Since launching the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has emerged as one of the world’s largest overseas energy investors. For much of the past decade, Beijing’s engagement abroad was dominated by fossil fuel projects. However, the post-pandemic period has marked a notable shift, with renewable energy investment increasingly taking centre stage, particularly in developing regions.
This transition has coincided with China’s promotion of the “Green Belt and Road Initiative,” a narrative designed to counter growing criticism that BRI projects were excessively carbon-intensive. At the same time, the Gulf states have significantly expanded their own clean energy investments overseas. Together, these trends have transformed Central Asia—long associated with hydrocarbons—into an emerging arena for renewable energy development since 2022.
China and Gulf investors are influencing Central Asia’s energy transition through what analysts describe as “complementary competition.” While both sides invest heavily in renewables, they often occupy distinct but mutually reinforcing roles, from financing and technology provision to construction and grid integration. Such investment can accelerate decarbonisation across the region, but it also carries the risk of creating new dependencies. Whether benefits outweigh risks will depend largely on Central Asia’s ability to diversify partners and shape investment terms.
Despite a history in which not all BRI agreements materialised, China has commissioned and completed multiple renewable energy projects in Central Asia since the pandemic. Kazakhstan has become the primary recipient of Chinese clean energy finance. According to the China BRI Investment Report 2024, Kazakhstan attracted US$4.6 billion in BRI investments in 2024, with a significant share directed to renewables and electricity production.
Flagship projects include the Zhanatas 100-megawatt wind farm built by China Power International Holding, as well as several major solar plants in the Karaganda and Almaty regions. These installations rank among Kazakhstan’s largest renewable projects and are frequently cited as evidence of China’s growing role in diversifying the country’s energy mix. Gulf firms, notably Masdar of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power, have also entered the market, investing in wind farms and battery storage systems.
Uzbekistan has similarly emerged as a hub for Chinese renewable investment. In 2023, Chinese BRI investments in the country reached approximately US$1.4 billion, largely focused on solar and wind power. A milestone was the 400-MW solar plant in the Andijan region, developed with Chinese financing and technology, which became Uzbekistan’s first utility-scale solar project.
Here too, Chinese companies face complementary competition from Gulf investors. Masdar has secured several major contracts, including the Zarafshan wind farm, planned at 500 MW and set to become Central Asia’s largest single wind project. While Masdar led development, China’s Goldwind supplied 111 turbines, and PowerChina joined as a construction contractor, illustrating how Gulf capital and Chinese technology often converge.
Elsewhere in Central Asia, Chinese clean energy finance remains limited. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have seen smaller-scale engagement, mostly in hydropower rehabilitation and electricity transmission rather than large solar or wind projects. Small market sizes, weak regulatory frameworks and limited incentives have constrained broader investment.
China’s motivation is partly driven by overcapacity at home. Central Asia offers an export market for Chinese renewable technology and expertise, allowing firms to sustain production while embedding themselves in regional infrastructure and strengthening diplomatic ties. Still, as of 2025, China’s renewable footprint in Central Asia remains smaller than in Africa or Southeast Asia, where population growth, industrial expansion and stronger incentives generate greater demand.
Another area of growing Chinese influence is electric vehicles. Chinese brands such as BYD and Geely now dominate Central Asia’s nascent EV markets. In Uzbekistan, nearly all imported EVs come from China, while Tajikistan has begun construction of an EV plant financed by Chinese capital.
Some experts warn that reliance on Chinese finance and technology could create asymmetric dependencies. Yet others argue that risks can be mitigated if Central Asian governments diversify partners and negotiate balanced terms. Ultimately, the success of the region’s green transition will hinge less on China’s intentions than on Central Asia’s capacity to set clear rules, strengthen regulatory frameworks and collaborate broadly.
