delivery schedules, industrial commitments and the risks associated with each supply chain.
A third option has also entered the debate: acquiring both aircraft rather than selecting one exclusively.
Earlier reports in Canadian media suggested that Ottawa could consider a fleet comprising 72 F-35s and 72 Gripen E/F fighters. Such a proposal would represent a larger total acquisition than the original plan for 88 F-35As and would seek to combine fifth-generation stealth capabilities with the industrial and operational advantages promoted by Saab.
A mixed fleet could preserve deep interoperability with US and allied forces while establishing a separate domestic industrial and sustainment network around the Gripen. It could also give Canada greater flexibility in managing future procurement decisions and negotiating industrial arrangements with foreign suppliers.
However, operating two different fighter types would introduce significant costs and complexity. The Royal Canadian Air Force would need to support separate training pipelines, maintenance systems, spare-parts inventories, technical expertise, weapons integration requirements and potentially different infrastructure.
The financial consequences would extend beyond purchasing the aircraft. Canada would need to evaluate the full lifecycle costs of operating, upgrading and sustaining both fleets over several decades.
A mixed fleet could also dilute the economies of scale associated with operating a single aircraft type. Its feasibility would depend on whether the additional strategic flexibility and industrial benefits justified the increased expenditure and organisational burden.
For these reasons, a dual-fighter arrangement remains a possibility to be assessed rather than an established procurement decision.
Saab’s latest announcement adds substance to its Canadian campaign, but it does not resolve the strategic choices facing Ottawa. The selection of CAE, IMP Aerospace & Defense and Magellan Aerospace establishes a prospective network of domestic partners, while the proposed assembly line and manufacturing activities offer a clearer picture of how a Gripen programme might operate in Canada.
The wider contest is also about the future of Canadian defence industry policy. Ottawa must determine how to balance immediate military requirements with employment, technology transfer, domestic industrial capacity and the political consequences of relying on foreign suppliers.
The F-35 offers capabilities and allied integration that would be difficult to replicate through an industrial agreement alone. The Gripen offers a different proposition, built around local manufacturing, sustainment and a potentially greater role for Canadian companies in the aircraft’s lifecycle.
Meanwhile, the continued review leaves manufacturers, prospective suppliers and the Royal Canadian Air Force facing uncertainty. The unresolved question is whether Canada will retain its existing commitment, alter the number of F-35s it purchases, select Saab’s fighter or pursue a mixed fleet.
For Saab, the partnerships announced on October 27 represent a significant step in making its proposal more concrete. For Canada, the decision will ultimately depend on whether the Gripen’s promised industrial and sovereign benefits can be delivered without compromising the operational capabilities required to defend the country and work effectively with its allies.
