The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has begun field-testing a new class of fiber-optic guided drones, signaling a significant leap in its unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capabilities. These drones, tethered to their operators via thin fiber-optic cables, represent a decisive effort to counter one of the most prominent threats in modern warfare: electronic jamming.
Footage aired by China Central Television (CCTV) during recent exercises by the PLA’s 81st Group Army under the Central Theater Command revealed soldiers deploying and piloting these advanced drones in simulated combat environments. Analysts say these tests are not merely demonstrations of new equipment—they reflect a calculated pivot in Chinese drone doctrine, likely shaped by close observation of the Russia-Ukraine war.
The ongoing war in Ukraine has become a proving ground for modern military technologies, particularly drones. From long-range reconnaissance to close-range kamikaze attacks, drones have played a decisive role on both sides. However, as electronic warfare (EW) systems have grown more sophisticated, traditional radio frequency (RF) drones have found themselves increasingly disrupted, jammed, or hijacked mid-flight.
This battlefield evolution has not gone unnoticed in Beijing.
“The PLA is watching Ukraine very closely,” said Sam Cranny-Evans, a defense analyst with Calibre Defence. “What they’re seeing is that electronic warfare is no longer a peripheral concern—it’s central. If you can’t maintain control of your drone in a jammed environment, then it’s not a weapon; it’s a liability.”
Enter fiber-optic drones. Instead of relying on radio signals, these drones use a thin, lightweight fiber-optic cable to transmit control and video signals between the operator and the aircraft. This hardwired connection renders traditional jamming techniques—designed to block or confuse RF signals—largely ineffective.
Cranny-Evans called the technology “unjammable,” explaining that adversaries would now have to resort to physical defenses—like camouflage, cover, or direct fire—to counter them. “The signal is now unjammable. Soldiers must rely on physical measures like finding cover or shooting down the drone to counter it,” he noted.
Beyond being resistant to EW attacks, fiber-optic drones offer technical advantages that make them attractive for tactical operations. The cable-based link ensures higher bandwidth, lower latency, and sharper video resolution than RF-based systems. These factors combine to give operators a clearer picture of the battlefield and allow for more precise control—crucial for missions involving explosives or reconnaissance in dense terrain.
According to Calibre Defence, recent PLA exercises have shown these drones navigating urban environments, flying through windows, and hovering in proximity to targets with remarkable stability. The direct feed, unaffected by jamming, allowed for rapid target acquisition and simulated precision strikes.
While radio-controlled First-Person View (FPV) drones have already transformed the nature of close-quarters warfare—being used in Ukraine and elsewhere to attack vehicles, bunkers, and even individual soldiers—their effectiveness has often been hampered by the saturation of EW systems.
By contrast, fiber-optic drones can operate undisturbed even in highly contested electronic environments. This makes them particularly suited for special operations, deep-penetration strikes, and urban combat, where electronic countermeasures are often deployed in layers.
Military analysts believe the PLA’s adoption of these systems could be a step toward building more resilient unmanned strike capabilities, especially in anticipation of potential future conflicts in environments rich with EW threats—such as Taiwan.
“The PLA is building an ecosystem of drones that can survive and operate in the most hostile signal environments,” said a U.S. defense official speaking on condition of anonymity. “That’s not just smart—it’s necessary.”
Despite their advantages, fiber-optic drones are not without limitations.
The most obvious constraint is the cable itself. Fiber-optic tethers limit the drone’s range, often to just a few hundred meters or up to a few kilometers, depending on the thickness and weight of the cable. The physical connection also introduces vulnerabilities—cables can snag, break, or be spotted by vigilant observers.
However, the PLA appears to be working to mitigate these issues. The drones shown in PLA footage appear compact and lightweight, with extremely thin cable spools designed for minimal drag. Operators were seen deploying them from concealed positions, suggesting tactical awareness of the cable’s limitations and potential exposure.
Additionally, newer variants are reportedly being equipped with cable auto-retraction systems and modular spools, allowing for rapid repositioning and reusability in dynamic combat zones.
The development of fiber-optic drones is part of a larger, multi-faceted evolution within the PLA’s drone program.
In 2024, the Chinese government launched a national drone innovation challenge aimed at developing ultra-low-cost, high-capability unmanned systems. Participants were tasked with creating drones that could navigate autonomously, evade jamming, deliver precision strikes, and even coordinate in swarms—all on a budget of less than $1,000 per unit.
The competition reflects a shift in PLA doctrine: from valuing complex, high-end platforms to embracing smaller, smarter, and more numerous systems that can flood and overwhelm enemy defenses. This is a direct nod to Ukraine’s successful use of cheap FPV drones to destroy much more expensive tanks and artillery systems.
Moreover, China is actively exploring the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into its drone fleets. By incorporating AI-assisted navigation, target identification, and battlefield coordination, the PLA aims to reduce reliance on human operators and increase operational autonomy.
The implications of the PLA’s fiber-optic drone program extend far beyond China’s borders.
As the line between commercial and military drone technology blurs, more state and non-state actors may look to emulate China’s model. Countries that rely heavily on EW defenses—such as the United States and NATO members—will need to adapt quickly to the prospect of drones that can’t be jammed or misled.
The evolution also raises legal and ethical questions. If drones become so resilient that they can operate deep behind enemy lines with little chance of being intercepted, what checks—if any—can be placed on their use? Will these systems be governed by existing international norms, or will they require new frameworks?
For now, the answer remains uncertain. But what is clear is that drone warfare has entered a new chapter—one defined not just by speed or payload, but by survivability in electronic combat.
The PLA’s testing of fiber-optic drones is more than a technological upgrade—it’s a strategic shift. By circumventing the vulnerabilities of RF-based systems, China is preparing for the realities of future warfare, where control of the electromagnetic spectrum will determine success or failure.
