China’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign inside the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has reached its most dramatic and destabilizing phase yet, with the investigation of one of the country’s most senior generals shaking the foundations of the world’s largest military force. The renewed scrutiny of top commanders underscores both the scale of President Xi Jinping’s drive to consolidate control over the armed forces and the growing internal strains within a military undergoing rapid modernization.
The latest shock came this past weekend, when China’s Ministry of National Defense announced investigations into Gen. Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the commission’s joint staff department. Zhang, a veteran officer with decades of service and a reputation as one of Xi’s most trusted military advisers, is the highest-ranking figure to fall in the long-running purge.
An editorial published in official PLA media accused the two men of having “seriously betrayed the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party and the CMC. It further alleged that they had fostered “political and corruption problems” that undermined the party’s absolute leadership over the military and threatened the party’s ruling foundation. The unusually severe language suggests that the accusations go beyond routine financial corruption, touching instead on issues of political loyalty and authority at the very top of the command structure.
For observers of China’s opaque political system, the developments raise urgent questions about who is now effectively leading the PLA, how deeply the purge has penetrated the senior officer corps, and whether the disruptions could affect the military’s readiness at a time of heightened regional tensions.
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive began shortly after he assumed power in 2012 and has since become one of the defining features of his rule. While the campaign has swept through civilian institutions and the ruling Communist Party, the PLA has been one of its most significant and sensitive targets. The military holds a unique position in China’s political system: it is not a national army in the Western sense but the armed wing of the Communist Party, sworn above all to uphold party rule.
Xi has repeatedly emphasized that the PLA must remain absolutely loyal to the party and its core leadership. Since becoming chairman of the CMC, he has overseen a far-reaching restructuring of the military, including the dismantling of old command hierarchies, the creation of new theater commands, and an ambitious push toward joint, high-tech warfare capabilities intended to rival those of the United States.
Running parallel to these reforms has been an aggressive effort to root out corruption. Dozens of generals and hundreds of lower-ranking officers have been investigated, dismissed, or imprisoned over the past decade. The stated aim has been to clean up endemic graft that, according to Chinese leaders and foreign analysts alike, hollowed out the military’s effectiveness and distorted procurement, promotions, and training.
Yet the investigation of Zhang Youxia marks a qualitative escalation. As vice chairman of the CMC, Zhang was second only to Xi himself in the military hierarchy and played a key role in shaping modernization priorities. His downfall signals that no rank, reputation, or personal connection is sufficient protection.
Analysts say the language used in official statements and PLA media points to concerns that extend well beyond bribery or abuse of funds. References to undermining the party’s leadership and threatening its ruling foundation imply political disloyalty or resistance, whether real or perceived.
“The phrasing suggests this is not just about money,” said Jonathan Czin, an expert at the Brookings Institution and a former senior China analyst for the CIA and the US National Security Council. “It sends a very clear sign throughout the system that nobody is safe, regardless of what kind of relationship you had or have with Xi Jinping.”
In authoritarian systems, such accusations can cover a wide range of behaviors: disagreement over policy, failure to deliver expected results, or involvement in factional power struggles. In China’s case, where decision-making processes are largely hidden from public view, the precise reasons for Zhang’s investigation may never be fully known.
A report by the Wall Street Journal raised the possibility that Zhang may have leaked sensitive information related to China’s nuclear weapons program, though the claims could not be independently verified. Even the circulation of such allegations, however, highlights the severity of the crisis and the level of mistrust now surrounding the upper echelons of the PLA.
The scale of the purge is stark. Of the seven officials appointed to the Central Military Commission during the 2022 party congress, only two remain in power today: Xi Jinping himself and Zhang Shengmin, the commission’s anti-graft chief. The others have either been placed under investigation or expelled from their posts.
Two defense ministers have been removed in recent years, and last October nine senior PLA commanders were purged in a single wave. The exact number of high-ranking officers affected is difficult to determine, but analysts say the turnover has been unprecedented in modern Chinese military history.
“This is kind of the ultimate crescendo of this anti-corruption campaign in the military,” Czin said. “It has now reached the very apex of the system.”
The effects are not confined to the top. Across the lower ranks, dozens of officers have reportedly been dismissed, sidelined, or reassigned. Entire chains of command may have been disrupted as investigators work their way through networks of subordinates and associates linked to fallen leaders.
