After assembling the world’s largest maritime force, China has now achieved a troubling milestone: surpassing the United States in the production rate of fighter jets. For every U.S. aircraft rolling off an assembly line, China builds 1.2. This seemingly narrow margin reflects a broader, and more dangerous, trend—Beijing is outpacing the U.S. not only in numbers but in strategic positioning, modernization, and battlefield preparation.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, the new commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, delivered a stark warning to the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this month: China is now capable of denying the United States air superiority in the first island chain—a critical buffer zone encompassing Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines. Without dominance in the skies over these waters, the U.S. military’s ability to defend allies and respond to aggression in the region is severely handicapped.
“If you do not hold the high ground along the first island chain, you are vastly limited in your ability to operate,” Paparo told lawmakers. “Ceding air superiority is not an option.”
That high ground is no longer a given for the United States. With over 2,100 fighters and 200 long-range H-6 bombers, China’s air fleet is vast and growing. More worrying is the quality of these assets. Beijing has not only deployed more than 200 of its fifth-generation J-20 stealth jets, but has also unveiled the J-35—a carrier-capable stealth aircraft—and is now flight-testing two sixth-generation platforms: the J-36 and J-50.
In just over a decade, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a transformation that military planners in Washington can no longer ignore. After building the largest navy in the world in terms of ship count, Beijing has now shifted its focus skyward.
“China is outproducing the United States in air, missile, maritime, and space capability,” Paparo told the Senate. “They are accelerating.”
Unlike the Cold War arms race driven by ideology, this is a competition grounded in numbers, terrain, and timing. The Indo-Pacific region, especially the first island chain, presents a strategic chessboard where range, stealth, and speed decide dominance. Control of the skies over this area—where American bases, supply lines, and allies are concentrated—is now up for grabs.
China’s edge doesn’t come solely from mass production. It’s also building the infrastructure to keep its fleet flying in wartime. A new Hudson Institute report titled “Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific” reveals that China has launched a systematic campaign to fortify its air bases.
Over the past few years, the number of hardened aircraft shelters—reinforced bunkers designed to protect jets from missile strikes—has more than doubled, from 370 to over 800. Total shelters now exceed 3,100. These fortifications offer China a key wartime advantage: the ability to preserve and launch its aircraft after a first strike, while potentially neutralizing those of its adversary on the ground.
The United States, meanwhile, is lagging. In war game scenarios simulating a conflict over Taiwan, U.S. analysts found that 90 percent of American aircraft losses occurred on the ground. The implication is grim: U.S. air bases are exposed, soft targets.
“Many US bases in the Indo-Pacific remain unprotected by any hardened structures,” a group of bipartisan lawmakers warned last year. “Aircraft are often kept close together for logistical efficiency. The result is critical U.S. air assets are highly vulnerable to Chinese strikes.”
At the heart of these concerns is Taiwan—the island Beijing claims as its own, and which the United States has pledged to help defend. According to Admiral Paparo, China increased its military pressure on Taiwan by 300 percent in 2024. This includes incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, cyber operations, and political warfare.
If China moves to take Taiwan by force, control of the air will be a prerequisite for any successful campaign. Admiral Paparo underscored the urgency: “It will be my job to contest air superiority… and to provide windows of air superiority in order to achieve our effects.”
In other words, in a future war, the U.S. won’t be able to claim uncontested air dominance. The best it can hope for is temporary pockets of control—enough to move forces, conduct strikes, and support allies. This is a major shift from America’s post-9/11 military operations, which rested on guaranteed air superiority.
The danger of not establishing air dominance was laid bare in Ukraine. Russia’s failure to suppress Ukrainian air defenses in the early stages of its invasion has forced both sides into a brutal war of attrition, with trench warfare reminiscent of World War I.
Modern conflicts, Paparo argued, depend on air superiority: “Air supremacy is the complete mastery of the air. Neither side will enjoy that. But we must contest it—fiercely.”
The strategic consequences are enormous. Without air cover, American ground forces—like the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in the first island chain—would be vulnerable. U.S. naval vessels operating in contested waters would risk being targeted by Chinese bombers and long-range missiles.
The Pentagon has often emphasized deterrence—the notion that the threat of overwhelming retaliation will keep China in check. But Paparo warned that deterrence without the real ability to win in combat is meaningless.
“Deterrence remains our highest duty,” he said. “But deterrence must be backed by the capability to prevail in combat.”
That means investing in faster jet production, hardened shelters, longer-range missiles, stealth technologies, and perhaps most critically, forward deployment of assets. The Biden administration has made some moves, such as enhancing cooperation with Australia and Japan, expanding Pacific base access through agreements like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, and investing in hypersonic weapons and next-generation aircraft.
Still, the U.S. defense industrial base is struggling to match China’s output. Beijing’s state-directed system allows for rapid scaling, long-term planning, and military-civil fusion. In contrast, the U.S. defense sector relies on private contractors, constrained budgets, and lengthy acquisition timelines.
What if deterrence fails? Many experts believe China could pursue a short, sharp war strategy—aiming to deliver a quick knockout blow to Taiwan before the U.S. can respond. In that scenario, the first few days would be critical. And in those days, air superiority—or its absence—could determine the outcome.
If U.S. jets are destroyed on the ground and its carriers are forced to retreat outside China’s missile range, Washington might find itself unable to project force in the region. Beijing could then force a political resolution under its terms.
“We must prepare now,” Paparo said. “We don’t want a war. But if it comes, we must be ready to win it.”
Lawmakers across both parties have echoed Paparo’s warnings, calling for a “crash program” to shore up Pacific air defenses. Some proposals include deploying more F-35s to Guam, building additional hardened shelters, dispersing aircraft across smaller islands, and improving missile defenses like the Aegis Ashore systems.
But the clock is ticking. Every month, China adds more fighters, builds more shelters, and tests more advanced systems. Its air force is not only growing, it is being designed specifically to fight the United States—and win.
The U.S. military still retains technological superiority in some areas—stealth, sensors, pilot training—but the edge is narrowing. In a peer-on-peer conflict, small margins become decisive. A few seconds of radar delay, a few jets grounded instead of flying, a few missed chances to strike first—these can determine the fate of thousands, if not the course of a war.
The Indo-Pacific is the fulcrum of 21st-century geopolitics. For decades, the U.S. has operated under the assumption that its air superiority was unshakable. That era is over.
What comes next will depend on what America does now. Whether it reinvests, repositions, and rethinks its strategies—or whether it continues to be outpaced by a rival preparing not just for peace, but for war.
The sky, once a symbol of American dominance, is now a contested frontier. The battle for air superiority in the Indo-Pacific has already begun—not with missiles or dogfights, but with production lines, blueprints, and hardened bunkers. Whether the United States can catch up may well define the next great chapter of global power.
