The Cook Islands signed a series of far-reaching agreements with China, including a comprehensive strategic partnership. These agreements represent more than bilateral cooperation; they reflect a broader geopolitical shift that could reshape power dynamics in the South Pacific. China’s growing presence in the region presents a direct challenge to the traditional influence wielded by Australia and New Zealand, countries that have long viewed the Pacific as their strategic backyard.
The Cook Islands, a self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand, has typically maintained close relations with Wellington. However, its recent embrace of Chinese infrastructure investment, diplomatic engagement, and strategic alignment signals a move toward economic diversification that carries long-term political implications. The reality is this: the geopolitical game in the Pacific is changing, and Australia and New Zealand are struggling to keep up.
China’s engagement with the Cook Islands is part of a broader regional strategy under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What began as a framework for building ports, roads, and telecommunications infrastructure has evolved into a multifaceted approach to diplomacy, debt, and influence. In the Cook Islands, Chinese investment has begun to transform key sectors, including transport, energy, and digital connectivity.
These investments are not mere acts of goodwill. By embedding itself in the economic foundations of Pacific Island nations, China increases its political leverage. Over time, this creates dependencies that shift the balance of power and potentially compromise local decision-making autonomy. The Cook Islands, while gaining valuable infrastructure and financial support, risks becoming economically entangled with a geopolitical actor whose interests may not always align with its own.
Australia and New Zealand have historically approached the Pacific through the lens of development aid, peacekeeping, and cultural ties. These strategies, while beneficial in fostering goodwill, now appear outdated in the face of China’s aggressive and tangible economic diplomacy. Pacific nations are no longer content to be passive recipients of aid; they seek partnerships that offer real and immediate benefits.
In Australia, domestic political realities hinder effective responses. Climate change, immigration, and economic uncertainty dominate the national agenda. Although successive Australian governments have stressed the importance of Pacific engagement, public support for initiatives aimed at curbing Chinese influence remains tepid. Voters are often more concerned with housing prices and job security than abstract geopolitical shifts in remote island nations.
In New Zealand, the dynamic is more personal. The Cook Islands shares a unique relationship with New Zealand: its citizens are New Zealand citizens, and ties of kinship and culture run deep. Yet this closeness may ironically undermine Wellington’s ability to influence decision-making. A paternalistic tone can creep into public statements and policy discussions, framing New Zealand as a protective guardian rather than a partner. This attitude no longer resonates with Pacific Island leaders eager to assert their sovereignty and chart independent foreign policies.
There is a growing sentiment among Pacific leaders that Australia and New Zealand, despite their regional leadership, often approach the Pacific with a colonial mindset. Efforts to dictate or caution against engagement with China are increasingly seen as condescending. The subtext of many Western warnings is clear: Beijing is a threat, and you need us to protect you. But Pacific nations, especially those like the Cook Islands, are pushing back against this narrative.
Elites in the region argue that China represents an opportunity to diversify their economic and political options. In their eyes, alignment with China is not necessarily about ideology or allegiance, but pragmatism. As the United States, under President Donald Trump’s renewed leadership, retreats from multilateralism and soft power diplomacy, China’s appeal as a reliable and generous partner grows.
If China poses a threat, many Pacific leaders argue, it is not a threat to their sovereignty or stability, but rather to the regional dominance historically enjoyed by Australia and New Zealand.
Part of the challenge for Canberra and Wellington lies in their entrenchment in multilateral frameworks like the Pacific Islands Forum. These institutions, while important, are slow-moving and consensus-driven, making agile responses to strategic challenges difficult. The need to consult multiple stakeholders and avoid heavy-handed tactics often leads to diluted or delayed action.
China, by contrast, operates bilaterally and with speed. When a Pacific Island nation seeks support, China can deliver without the bureaucracy or moral caveats often attached to Western aid. This nimbleness gives Beijing a significant edge in a region where needs are urgent and patience is limited.
New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters has called for a “reset” in the relationship with the Cook Islands. This includes revisiting the terms of free association, an arrangement that may no longer reflect the realities of 21st-century geopolitics. A new pact, built on equality rather than oversight, could help restore balance and trust.
Such a reset must begin with a clear-eyed recognition that the Cook Islands is not beholden to any one power. Rather than viewing the relationship through a lens of loyalty and expectation, New Zealand must treat the Cook Islands as a sovereign partner with its own interests and agency. This means accepting that the Cook Islands will engage with China—and possibly other powers—as part of its strategic calculus.
Efforts by Australia to counter China’s influence through soft diplomacy are underway. The creation of the Pacific Policing Initiative and the funding of a Papua New Guinea team for the National Rugby League are examples of targeted engagement. However, these projects, while symbolically important, fall short of addressing the structural economic challenges facing Pacific Island nations.
One critical area that remains neglected is logistics. The cost and inefficiency of freight cargo transport across the Pacific is a major impediment to trade and development. A bold step for Australia would be to lead the creation of a regional shipping company, co-owned by Pacific nations. This would demonstrate commitment to solving real problems and provide a tangible counterweight to Chinese investment.
The rise of China in the Pacific should not be viewed solely as a zero-sum competition. There is an opportunity for Australia and New Zealand to evolve their approach from guardianship to partnership. Doing so would require embracing a more pragmatic, less moralistic view of international relations. Instead of pressuring Pacific nations to choose sides, they must work to ensure that the region remains a place where multiple partnerships can coexist.
For the Cook Islands, the path forward is complex. While Chinese investment may boost economic growth, it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Debt obligations, shifting diplomatic norms, and the potential erosion of transparency all pose risks. But these are risks that the Cook Islands must weigh for itself.
Australia and New Zealand’s role, if they hope to remain influential, must be to offer viable alternatives. This means investing not just money but political capital into understanding Pacific priorities and co-creating solutions.
China’s deeper involvement in the Cook Islands marks a potential turning point in South Pacific geopolitics. No longer passive actors, Pacific nations are asserting themselves in new and confident ways. The traditional power hierarchies are being rewritten, and the old rules no longer apply.
Australia and New Zealand must come to terms with this reality. The future of Pacific engagement will not be dictated by proximity or past alliances, but by relevance and respect. Whether through revamped free association agreements, strategic infrastructure partnerships, or a renewed diplomatic ethos, Canberra and Wellington need to move beyond reactive policy.
