As geopolitical tides shift in East Asia, a new form of strategic signaling is taking center stage — aircraft carriers. The region’s waters are no longer just vital trade corridors but are quickly becoming high-risk zones for close military encounters. The presence of multiple carrier strike groups (CSGs) — from China, the United States, and allied nations — has transformed the South and East China Seas into arenas of persistent military maneuvering and posturing.
With the Chinese aircraft carrier Shandong executing drills near Taiwan, the USS Carl Vinson transiting to the Middle East, and allied carriers like France’s Charles de Gaulle and Japan’s JS Kaga sailing in tandem, the potential for friction — accidental or intentional — has never been higher.
On April 4, 2025, the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) passed through the Strait of Malacca, marking its departure from the increasingly tense waters of East Asia. The nuclear-powered carrier is bound for the CENTCOM area of responsibility, joining the USS Harry S. Truman, which is actively engaged in combat operations against Houthi militants in Yemen.
The Vinson’s redeployment is significant. It spent months operating in contested waters near China, Korea, and Japan, serving as a stabilizing force and a deterrent amid growing Chinese naval assertiveness. Its temporary absence marks a strategic reshuffling — the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) is set to replace it within the U.S. Seventh Fleet, maintaining a consistent American presence.
Notably, during its last month in the region, the Vinson encountered Russian maritime patrol aircraft, underlining the region’s complex, multi-actor dynamics. The carrier’s next role, reinforcing naval air operations in the Middle East, underscores America’s ability to project power across two volatile theatres simultaneously.
To the northeast, China’s second aircraft carrier, the Shandong, has been executing high-profile drills in the South China Sea and Philippine Sea, particularly around Taiwan. According to Japanese defense officials, the carrier group launched dozens of sorties involving fixed-wing J-15 fighters and rotary-wing helicopters.
These operations are part of a massive PLA Navy exercise, described by observers as a simulation of a Taiwan invasion scenario. The scale and regularity of such exercises have led many analysts to warn that Beijing is both rehearsing and signaling its readiness for conflict, should political or diplomatic developments warrant a hardline approach.
The People’s Republic of China considers Taiwan a breakaway province, while Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state. The intensification of military pressure, particularly through the use of high-profile naval assets, is a calculated move by China to assert dominance without crossing the threshold into war — at least, for now.
While these drills are nominally defensive, the expansion of China’s amphibious capabilities tells a more aggressive story. Observers have noted a steady buildup of landing craft, amphibious assault vehicles, and naval infantry drills that mirror WWII-style beach landings.
Military analysts have drawn parallels between China’s modern military logistics and the D-Day landings in Normandy. With the Shandong acting as an air support hub, the PLAN is developing a credible force capable of sustaining long-range amphibious operations.
Furthermore, the introduction of new heavy-lift aircraft, improved amphibious transport docks (LPDs), and integration of rocket artillery on marine platforms hints at long-term strategic planning for a large-scale island campaign — and Taiwan remains the most likely target.
The Shandong, China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, represents a modified design of the Soviet Kuznetsov-class. The vessel replaces missile silos with expanded hangar space, allowing for a larger air wing, while maintaining a ski-jump for STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) operations.
The Shandong’s successor, the Type 003 Fujian, marks a dramatic leap forward. Expected to enter full service by 2026, Fujian features EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) and CATOBAR capabilities — akin to U.S. carriers — but still runs on conventional propulsion.
Meanwhile, the USS Vinson and its counterparts, including the USS Nimitz and USS George H.W. Bush, operate nuclear-powered supercarriers with catapult systems, supporting E-2D Hawkeye early warning aircraft and F/A-18 Super Hornets, providing greater endurance and air coverage.
France’s Charles de Gaulle, though smaller than U.S. carriers, shares nuclear propulsion and CATOBAR features. Its Rafale-M fighters and E-2Cs offer high-end capabilities, while the Royal Navy’s HMS Prince of Wales, due in East Asia later this year, brings stealth-enabled F-35Bs to the mix — though its Merlin AEW helicopters have limited range compared to Hawkeyes.
France’s Clemenceau 25 mission — led by the Charles de Gaulle — underscores Europe’s interest in East Asian stability. Having operated in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, it joined Vinson and Japan’s JS Kaga in joint drills near the Philippine Sea.
These multilateral operations signal unity among Indo-Pacific democracies, with Japan, in particular, playing a vital role. The JS Kaga, originally a helicopter destroyer, has been retrofitted to carry F-35Bs, transforming it into a light aircraft carrier.
Later this year, the UK’s HMS Prince of Wales will conduct CSG 25, mirroring the 2021 CSG 21 deployment of the Queen Elizabeth, which operated near Chinese carriers. These high-visibility deployments are both reassurance to allies and a message to Beijing — the seas of Asia are not China’s alone.
While these carriers often operate hundreds of miles apart, the reach of their aircraft, radar, and surveillance systems means their spheres of influence routinely overlap. Even without direct confrontation, airspace congestion, close fly-bys, and radar targeting raise the risk of miscalculation.
Past interactions — such as the near-meeting between the Vinson and Shandong — have been peaceful but tense. Given the increasing density of naval operations, analysts warn that a minor incident could spiral into something much larger.
With aircraft operating across wide swaths of ocean, and airspace deconfliction protocols often ignored or disputed, communication breakdowns pose a significant threat.
Looking ahead, the stage is set for continued carrier diplomacy — and tension. The likely rendezvous of HMS Prince of Wales with either the USS Nimitz or USS George H.W. Bush for a PHOTEX (Photo Exercise) will attract the attention of both media and Chinese naval units, potentially prompting PLAN shadowing operations or sudden drills.
As China commissions new carriers, expands maritime infrastructure in the South China Sea, and signals a tougher line on Taiwan, Western nations will likely increase joint patrols, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), and carrier presence missions.
But while naval firepower remains the clearest form of deterrence, the risk of unintended escalation grows with each new deployment. The key question is whether diplomatic engagement can keep pace with the growing density of steel and strategy at sea.
