China is advancing plans to build a nuclear power plant on the Moon as part of a joint project with Russia to establish a long-term lunar research base, according to new details unveiled by a senior Chinese space official. The ambitious plan underscores Beijing’s determination to become a dominant force in space and signals a major leap in its strategic partnership with Moscow.
Speaking at an international space conference in Shanghai on Wednesday, Pei Zhaoyu, chief engineer for China’s upcoming Chang’e-8 mission, revealed that nuclear energy could serve as the backbone of the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) energy infrastructure. The ILRS is a joint China-Russia initiative aimed at building a permanent base on the Moon, with a timeline that extends into the 2030s.
While China has not formally confirmed the deployment of a nuclear power facility on the lunar surface, the inclusion of such a concept in Pei’s official presentation, delivered to representatives from 17 countries and global space organizations, is seen as an implicit endorsement of the plan.
“A major challenge for any long-term lunar mission is power,” Pei said during his address. “We’re exploring multiple solutions, including solar panels, power transmission cables, and nuclear systems. Our aim is to build an energy infrastructure that ensures round-the-clock support for exploration and habitation.”
The Moon’s harsh environment—marked by 14-day-long nights, extreme temperature fluctuations, and limited sunlight—makes it difficult to rely solely on solar power. While large-scale solar arrays may work during the lunar day, they provide no electricity during the prolonged night, making nuclear energy an attractive alternative.
According to Pei, the Chang’e-8 mission, set for launch in 2028, will serve as a technological pathfinder for the ILRS. It will test key systems required for future lunar habitation, including energy generation, storage, and distribution infrastructure. The mission will lay the groundwork for larger-scale operations and, potentially, for the construction of a small modular nuclear reactor.
China and Russia have been steadily deepening their space cooperation in recent years, and the ILRS stands as one of the most visible signs of that alignment. The project, first announced in 2021, envisions a permanent robotic outpost by the early 2030s, followed by a crewed lunar base around 2035.
Russia’s extensive experience with nuclear technology, particularly in space-based applications, makes it a key partner in the project. Wu Weiren, chief designer of China’s lunar exploration program, emphasized this point during the Shanghai event.
“When it comes to nuclear power plants, especially sending them into space, Russia leads the world,” Wu told Reuters. “It is ahead of the United States in this field and provides a natural advantage for the ILRS.”
Russia has a long history of deploying nuclear systems in space, including radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) used on Soviet-era lunar and planetary missions. Its expertise could be critical in developing a lunar fission reactor capable of producing stable, high-output energy in the Moon’s hostile conditions.
The nuclear reactor plan fits into a broader pattern of China’s increasingly ambitious space goals. In 2023, China became the second country after the U.S. to retrieve samples from the far side of the Moon with its Chang’e-6 mission. Its follow-up, Chang’e-7, will launch in 2026 to scout potential landing sites for the ILRS near the lunar south pole, a region believed to harbor water ice in permanently shadowed craters.
The 2028 Chang’e-8 mission, Pei explained, will include in-situ resource utilization experiments—such as converting lunar soil into construction materials and extracting oxygen from regolith. These are critical steps toward creating a sustainable lunar presence.
If successful, China plans to send its first astronauts to the Moon before 2030, marking a milestone achievement in its human spaceflight program. A crewed lunar base would follow in the years thereafter, supported by a robust energy system that could include nuclear power.
The idea of a nuclear power plant on the Moon is not without controversy. While China has not disclosed technical specifics, the potential militarization of such infrastructure has raised concerns among some Western analysts and defense officials.
“Nuclear power in space always triggers strategic alarms,” said Laura Grego, a space security expert at the Union of Concerned Scientists. “While the stated purpose may be civilian, the dual-use nature of nuclear technology—especially in a strategic environment like the Moon—makes it a flashpoint.”
The United States has also been working on space-based nuclear technology. NASA, along with the Department of Energy, has been developing a surface fission reactor under the Artemis program. The U.S. aims to deploy a 40-kilowatt nuclear system on the Moon by the early 2030s.
However, China’s willingness to fast-track its plans and partner with Russia has added urgency to the space race. With geopolitical tensions high, lunar infrastructure is increasingly being viewed through the lens of national security and great power competition.
Despite the sensitive implications, China has framed the ILRS as an inclusive, international scientific project. The Shanghai conference featured delegates from countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Officials described the event as part of a broader diplomatic push to build a “Lunar Community of Shared Future.”
Yet, the ILRS is also widely seen as a counterweight to the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, a framework for lunar cooperation signed by more than 30 countries, including key U.S. allies.
“China is trying to build its own lunar bloc,” said Namrata Goswami, a space policy analyst and co-author of Scramble for the Skies. “It’s part of a broader geopolitical struggle for influence—not just on Earth, but beyond.”
The prospect of a nuclear power plant on the Moon may sound like science fiction, but it reflects a real and accelerating trend: the return of great powers to the lunar frontier, not for flags-and-footprints missions, but to establish lasting infrastructure and presence.
For China and Russia, the ILRS is both a symbol and a tool—a symbol of their partnership and aspirations, and a tool for asserting influence in the next major arena of strategic competition.
As Pei Zhaoyu’s presentation made clear, energy will be the lifeblood of any sustained lunar operation. And if China moves forward with a nuclear reactor on the Moon, it will mark not just a technological feat but a geopolitical statement with ripple effects far beyond the lunar surface.
