In just three decades, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has evolved from a defensive, second-tier force into one of the most technologically sophisticated and operationally ambitious air forces in the world. Once confined by national airspace, doctrine, and political caution, the PLAAF is now flying long-range patrols, fielding hundreds of fifth-generation fighters, and participating in increasingly complex bilateral air exercises across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
At the heart of this transformation is a mix of geopolitical ambition, technological innovation, and a relentless desire to learn—from its own limitations and the successes of others. While international collaboration remains selective and politically fraught, the PLAAF’s modernization journey is unmistakably bold, strategic, and unrelenting.
In recent years, China has publicly showcased some of its most advanced air power assets. The twin-engine J-36 and J-50 stealth fighters represent its push into sixth-generation air combat, blending stealth, supersonic cruise, AI-driven systems, and optionally manned platforms. Complementing these are force multipliers like the Y-20-based AWACS and the Y-20U aerial refueler, both critical to extending the PLAAF’s operational reach.
The growing arsenal of long-range air-to-air and air-to-surface guided munitions gives these platforms the teeth to strike far beyond China’s borders. Appearances at air shows and aggressive patrols across the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea are not just shows of strength—they’re declarations of a new doctrine: air dominance as a prerequisite to regional supremacy.
The 1991 Gulf War was an inflection point for China’s military thinking. The dazzling display of Western air superiority—precision strikes, stealth technology, seamless command and control—exposed the PLAAF’s own limitations. For the Chinese leadership, the war served as a wake-up call.
In response, Beijing initiated a series of far-reaching reforms in the 2000s. A critical moment came in 2003 when the PLAAF was granted operational autonomy, no longer a subordinate wing of the ground forces. From there, modernization accelerated: legacy aircraft were phased out, and China’s fast-maturing aerospace industry ramped up development of indigenous jets, radars, and electronic warfare systems.
Today, the PLAAF boasts over 300 fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighters, with sixth-generation platforms expected by 2030. These aircraft operate in a networked environment supported by ISR, AWACS, tanker, and electronic warfare platforms—a transformation unthinkable just two decades ago.
Historically, the PLAAF was inward-looking—much like its Russian counterpart. This isolation stemmed from a mix of centralized planning, political caution from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and practical barriers like the language gap. Few nations exercised with China, and those that did often faced quiet pushback from the West.
But the strategic leadership in Beijing has gradually realized that technology alone doesn’t make a capable air force—operational experience, especially with peer air forces, is key. As a result, China began investing in bilateral air exercises with nations that are either politically aligned, operate Chinese platforms, or are outside the U.S. defense orbit.
China’s deepest air force partnership is with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Since 2011, the Shaheen series of exercises have grown from modest drills to full-spectrum combat simulations involving AEW&C aircraft, beyond-visual-range combat, and even crew swapping.
In the most recent Shaheen-X in 2023, held in China’s Gansu Province, PAF flew Mirages, JF-17s, and J-10Cs. PLAAF fielded the J-11 and its own J-10C fighters, along with the KJ-500 AEW&C. The integration of platforms like the JF-17 and J-10CE into both air forces has created a seamless operational bridge—one that enhances interoperability, signal intelligence sharing, and tactical evolution.
For the PLAAF, these exercises have been a vital window into Western tactics, particularly since the PAF frequently trains with NATO-standard air forces, including the U.S. Air Force’s Red Flag series.
China’s outreach to Southeast Asia includes the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF). Since 2015, the Falcon Strike exercises have seen J-10Cs and JH-7A bombers fly alongside Swedish-made Gripens.
Early editions revealed glaring gaps in PLAAF performance—RTAF’s Western tactics and training proved superior. But more recent editions, such as the 2024 iteration at Udorn Thani Air Base, showed the PLAAF bouncing back with refined tactics, better situational awareness, and improved electronic warfare coordination.
Here too, political tension simmers under the surface. The U.S. barred Thailand’s F-16s from participating in joint drills with China, concerned about the transfer of sensitive data. But the PLAAF pressed on, analyzing every engagement for insights.
The Falcon Shield exercises with the UAE Air Force—first launched in 2023—demonstrate China’s foray into the Middle East. Hosted at Hotan Air Base in Xinjiang, these exercises are strategic on multiple levels.
The UAE deployed Mirage-2000s and a Multi-Role Transport Tanker (MRTT), while China fielded the J-16, J-10C, and KJ-500. The Mirage-2000’s presence is especially significant: both Taiwan and the Indian Air Force (IAF) fly variants of the same aircraft. This allows China to study their electronic signatures and maneuverability in detail—priceless information in a real-world conflict scenario.
Despite their hardware connections—China reverse-engineered much of its fleet from Russian aircraft—the PLAAF and Russian Air Force have had limited direct engagement. Language barriers, doctrinal differences, and strategic mistrust kept them apart.
That began to change in 2021, when Russian SU-30SM fighters flew to China for joint drills. Joint bomber patrols over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea followed, with Chinese H-6K bombers flying alongside Russian TU-95MCs. Both nations share territorial disputes with Japan, giving these patrols not just operational, but geopolitical, weight.
In April 2025, the PLAAF launched its first-ever air exercise with the Egyptian Air Force, dubbed Eagles of Civilization 2025. Held on Egyptian soil, the drills feature China’s J-10B/C fighters, the Y-20U aerial tanker, and the KJ-500 AEW&C, pitted against Egypt’s MiG-29M/M2 fighters.
This cooperation underscores China’s ambitions in North Africa, especially as U.S. influence wanes. With the United States perceived as an unreliable partner under Trump-era unpredictability, Egypt is hedging its bets—opening the door for PLAAF to showcase its expeditionary capability.
For India, these developments are not academic. The Indian Air Force (IAF) faces a PLAAF that is larger, more technologically advanced, and increasingly experienced in joint operations.
With India struggling to maintain its fighter squadron strength and its fifth-generation fighter program still on the drawing board, the asymmetry is growing. PLAAF now routinely trains against platforms and tactics similar to those of the IAF—MiG-29s, Mirage-2000s, and SU-30s—thanks to its exercises with Egypt, UAE, and Russia.
The induction of Y-20U tankers and the anticipated KJ3000 AWACS system will also enable the PLAAF to sustain 24/7 operations deep into contested airspace—directly challenging IAF’s regional advantage.
There’s another layer to these exercises. Each engagement, every radar ping, and communication intercept becomes part of the PLAAF’s AI-powered intelligence network. China isn’t just collecting telemetry—it’s building a combat dataset for future conflicts.
Through signal intelligence, electronic warfare mapping, and AI-based tactical simulations, the PLAAF is creating detailed profiles of how adversary platforms behave under stress. This data doesn’t just serve engineers or tacticians—it trains autonomous systems, decision-support algorithms, and even combat simulators for PLAAF pilots.
In effect, every exercise is a live field lab.
The PLAAF’s transformation is not complete—but it is impressive. From backward tactics and outdated jets, it now stands as a near-peer competitor to the U.S. and its allies. While political constraints still limit full-scale multinational participation, bilateral engagements have proven to be a powerful alternative.
China’s choice of partners—Pakistan, Thailand, UAE, Egypt, and Russia—reflects a strategy focused on gaining experience, gathering intelligence, and influencing defense ecosystems where U.S. reach is diminishing.
What’s clear is that the PLAAF is not just flying longer or faster—it’s thinking smarter, training harder, and expanding its footprint with intent. Its presence in international skies is no longer a matter of curiosity. It’s a force to be reckoned with. As its sixth-generation fighters edge closer to service, the global balance of air power is slowly but surely beginning to shift.
