In April 2022, China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) marked a strategic pivot in its foreign policy, signaling Beijing’s ambition to take on a more proactive role in global security, breaking away from its long-standing non-interference doctrine. Yet, as China grapples with protecting its multi-billion-dollar investments in Africa, especially in the turbulent Sahel region, this grand vision faces severe tests. The ability of Beijing to mediate conflicts and protect its interests in West Africa will be a crucial marker of its future global security credentials.
China’s Expanding Influence through the Global Security Initiative (GSI)
China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) was conceived as a new framework for maintaining international peace and stability, positioning China as a key global player in resolving conflicts. With this initiative, Beijing has increasingly inserted itself into global and regional conflicts, seeking to replace its former non-interference policy with a more assertive role in global governance.
In Africa, China’s interests are primarily economic, with the continent being a significant partner in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and a source of critical raw materials, including oil. While Beijing’s engagements in Africa have largely focused on economic development and infrastructure projects, it has gradually begun to extend its role into the security domain, using the GSI as a platform to establish its influence in African conflict zones.
The situation in the Sahel, however, presents a daunting challenge to China’s aspirations of becoming a global security provider. The region is marked by rampant instability, with terrorism, military coups, and inter-state conflicts making it one of the most volatile areas on the African continent. The Sahel’s turbulence poses a direct threat to Chinese investments, notably its major oil pipeline project spanning Niger and Benin.
Niger-Benin Oil Pipeline: A Strategic Investment Amidst Instability
A crucial element of China’s African engagement is its investment in the oil-rich regions of West Africa. In early 2024, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) completed a 2,000-kilometer pipeline connecting Agadem in eastern Niger to the port city of Seme-Kpodji in Benin. This ambitious project aimed to produce 90,000 barrels of oil per day, more than quadrupling Niger’s current output for the domestic market and substantially boosting its oil exports.
Originally slated for completion in 2021, the pipeline project was delayed by nearly three years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the region’s persistent instability. Further complicating matters, a military coup in Niger in July 2023 triggered severe economic sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These setbacks have caused the project’s costs to balloon beyond the initial US$5 billion estimate.
The pipeline represents CNPC’s most significant investment in a cross-border oil infrastructure project, underscoring China’s deepening involvement in the region. The project’s importance is further amplified by Niger’s decision to leave ECOWAS and join Burkina Faso and Mali in forming the Alliance of Sahel States—a coalition of junta-led nations seeking to assert their sovereignty and resist Western influence.
Economic and Political Costs of the Crisis for China
The disruptions caused by the military coup and subsequent sanctions have imposed significant economic costs on China. Beyond the initial investment of over US$5 billion, CNPC extended a US$400 million loan to the junta-led government in Niger, with a 7% interest rate, to help the country settle its growing debts. In return, Niger agreed to repay the loan through oil exports, making the pipeline crucial for the survival of its regime.
For China, the stakes are high. The success of the pipeline would have transformed Niger’s economy, with China committing to purchase all the country’s oil output. This financial lifeline was vital not only for sustaining the country’s junta regime but also for stabilizing a key region for Chinese energy interests. However, the delays and regional tensions have put the entire project in jeopardy.
Diplomatic Maneuvers and Escalating Tensions
In an attempt to salvage its investment, China has taken on a mediating role in the regional conflict, a move that marks a notable shift from its traditional policy of economic engagement without political involvement. Under the Benin–Niger inter-state steering committee, Chinese diplomats, alongside CNPC representatives, have spearheaded negotiations aimed at resolving the dispute. Notably, CNPC, a state-owned enterprise, has been at the forefront of these diplomatic efforts, signaling a new form of Chinese diplomacy led by the private sector.
In May 2024, after intense negotiations, Benin, which had initially opposed the coup in Niger, agreed to normalize cross-border oil flows. However, even before the pipeline became operational, old rivalries between Niger and Benin resurfaced. On June 9, 2024, Niger’s coup leader, Abdourahamane Tiani, ordered the closure of the section of the pipeline transporting refined oil to Benin, reigniting tensions between the two nations.
The situation escalated further when Benin sentenced three Nigeriens to 18 months in prison for unauthorized entry into the port of Seme, exacerbating the animosity between the countries. This breakdown in relations directly threatens China’s investments and diplomatic efforts, as the pipeline’s success hinges on stable cooperation between Niger and Benin.
Rising Internal Threats and the Impact of Terrorism
While regional conflicts pose one set of challenges, internal instability in Niger compounds China’s difficulties. The Patriotic Liberation Front, a rebel group operating in Niger, has emerged as a significant threat to both the junta government and Chinese interests. In June 2024, the group claimed responsibility for damaging a critical section of the pipeline and issued threats of further sabotage unless Niger withdrew its deal with China.
The rising threat of terrorism further complicates China’s involvement in the region. On July 18, 2024, an attack attributed to Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wa Al-Muslimeen (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate group, led to the abduction of three CNPC employees. This marked the latest in a series of jihadist assaults on Chinese infrastructure and personnel in the Sahel, underscoring the precarious security environment in which Beijing operates.
Faced with escalating terrorist threats and operational difficulties, CNPC temporarily suspended its operations in Niger. This decision has far-reaching economic consequences: each day of shutdown costs CNPC approximately US$9 million, while its partner, the West African Oil Pipeline Company, loses US$1.3 million. Niger, too, is suffering, missing out on US$1.8 million in daily oil revenues.
Looming Economic Crisis for Niger and the Potential for Re-routing
The prolonged shutdown of the pipeline has placed Niger’s already fragile economy on the brink of collapse. The country, still reeling from the effects of ECOWAS sanctions, faces a serious risk of bankruptcy if CNPC halts operations indefinitely.
As a potential solution, Niger’s junta government has explored the possibility of re-routing its oil exports away from Benin. One option under consideration is connecting the pipeline to Chad, where it could join the existing Chad-Cameroon pipeline leading to the port of Kribi. Alternatively, Niger could seek to establish a new route to Nigeria’s coast.
However, the feasibility of re-routing is questionable. Given the high costs of the existing project, it is unlikely that China would invest in another large-scale pipeline before recouping its losses from the current venture. Moreover, the proposed route through the Lake Chad region presents additional security risks, as it passes through areas controlled by Boko Haram, a notorious terrorist group. Given these challenges, China is unlikely to support a new project that poses even greater dangers than the present one.
China’s Future in Africa: A More Cautious Approach?
While the Niger-Benin pipeline may not be the most valuable of China’s international projects, its significance lies in the lessons it offers for Beijing’s future engagement in Africa. China’s experience in the Sahel—marked by inter-state rivalry, domestic instability, and rising terrorism—highlights the risks associated with its expansive investments on the continent.
The challenges facing the Niger-Benin pipeline are a microcosm of the broader difficulties China encounters in West Africa, where political instability and security threats are ever-present. These developments are likely to make Beijing more cautious in its future investment decisions, particularly in volatile regions where the risks to Chinese infrastructure and personnel are high.
Nevertheless, China’s broader ambitions in Africa remain intact. The country will likely continue to seek a more assertive diplomatic role in the region, using the Global Security Initiative as a vehicle for advancing its interests. However, the ongoing crisis in Niger serves as a reminder that China’s path to becoming a global security provider will be fraught with challenges—both economic and political.
As Beijing navigates the turbulent waters of West African politics, its ability to mediate conflicts, protect its investments, and manage security threats will determine the success of its diplomatic efforts and the long-term viability of its Global Security Initiative.
