Chinese defence researchers have significantly escalated efforts to develop countermeasures against SpaceX’s Starlink mega-constellation, which Beijing increasingly views as a strategic threat in the event of a military confrontation over Taiwan. The latest indication of this campaign comes from a detailed simulation of electronic warfare (EW) attacks designed to disrupt the satellite network’s downlink communications—a capability that China sees as crucial to neutralising U.S. and allied technological advantages.
Starlink’s decisive role in supporting Ukrainian forces since Russia’s invasion has deeply unsettled Beijing. When SpaceX owner Elon Musk activated Starlink over Ukraine in early 2022, the constellation enabled secure battlefield communications, real-time command-and-control, reconnaissance support, and connectivity for drones and unmanned systems. China fears Taiwan, backed by the U.S. and regional allies, could exploit the same advantages—not only for peacetime surveillance, but also for guiding precision strikes against Chinese forces during a conflict.
Russia’s early attempts to jam Starlink proved temporary, as SpaceX rapidly upgraded the constellation and pushed software fixes. China took note. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now faces an adversary with nearly 10,000 manoeuvrable satellites capable of frequency-hopping, autonomous routing, and resisting jamming in real time. The PLA’s new goal: electromagnetic supremacy against the most sophisticated commercial-military communications system ever deployed.
A peer-reviewed study titled Simulation research of distributed jammers against mega-constellation downlink communication transmissions, conducted by Zhejiang University and the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) and reported by the South China Morning Post, offers the clearest public insight yet into how China might attempt to cripple Starlink over a battlefield. The research builds on China’s February 2024 breakthrough, when scientists claimed to have monitored and analysed the entire electromagnetic spectrum in real time—asserting that future adversaries would have “nowhere to hide.”
BIT defence researcher Yang Zhuo, who led the latest study, underscored the difficulty of targeting the low-Earth-orbit network. “The orbital planes of Starlink are not fixed, and the movement trajectories of the constellation are highly complex,” the authors noted. The difficulty is amplified by Starlink’s mesh architecture: a ground terminal switches between multiple satellites within seconds. If one link is jammed, traffic is simply rerouted.
According to the study, traditional jamming from large ground stations would be ineffective. Instead, the researchers proposed a distributed jamming strategy using hundreds—or even thousands—of small EW nodes deployed on drones and high-altitude balloons. These airborne jammers would form an electromagnetic “shield” over the battlefield, overwhelming Starlink user terminals with noise.
To test the concept, the team built a sophisticated simulation using real Starlink orbital data. They modelled actual downlink signal strength, user terminal antenna behaviour, radio-wave propagation, and the combined effects of multiple jammers illuminating the same target. Virtual jammers flying at 20 kilometres altitude were arranged five to nine kilometres apart, each using narrow-beam or wide-beam antennas to disrupt the terminals below.
Under optimal conditions, a single jammer—using a powerful 26 dBW (400-watt) signal and narrow-beam antenna—could suppress Starlink connectivity over an average 38.5 square kilometres. Covering Taiwan’s roughly 36,000 square kilometres would require at least 935 such nodes. Accounting for redundancy and terrain obstacles, the number could rise substantially. Using a cheaper 23 dBW power source would double the required jammers to about 2,000.
Group Captain Arvind Pandey (Retd), a geospatial intelligence specialist, told the EurAsian Times that China’s approach is technically feasible. “This study claims to use 1000–2000 drones to make an airborne mesh for degrading the Starlink constellation through soft kill in a limited area, which is very much doable, especially with AI-powered interference technology,” he said.
China’s interest in Starlink countermeasures goes beyond jamming. In recent years, Chinese scientists have tested a range of “hard-kill” and “soft-kill” technologies to damage or disable satellites. In 2023, researchers reported developing a compact power source capable of enabling high-power microwave weapons to destroy low-orbit satellites. Reports in June 2024 claimed PLA submarines equipped with megawatt-class solid-state lasers could attack satellites while submerged, using an extendable “optoelectronic mast.”
In January 2025, Chinese scientists simulated a space operation in which 99 Chinese satellites could approach and potentially disable around 1,400 Starlink satellites within 12 hours. These interceptor satellites could theoretically be armed with lasers, microwaves, or other payloads.
A review by the Associated Press in August 2025 identified at least 64 Chinese research papers examining Starlink and potential countermeasures. “Starlink’s omnipresence and potential military applications have unnerved Beijing,” AP reported, noting that Chinese researchers see it as both a threat and a model to emulate.
China is also building its own rival to Starlink: the Qianfan or G60 mega-constellation, which aims to field over 15,000 low-orbit satellites. But analysts warn that the same methods China is developing to disable Starlink could just as easily be used against its own system—raising questions about the long-term viability of such space-based communications networks in future high-intensity conflicts.
