China has significantly bolstered its arsenal of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), a move raising alarms across the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. Recent satellite imagery, released by commercial satellite operator Umbra on September 9, 2024, reveals nearly 60 newly assembled transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) at the Beijing Xinghang Electromechanical Equipment Factory, a key missile production site. According to Janes, a defense intelligence group, these TELs form part of a rapid expansion in China’s missile production, suggesting a major shift in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) capabilities.
This development represents a strategic acceleration in the production of DF-26 missiles, known colloquially as the “Guam Express” for their range capability of reaching American military bases on Guam. For the United States and its allies, China’s growing missile stockpile signals an intent to strengthen its deterrence capabilities and enhance its readiness for any potential conflict in the region.
The SAR imagery captured by Umbra offers a clear view of 59 DF-26 TELs in a newly developed staging area at the Beijing-based manufacturing facility. Analysts from Janes report that commercial satellite data, analyzed from 2023 to 2024, suggests the factory has assembled approximately 72 DF-26 TELs since the last delivery to the PLARF in 2020-2021. If fully equipped, these newly produced TELs could support two 36-TEL brigades, indicating a massive boost to China’s intermediate-range ballistic missile force.
The newly produced missiles could allow China to double the PLARF’s operational reach, according to defense analysts. “The large assembly of DF-26 launchers is more than just an increase in numbers,” says Jane’s defense analyst Ankit Panda. “It’s a clear indication that China’s commitment to expanding its IRBM force is serious and persistent.” The scale of production has also drawn comparisons to the rapid militarization that characterized Cold War arms build-ups.
The DF-26, a mobile ballistic missile platform, has been a point of concern since its initial reveal during China’s 2015 military parade, where it was touted as a pivotal asset for “dual deterrence.” The missile’s ability to carry either nuclear or conventional warheads allows it to execute precision strikes on both land and naval targets, giving the Chinese military unmatched flexibility in its choice of payload.
A 2023 report from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), titled the “China Military Power Report,” estimated that the PLARF had roughly 250 DF-26 launchers in service at the end of 2022. The Pentagon’s findings align with observations from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), which suggests that some of these TELs may have been assembled at the Beijing facility. The increase in DF-26 TELs underscores a strategic pivot by the PLARF to mobile missile systems, likely aimed at ensuring survivability and enhancing mobility across critical deployment regions.
However, the most recent SAR and monthly satellite data indicated that from 2022 to early 2024, visible DF-26 assembly activities were minimal. The abrupt uptick in production has left analysts questioning whether China’s current focus is on actively deploying these missiles or primarily stockpiling them. “The sheer volume of assembled DF-26 TELs could imply that China is preparing for a worst-case scenario or it could simply be flexing its manufacturing muscle to project power,” remarked Daniel Ellsberg, an analyst with the Center for Strategic Studies.
The DF-26’s specifications are designed to meet China’s strategic needs within the Indo-Pacific. With a maximum range of over 3,100 miles (approximately 5,000 kilometers), the DF-26 can target critical installations, particularly on Guam, where U.S. forces have built a substantial military presence. The missile’s capability to switch between conventional and nuclear warheads within hours further complicates defensive planning, as this dual-purpose functionality requires adversaries to prepare for multiple types of response scenarios.
This flexible targeting capability is especially significant in a region where U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups play a crucial role in power projection. During a potential conflict, U.S. carriers, which serve as mobile airbases, would likely be prime targets for China’s ballistic missile systems. Analysts such as Dr. Ian Easton of the Project 2049 Institute note that the DF-26’s “carrier killer” reputation places U.S. naval operations at unprecedented risk. “China’s ability to strike both ground and naval targets with the DF-26 complicates U.S. defensive options,” says Easton, “particularly if the U.S. cannot quickly neutralize or intercept these missiles.”
The U.S. Department of Defense, along with military officials from allied nations like Japan and Australia, have expressed deepening concerns about the DF-26’s role in potentially altering the military balance within the Indo-Pacific. “The DF-26 is a destabilizing asset,” commented former U.S. Navy Admiral William Moran. “It places American forces in a much more vulnerable position and fundamentally changes our calculus regarding force protection and power projection in the region.”
An analysis of satellite imagery and handheld photography indicates that at least seven brigades within the PLARF are currently outfitted with the DF-26. These brigades are strategically stationed across key locations from Jianshui in the south to Korla in the northwest, offering China substantial regional coverage and positioning the DF-26 as a core part of the PLARF’s regional offensive strategy.
However, it remains unclear if these new TELs are intended to reinforce existing DF-26 brigades or to replace outdated DF-21 missile systems. The DF-21, while still operational, lacks the advanced dual-capability and range of the DF-26, leading many defense analysts to believe that the latter will become the primary missile of choice for China’s mid-range strike capabilities.
In October 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping inspected a DF-26 unit in Anhui province, an event that Chinese media portrayed as a high-profile endorsement of the PLARF’s ongoing missile expansion. The timing of the inspection has led to speculation that China is sending a signal to both domestic and international audiences about its readiness and capability to defend its regional interests.
For the United States and its allies, the expanding DF-26 arsenal brings complex strategic and economic considerations. Former U.S. Navy submarine commander Tom Shugart underscored the “trade-off” scenario in which China could afford to lose relatively inexpensive missiles to destroy far more costly American naval assets. “In a sea conflict, the PLA would be perfectly willing to trade a missile costing around $20 million for an American destroyer that costs billions to replace,” Shugart said.
The DF-26’s low cost relative to American destroyers, carriers, or other high-value targets renders it a cost-effective tool in China’s arsenal. The calculus behind using missiles like the DF-26 to target large American assets may very well shape future defense planning for both the U.S. and its allies in the region.
The DF-26, produced by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), reflects the high priority China places on indigenous production and technological advancement in defense. Chinese defense manufacturers have invested heavily in optimizing assembly processes to expedite missile production while maintaining high quality standards, according to recent studies from the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. The rapid assembly of DF-26 TELs demonstrates China’s ability to ramp up production for strategic needs quickly.
Furthermore, the DF-26’s increased range and precision, as evidenced by recent tests, highlight CASC’s achievements in developing road-mobile missiles. Such advancements also reveal a high level of technological proficiency, as mobile systems like the DF-26 necessitate compact but powerful engines, durable chassis, and advanced electronics for targeting.
The expanded DF-26 stockpile presents a challenge not only for the U.S. but also for its allies, especially Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, where American military presence and assets are heavily concentrated. China’s aggressive missile strategy places new pressure on these nations to either bolster their own defensive capabilities or rely more heavily on U.S. support.
For the United States, the proliferation of DF-26 TELs likely means further investment in missile defense systems, increased diplomatic engagement with regional allies, and potentially more U.S. military assets stationed in the region. The Pentagon is already working on bolstering missile defense through partnerships with Japan and South Korea, although defense experts caution that missile interception is far from foolproof. The U.S. Army’s newly deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, for instance, may have limited capacity to intercept missiles like the DF-26 due to their range and speed.
Ultimately, China’s decision to continue ramping up its DF-26 production indicates a commitment to enhancing its regional deterrence posture, even as the U.S. and its allies strengthen their own countermeasures. This escalating arms build-up has led many security analysts to worry about a potential arms race in the Indo-Pacific, where both sides seek strategic dominance.