Such upheaval creates uncertainty throughout the force. Officers may become more cautious, reluctant to take initiative or make decisions that could later be scrutinized. At the same time, fear of being associated with the wrong patron or faction can paralyze career advancement and internal coordination.
With so many senior positions vacant or in flux, Xi now faces a difficult challenge: deciding who can credibly replace the purged leaders. The pool of experienced, politically reliable candidates has narrowed significantly.
“Because so many senior officers have been removed or are under investigation, the pool of candidates for refilling top positions has been winnowed,” said Brian Hart, deputy director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Xi could continue to use the existing command structure of the CMC and fill it with new people loyal to him. It is also possible he could try to start over with a bit of a blank slate by more fundamentally remaking the PLA’s leadership structure.”
Both options carry risks. Appointing loyalists with limited operational experience could weaken the military’s effectiveness, particularly in complex joint operations involving air, naval, cyber, and missile forces. More radical restructuring, meanwhile, could further disrupt already strained command relationships.
For a military that has spent years trying to overcome problems of coordination and jointness, such instability comes at a sensitive moment.
China’s military modernization drive is explicitly aimed at closing the gap with the United States, especially in the Western Pacific. The PLA has invested heavily in advanced fighter aircraft, long-range missiles, naval platforms, space and cyber capabilities, and integrated command-and-control systems.
Yet modernization depends not only on technology but also on leadership, training, and institutional trust. Frequent purges at the top can undermine all three.
“Fewer experienced commanders could slow coordination across China’s military,” Hart said. “That’s a serious challenge for complex operations like a blockade or invasion of Taiwan.”
Some China watchers argue that Xi appears willing to accept short-term disruptions in exchange for a force that is more politically disciplined over time. The PLA Daily editorial framed the campaign as a net positive, claiming that “the more the People’s Army fights corruption, the stronger, purer, and more combat-capable it becomes.”
US officials have previously suggested that corruption was indeed hampering China’s military progress, distorting procurement and undermining readiness. From this perspective, the purge could ultimately improve effectiveness by removing compromised leaders.
Others are more skeptical. They argue that the scale and pace of the crackdown risk doing lasting damage, especially if fear replaces professional judgment within the officer corps.
Externally, Beijing may seek to demonstrate that internal shake-ups are not affecting military readiness. One way to do that is through high-profile exercises and displays of force, particularly around sensitive flashpoints like Taiwan.
“You could actually see an uptick in the number of major exercises around Taiwan,” said Lyle Morris, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. “But internally, it could mask significant upheaval and disarray within the PLA.”
China has previously staged large-scale joint exercises following earlier waves of purges, projecting confidence and resolve even as leadership turmoil unfolded behind the scenes. Such actions serve multiple purposes: deterring adversaries, reassuring domestic audiences, and signaling that the party remains firmly in control of the gun.
However, analysts caution that exercises cannot fully compensate for the loss of experienced commanders and stable leadership. Planning and executing real-world operations under crisis conditions is far more demanding than rehearsed drills.
The ongoing upheaval also has implications for how China might make decisions about the use of force. Any leader contemplating military action would want trusted, capable commanders in place who can translate political directives into effective operations.
“It is hard to deny that this creates challenges for the PLA in the short term,” Hart said. “Any leader deciding on using force would want senior leaders and commanders in place who are loyal, experienced, and effective in their roles. The immense turnover within the PLA’s highest ranks complicates that.”
At the same time, the purge may reinforce Xi’s personal control over the military, reducing the risk of dissent or disobedience in a crisis. Whether that centralization improves or degrades overall performance remains an open question.
Ultimately, the investigation of Zhang Youxia highlights the enduring opacity of China’s political and military system. Despite occasional official statements and editorials, the true dynamics driving the purge remain hidden within what analysts often describe as a “black box.”
What is clear is that Xi’s determination to reshape the PLA in his own image has entered a new and more disruptive phase. As China seeks to project power abroad while tightening discipline at home, the tension between political loyalty and military effectiveness will continue to shape the future of its armed forces.
For the rest of the world, the stakes are high. The trajectory of the PLA’s leadership and readiness will influence regional stability, crisis dynamics around Taiwan, and the broader balance of power between China and the United States. As the purge deepens, so too does uncertainty about the internal state of a military that sits at the center of Beijing’s global ambitions.
