China’s military modernization has taken another step forward with the apparent operational deployment of the KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). This development, confirmed through recent imagery of the H-6K bomber carrying the missile, signals the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is advancing its strategic and tactical capabilities.
The KD-21 is widely believed to be part of China’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, a military doctrine designed to keep adversaries at bay, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. While little official information about the KD-21 has been disclosed, its increasing presence suggests it is now in frontline service.
This report takes a deep dive into the KD-21, its origins, possible capabilities, strategic significance, and the impact it could have on regional security dynamics.
The first public appearance of the KD-21 occurred in November 2022 at Airshow China in Zhuhai, where the missile was displayed alongside China’s other advanced weaponry. However, at that time, its operational status remained unclear.
New imagery now provides the strongest evidence yet that the missile is in service. Photos show an H-6K bomber from the 10th Bomber Division’s 29th Air Regiment, under the PLAAF’s Eastern Theater Command, armed with two KD-21 missiles mounted on its center-wing pylons. This division is strategically crucial, as it operates from Anqing in Anhui province, placing it in a key position to influence military operations in the Taiwan Strait and broader Indo-Pacific region.
These images, taken during a recent military exercise, were first highlighted by Andreas Rupprecht, a respected observer of Chinese military aviation. The aircraft’s unit markings confirm that the KD-21 is now in service with an active combat unit.
While there were initial speculations that this missile was designated YJ-21, it is now widely identified as KD-21. Notably, the KD-series typically refers to land-attack missiles, while YJ-series missiles are designed for anti-ship roles. This distinction raises critical questions about the missile’s primary function.
One of the most intriguing aspects of the KD-21 is its resemblance in concept to Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, a missile launched from modified MiG-31 interceptors. The Kinzhal, often mistakenly referred to as a hypersonic missile, is an air-launched version of the Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and has been used in the Russia-Ukraine war.
The KD-21 appears to follow a similar trajectory. Some analysts believe it may be based on the CM-401 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), which is launched from ground-based and naval platforms. The CM-401, which can also target land-based installations, reportedly has a terminal speed of Mach 4 to Mach 6. If the KD-21 shares these characteristics, it would present a significant challenge for existing missile defense systems.
While official specifications remain unknown, the KD-21 is likely capable of:
- High-speed terminal attack: Like other ALBMs, it could reach hypersonic speeds (Mach 5+) during the final approach.
- Maneuverable warhead: The missile could feature terminal-phase maneuverability, making interception extremely difficult.
- Extended range: When launched from the H-6K bomber, its range would far exceed ground-launched variants, potentially reaching over 600 miles if it follows a “porpoising” or skip-glide trajectory.
- Targeting flexibility: Whether used against ships or land-based infrastructure, the KD-21 is likely designed to strike high-value targets with precision.
China’s investment in such a system aligns with its broader efforts to enhance its ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone capabilities, forming a layered and complex strike network.
Ballistic missiles are difficult to intercept due to their speed and flight profile. Unlike cruise missiles, which fly at low altitudes, ALBMs approach from above at extreme speeds. This makes traditional air defenses—designed to counter aircraft and slower cruise missiles—far less effective.
In recent conflicts, Russia’s Kinzhal has been successfully intercepted by Western air defense systems such as the Patriot PAC-3, but only under specific conditions. The KD-21, if designed with terminal maneuverability, would be even harder to shoot down.
This is particularly concerning for U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific, where defending against saturation missile attacks is already a significant challenge. The addition of air-launched ballistic missiles only complicates the problem.
The KD-21’s range and delivery method give China new attack options, especially regarding Taiwan. Launched from the H-6K, the missile could target Taiwan’s eastern coast, where many military installations are located. This would negate the defensive advantage Taiwan enjoys by placing key assets on the opposite side of the island from China’s mainland.
Beyond Taiwan, the KD-21 could strike U.S. and allied bases in Japan, Guam, and even beyond, putting critical military infrastructure at risk. This is in line with China’s A2/AD doctrine, which seeks to prevent foreign forces from operating freely in the region.
China’s military does not rely on a single missile type but rather a vast network of missile systems. The KD-21 is not the only ALBM in development. Another major weapon, the CH-AS-X-13, is thought to be a much larger, longer-range ALBM, possibly designed for the H-6N variant of the bomber.
According to U.S. military assessments, the CH-AS-X-13 might have both nuclear and conventional capabilities, making it a strategic deterrent weapon. If the KD-21 is optimized for precision land-attack missions, it would complement this larger strategic missile by allowing China to field more numerous, smaller, and more versatile ALBMs.
The U.S. and its allies have already been working to upgrade missile defense networks in response to threats from China, North Korea, and Russia.
- Deploying more THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) systems in the Indo-Pacific.
- Expanding Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems on naval vessels.
- Enhancing Patriot missile batteries in Taiwan, Japan, and Guam.
- Developing next-generation hypersonic interceptors, such as those under the U.S. Hypersonic Defense Program.
A key part of U.S. strategy is ensuring that China cannot launch such weapons without facing severe retaliation. This involves:
- Deploying more long-range strike assets, such as the B-21 Raider stealth bomber.
- Expanding anti-ship missile stockpiles, including the LRASM (Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile).
- Developing hypersonic weapons of its own, such as the AGM-183A ARRW (Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon).
The KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile represents a major advancement in China’s growing arsenal. With its potential for hypersonic speeds, maneuverable warheads, and strategic reach, it adds a new layer of complexity to modern warfare.
While its exact capabilities remain unclear, what is certain is that it has now entered operational service, reinforcing China’s ability to threaten key military targets in the Indo-Pacific region.
For Taiwan, the U.S., and its allies, this development underscores the need to accelerate missile defense improvements and maintain a credible deterrent to counter China’s growing military might.
As the race for next-generation missile capabilities intensifies, the KD-21 is just the latest piece in China’s evolving strategy, one that will continue to shape the future of global military power dynamics.
