
As missiles fly between Iran and Israel and U.S. airstrikes hit Iranian soil, China’s silence has become deafening. Once hailed as a rising powerbroker in the Middle East, Beijing now finds itself sidelined — watching from the shadows as its key allies destabilize the very region where it sought to project calm authority.
In recent years, China positioned itself as a mediator, offering an alternative to what it called “U.S.-led interventionism.” Its crowning diplomatic moment came in 2023, when Beijing brokered a surprise rapprochement between regional archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. But that momentum appears to have dissipated. In the wake of an unprecedented military exchange between Iran and Israel and a widening U.S. military response, China’s ambitions to be seen as a stabilizing global leader face serious tests — and so far, analysts say, Beijing is failing them.
“Beijing has offered Tehran no real help — just rhetoric that paints China as the principled alternative while it stays safely on the sidelines,” says Craig Singleton of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
China’s regional strategy has long rested on carefully cultivated neutrality. Unlike the United States, which is closely aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia, China has tried to maintain good ties with virtually all actors in the Middle East. That balancing act allowed it to grow its economic footprint — especially through massive energy imports — while avoiding the burden of deep political entanglements.
China buys more than a million barrels of Iranian oil daily, propping up Tehran’s sanctions-hit economy. It also maintains a robust trade and arms relationship with Israel, and deep commercial ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
This wide-ranging engagement was framed as pragmatic diplomacy. In Beijing’s official rhetoric, China offered “win-win cooperation,” backed by development projects under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and an aversion to foreign interference. But this non-committal posture is now being tested.
“Everybody in the Middle East understands that China has little leverage, if any, to play any role in de-escalation,” said Ahmed Aboudouh of Chatham House. “Its silence speaks volumes.”
Despite its growing commercial ties with Arab states and Israel, China’s relationship with Iran holds unique strategic significance. When the United States unilaterally exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Beijing doubled down on its support for Tehran, deepening economic and political ties.
In 2021, the two sides signed a 25-year cooperation agreement, pledging investments in energy, infrastructure, and technology. By 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping had called ties with Iran “strategic,” emphasizing shared opposition to “bullying” — a euphemism for U.S. sanctions and military pressure.
This support has gone beyond economics. Liu Qiang, a retired Senior Colonel and key figure at the Shanghai International Center for Strategic Studies, recently described Iran’s survival as a “matter of China’s national security.” In an article posted on Aisixiang, a respected academic platform, Liu argued that Beijing must take “proactive measures” to prevent Iran from being militarily “broken” by Israel or the U.S.
Yet, despite such rhetoric, China has done little in practice to bolster Tehran during its most vulnerable moment.
The recent Iran-Israel exchanges marked a turning point in regional volatility. For the first time, Israel directly attacked Iranian soil, and Tehran responded with ballistic missiles aimed at Israeli military sites — a dramatic escalation that threatened a full-scale war.
In response, the United States launched targeted strikes on Iranian military assets in retaliation for attacks on its forces across the region. The situation pushed the Middle East to the brink of a broader conflict that could engulf multiple countries and disrupt global energy flows.
Amid this storm, Beijing issued only measured statements calling for “calm” and urging “dialogue.” There was no military support to Iran, no diplomatic shuttle between capitals, no high-profile Chinese envoy dispatched to defuse tensions.
“China sticks to rhetoric — condemnations, UN statements, talk of ‘dialogue’ — because over-promising and under-delivering would spotlight its power-projection limits,” said Singleton.
This cautious stance reflects a broader reality: China is not yet willing — or able — to risk confrontation with the United States, particularly not over Iran.
Although China has significant economic leverage in Iran, its political influence remains limited. Tehran’s strategic decisions are still guided more by ideological commitments, domestic pressures, and its regional “Axis of Resistance” alliance than by external partnerships.
Tuvia Gering of the Atlantic Council notes that Iran is central to China’s goal of balancing against U.S. hegemony, but this doesn’t translate into direct influence over Iranian actions.
“Iran fits into Beijing’s broader campaign to counterbalance U.S.-led hegemony and, to a lesser extent, NATO encroachment,” Gering said. “But that doesn’t mean Iran takes orders from China.”
China also has reasons to be cautious. Supporting Iran too visibly — especially with military aid — would not only provoke Washington, but also alienate Arab partners and Israel, potentially jeopardizing its broader Middle East strategy.
According to Andrea Ghiselli, a lecturer at the University of Exeter, “Iran needs more than statements at the UN or missile components. It needs air defences and fighter jets, which are things that China could provide — but doing so would take time, and would almost certainly trigger a severe response from the U.S. and Israel.”
Beijing’s perceived neutrality once worked to its advantage, but it is now becoming a liability. As war drums beat louder, regional powers are searching for effective mediators, not bystanders.
China’s failure to mediate during the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has already drawn criticism. Its generic calls for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid did little to influence the battlefield or protect civilians. And its deeper alignment with Russia since the Ukraine invasion has undermined its credibility as a neutral peacemaker.
“The fallout from Gaza and now Iran-Israel violence has damaged China’s image as a potential mediator,” said Aboudouh. “There is a growing realization that China is neither willing nor able to shape outcomes in the region.”
China’s abstention from the hard power dimensions of Middle Eastern politics — its refusal to use military or diplomatic coercion — is exposing the gap between its ambitions and its capabilities.
For years, Chinese strategists have emphasized “strategic ambiguity” — the idea that China can reap the benefits of engagement without committing to risky entanglements. This approach, paired with economic diplomacy, has underpinned Beijing’s rise as a global power.
But in a region as volatile as the Middle East, ambiguity is increasingly seen as indecision. China’s refusal to pick sides, or even to strongly mediate, risks eroding its credibility with all parties.
Even Iran — whose economy depends on Chinese oil purchases — may begin to question the value of the partnership if Beijing continues to offer only symbolic support during crises.
“Beijing has sought to prevent a total unraveling of Iran’s regional role,” said Gering. “But so far, its efforts have been thin.”
The Biden administration has seized on this moment to challenge China’s claims of influence. U.S. officials have publicly urged Beijing to “use its leverage” with Tehran to prevent further escalation or a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — a vital chokepoint for global energy supplies.
Thus far, there’s little evidence that China has responded. Experts remain skeptical that Beijing has the willingness, or even the tools, to rein in Iran.
China may still wield substantial economic leverage, but its unwillingness to apply real pressure — whether through sanctions, conditional trade, or diplomatic ultimatum — reinforces the perception that its role in regional security is largely performative.
The Middle East is not the only theater where China’s ambitions face limits. In the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and even Africa, Beijing is encountering pushback — from the U.S., from local actors, and from shifting political tides.
Its experience in the Middle East is now becoming a case study in what happens when a great power seeks influence without responsibility. The risks of exposure are high: bold declarations about multipolarity and new world orders begin to ring hollow when they are not matched with meaningful action.
“China is discovering that global leadership means getting your hands dirty,” said Ghiselli. “It means stepping in during crises — not just after the dust settles.”
China’s ambitions in the Middle East were never just about oil or trade. They were about redefining the global order — offering a new model of international relations based on “mutual respect” and “non-interference.”
But that model is now being tested. As Iran and Israel push the region toward war, and the United States reasserts its military dominance, China’s response has been largely rhetorical, limited to carefully worded UN statements and generic calls for peace.
The result, analysts say, is a crisis that exposes the soft underbelly of Beijing’s rise. In a world increasingly defined by volatility, those who claim global leadership must prove it — not with slogans, but with action.