A significant setback has emerged for Pakistan’s long-standing ambition to establish a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent after reports surfaced that China refused Islamabad’s request for advanced nuclear submarine technology and submarine-launched ballistic missile systems.
According to leaked Pakistani diplomatic communications and military records linked to negotiations held during 2024, Islamabad approached Beijing seeking assistance to develop a fully operational underwater nuclear second-strike capability. In exchange, Pakistan reportedly offered China expanded and potentially permanent military access to the strategically important Gwadar deep-water port in Balochistan.
The proposal, if accepted, would have marked a major transformation in South Asia’s strategic balance by enabling Pakistan to complete a full nuclear triad — the ability to deliver nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea platforms. Such a capability is widely regarded by military strategists as essential for maintaining a survivable nuclear deterrent because sea-based assets are significantly harder to detect and destroy during a conflict.
However, Beijing ultimately rejected the request, citing concerns over regional instability, the risks of intensifying a nuclear arms race in South Asia, and potential violations of international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
The reported refusal has drawn attention to the limits of the otherwise close strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, often described by officials in both countries as an “all-weather” relationship. While China remains Pakistan’s largest defence supplier and a major economic partner under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the latest developments suggest Beijing remains unwilling to transfer its most sensitive strategic technologies.
Pakistan’s push for Chinese assistance was driven largely by persistent technical and operational difficulties in its indigenous efforts to establish a maritime nuclear deterrent. For years, Pakistan has attempted to adapt its French-origin Agosta-90B diesel-electric submarines to launch the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), a key component of Islamabad’s sea-based deterrence plans.
Although Pakistan successfully conducted a test of the Babur-3 in 2017, defence analysts have repeatedly questioned the operational reliability and survivability of the system. Conventional diesel-electric submarines face major limitations compared to nuclear-powered submarines, particularly in endurance, stealth, and sustained underwater operations.
Unlike nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), diesel-electric vessels must periodically surface or use snorkels to recharge batteries, increasing their vulnerability to detection. These constraints undermine the credibility of a second-strike capability, which depends on the ability of nuclear assets to remain hidden and survive a first strike.
Faced with these challenges, Pakistani officials reportedly sought direct transfers of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines, associated propulsion systems, and submarine-launched ballistic missile technologies. Such transfers would have dramatically accelerated Pakistan’s efforts to establish a more survivable nuclear force at sea.
China, however, appears to have concluded that the geopolitical and diplomatic costs outweighed the strategic benefits.
Analysts believe Beijing’s decision was influenced not only by concerns over non-proliferation agreements but also by broader calculations regarding regional stability and its own global image. China has increasingly attempted to present itself as a responsible major power, particularly in areas related to nuclear governance and arms control.
Directly assisting Pakistan in acquiring nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines could have triggered strong international criticism and potentially invited sanctions or diplomatic pressure from Western powers and regional actors alike.
The move also reflects China’s careful balancing act in South Asia, where it seeks to maintain close ties with Pakistan while avoiding a direct strategic confrontation with India over nuclear competition in the Indian Ocean.
Despite extensive defence cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad, China has historically exercised caution regarding transfers of its highest-end strategic military technologies. Pakistan is already receiving eight Hangor-class diesel-electric submarines from China under one of the largest defence deals between the two countries. Yet these platforms, while advanced, do not provide the same strategic capabilities as nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
The controversy surrounding Gwadar port further highlights underlying tensions in the bilateral relationship.
Gwadar, located near the entrance of the Persian Gulf and viewed as a critical component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has long been central to speculation regarding potential future Chinese military access in the Arabian Sea. Reports that Pakistan offered expanded military control of the port underscore Islamabad’s urgency in securing Chinese support.
However, the apparent failure of negotiations also reveals Chinese concerns over the growing instability surrounding CPEC investments in Pakistan. Security threats targeting Chinese engineers and workers have intensified in recent years, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where separatist and militant groups have repeatedly attacked Chinese-linked projects.
At the same time, Pakistan’s worsening economic difficulties and mounting external debt obligations have complicated the implementation of several major infrastructure initiatives under CPEC. Chinese companies and lenders have reportedly become increasingly cautious about long-term financial exposure in Pakistan.
While Pakistan struggles to operationalise its maritime nuclear ambitions, India continues to steadily expand its own underwater nuclear capabilities through indigenous development.
Under New Delhi’s Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) programme, India has successfully developed the Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, providing the country with a credible and survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent.
The INS Arihant, India’s first indigenously built SSBN, entered operational service several years ago and has since completed deterrence patrols. It was followed by INS Arighaat, while additional submarines under the programme continue progressing through sea trials and construction phases.
India’s sea-based deterrent is supported by domestically developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, including the K-series missile family, which provides varying operational ranges and strategic flexibility.
Military analysts argue that India’s emphasis on self-reliance has significantly strengthened its strategic position in the Indian Ocean region. By reducing dependence on foreign suppliers for critical nuclear and naval technologies, New Delhi has achieved greater autonomy in maintaining and modernising its deterrence posture.
The contrast between India’s indigenous progress and Pakistan’s reliance on external assistance has become increasingly pronounced.
Defence experts note that Islamabad’s inability to acquire nuclear-powered submarines leaves it dependent on conventionally powered vessels with limited endurance and survivability. Although the Babur-3 missile programme offers a partial sea-based capability, analysts remain sceptical about whether Pakistan can establish a truly secure second-strike force without access to advanced nuclear submarine technology.
China’s refusal is therefore being interpreted by many strategic observers as a pivotal moment in the regional balance of power.
For Beijing, the decision allows it to avoid direct involvement in a potentially destabilising nuclear rivalry while maintaining broader strategic flexibility in South Asia. For Pakistan, however, the denial highlights the widening technological and operational gap between its military capabilities and those of India.
The development also reinforces the growing importance of indigenous defence manufacturing and technological self-sufficiency in modern strategic competition. As India continues investing heavily in domestic naval and nuclear programmes, Pakistan faces mounting challenges in sustaining strategic parity, particularly in the maritime domain.
