China’s accelerating nuclear submarine buildup is no longer just a shipyard story confined to satellite imagery and dry dock expansions. It has become a strategic test of whether faster industrial output can be converted into credible leverage against US sea power in the Pacific, reshaping the undersea balance that has underpinned American dominance since the end of the Cold War.
This month, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported that China has sharply accelerated production of nuclear-powered submarines over the past five years, overtaking the United States in annual launches for the first time. The acceleration is tied to the expansion of the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. yard in Huludao, where new construction halls and upgraded facilities have enabled a steady drumbeat of submarine launches.
According to the IISS assessment, China launched more submarines between 2021 and 2025 than in the entire previous decade. Commercial satellite imagery has identified what analysts assess to be the seventh and eighth Type-094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) at Huludao and associated operational bases. Alongside them is a growing run of Type-093B Shang III nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), reportedly fitted with vertical launch systems (VLS) that allow the deployment of cruise missiles in addition to torpedoes.
US defense assessments cited in the report suggest that up to nine Type-093B hulls have been launched since 2022, implying a production tempo of roughly two per year. Earlier this month, imagery revealed the launch of a new, larger SSN, likely the first of a next-generation class that could further expand China’s capabilities in blue-water operations.
The industrial surge follows the construction of a second major production hall between 2019 and 2022. Analysts describe China’s current output rhythm as approaching a “1+2” model—roughly one SSBN and two SSNs over a multi-year cycle—comparable in tempo to US plans. However, the IISS cautions that American submarines remain larger, more complex, and generally regarded as quieter and more capable in long-range operations.
The numerical gap between the two fleets remains significant. Data compiled by Statista in January 2026 shows the United States maintaining the world’s largest nuclear submarine fleet at 71 units. China, at 32, is a distant second. Yet the trajectory line is shifting. While Washington retains overall superiority, Beijing’s faster annual throughput is gradually narrowing the gap.
A January 2026 report from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that the US Navy has procured 41 Virginia-class SSNs through fiscal year 2025. Although the plan from FY2011 to FY2024 called for two boats per year, actual production has lagged since 2022 at roughly 1.1 to 1.2 submarines annually. The slowdown has created a backlog of funded but unbuilt hulls, underscoring strain within the US submarine industrial base.
The FY2026 US budget again seeks two Virginia-class submarines, with longer-term goals of reaching 2.0 and eventually 2.33 boats per year to support commitments under the AUKUS security partnership. Timelines, however, remain uncertain. Separately, a December 2025 CRS report highlights challenges in the 12-boat Columbia-class SSBN program, which averaged just 0.4 boats per year between FY2021 and FY2025. The program plans to ramp up to one per year from FY2026 to FY2035, despite an approximately 17-month delay to the lead boat.
The implication is stark. China’s higher annual output allows its undersea fleet to grow faster through simple accumulation, even if individual platforms may be less advanced than their American counterparts. The United States, building more slowly while managing two major submarine programs simultaneously, must first prevent its relative numbers from slipping further before it can begin closing the production gap.
Because submarines remain in service for decades—often 30 years or more—today’s production disparities compound into long-term structural advantages. Even if US output improves later in the decade, the shortfalls of the early 2020s will continue to echo in fleet size, deployment availability, and surge capacity for years to come.
Beyond industrial metrics, China’s expanding nuclear-powered submarine fleet carries profound operational implications. Nuclear propulsion grants submarines virtually unlimited range and endurance compared to conventionally powered boats, enabling sustained deployments far from home waters without surfacing or snorkeling.
US naval power has long revolved around its fleet of 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the centerpiece of American global force projection. Each carrier strike group embodies immense military and political value; losing even a single carrier in combat would represent a strategic shock.
China has invested heavily in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems designed to complicate US intervention in a Taiwan contingency. Among these are anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26B, often dubbed “carrier killers.” Yet the complex kill chain required to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess damage on a moving carrier at sea introduces multiple vulnerabilities and potential points of failure.
Submarines offer a different approach. Unlike ballistic missiles that depend on a multi-layered targeting architecture, SSNs can covertly trail carrier strike groups, positioning themselves for torpedo or cruise missile attacks with comparatively fewer external dependencies. In that sense, China’s SSNs, operating in concert with its missile forces, could become some of its most potent assets against US carriers.
As US carriers adjust operating patterns to remain outside the densest threat envelopes of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles, they may be compelled to operate farther from China’s coast. In such a scenario, Chinese SSNs—if sufficiently quiet and capable—could deploy deeper into the Pacific to hold US carriers at risk. This dynamic would raise the costs and risks of American intervention in a Taiwan crisis, even without achieving outright sea denial.
China’s SSNs may also assume defensive roles. As Beijing’s own carrier strike groups venture beyond the First Island Chain, nuclear attack submarines could escort and screen those formations against US and allied submarines. Protecting high-value surface units from undersea threats would be essential if China seeks to operate carriers in contested waters.
The strategic reach of China’s SSNs extends beyond naval duels. According to the US Army’s ODIN database, the Type-093B Shang III may carry the CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile, with an estimated range of around 2,000 kilometers. Such a capability would enable Chinese submarines to threaten US and allied facilities well beyond the First Island Chain, including Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Wake Island, Hawaii, and potentially installations in Australia and New Zealand.
Guam, in particular, is a critical hub for US Indo-Pacific operations, hosting bomber deployments, submarines, and logistical infrastructure. The prospect of Chinese SSNs launching cruise missiles from the Philippine Sea or beyond would complicate US defensive planning and stretch missile defense resources.
China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent is also evolving. Historically constrained by geography, China has relied on a bastion strategy centered in the South China Sea. The Bohai, Yellow, and East China seas are relatively shallow and enclosed, limiting SSBN maneuverability and survivability. By contrast, the South China Sea offers deeper waters and has been heavily fortified by Chinese air, surface, and submarine forces, as well as artificial islands equipped with sensors and air defenses.
Within this protected bastion, China’s Type-094 Jin-class SSBNs have conducted patrols that underpin the sea-based leg of its emerging nuclear triad. The introduction of the longer-range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile extends the reach of these submarines, potentially allowing them to target parts of the continental United States from bastion waters.
Looking ahead, China is expected to begin producing the next-generation Type-096 SSBN later this decade. Analysts believe the Type-096 will feature improved quieting and greater missile capacity, strengthening China’s second-strike capability. A larger SSBN fleet would allow overlapping patrols and greater surge capacity, enhancing the credibility of Beijing’s nuclear deterrent.
Yet numbers alone may not resolve China’s strategic dilemmas. Shifting from a bastion strategy to open-ocean patrols would reduce the need to defend an expensive South China Sea sanctuary and complicate US detection efforts. Open-water patrols in the Pacific would also bring more of the continental United States within missile range.
However, reaching the broader Pacific requires transiting critical chokepoints along the First Island Chain, including the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako Island and the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. These passages are heavily monitored by US and allied anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets, including maritime patrol aircraft, surface ships, and undersea sensor networks.
Crossing such sensor-saturated chokepoints demands exceptionally quiet submarines and sophisticated command-and-control integration. If Chinese submarines lack sufficient stealth, attempts at mass breakout could create predictable “fatal funnels,” concentrating US and allied ASW efforts in narrow corridors.
Despite improvements in Chinese submarine design, questions persist about acoustic signatures and crew proficiency. US submarines have decades of operational experience in blue-water patrols, and the US Navy maintains extensive ASW capabilities across the Pacific. Bridging that qualitative gap may prove more challenging than expanding shipyard throughput.
At the same time, the United States faces its own structural constraints. The submarine industrial base, concentrated in a small number of shipyards, must juggle Virginia-class production, Columbia-class construction, maintenance backlogs, and workforce shortages. AUKUS commitments to transfer Virginia-class submarines to Australia add further complexity to production planning.
For Washington, the challenge is not merely to outbuild China, but to preserve qualitative superiority while stabilizing production rates. For Beijing, the test is whether rapid industrial expansion can translate into operational competence, survivability, and strategic leverage beyond coastal waters.
The undersea contest in the Pacific is therefore entering a new phase. China’s faster submarine production is steadily shifting the balance by compounding long-term numerical pressure on a slower-moving US industrial base. But hull counts alone do not determine outcomes.
Ultimately, whether China’s buildup translates into real operational and strategic advantage will depend less on the sheer number of submarines launched each year and more on Beijing’s ability to field boats that can operate quietly, reliably, and at scale beyond the First Island Chain. Breaking through chokepoints, sustaining distant patrols, integrating missiles and sensors, and maintaining secure command-and-control links in wartime conditions will be decisive.
For now, the story unfolding at Huludao’s expanded shipyards is both industrial and strategic. It reflects a broader competition between two naval powers racing not only to build submarines, but to shape the future balance of power beneath the Pacific’s surface.
