Recent developments in Syria have dramatically shifted the region’s political landscape. The 24-year reign of Bashar al-Assad ended in December 2024, as rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized control of major cities, including Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus. Forced into exile in Moscow, Assad’s fall has triggered ripple effects across the Middle East, presenting both challenges and opportunities for global powers like China.
For Beijing, this upheaval represents more than just a regional power shift. It underscores the need to recalibrate its foreign policy, balancing economic and security interests while navigating the complexities of a rapidly changing Middle Eastern geopolitical environment.
China’s initial response to Assad’s ousting was measured, emphasizing stability and cooperation. Through its UN representative, Fu Cong, Beijing expressed readiness to work with the international community to facilitate Syria’s transition toward peaceful development. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning echoed these sentiments, stressing the need for a political solution that prioritizes Syria’s long-term stability.
This cautious diplomacy aligns with China’s broader principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, yet underscores Beijing’s desire to remain a key player in shaping Syria’s future.
The roots of China-Syria relations trace back centuries to the ancient Silk Road, symbolizing enduring economic and cultural ties. In the modern era, Syria was one of the first Arab nations to recognize the People’s Republic of China, fostering a long-term partnership. In recent years, this relationship deepened through economic and strategic initiatives, including Syria’s inclusion in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2022 and the establishment of a strategic partnership in 2023.
Under Assad, China had become a major economic partner, with bilateral trade reaching $415.98 million in 2022. However, Assad’s fall has created a vacuum, forcing Beijing to reassess its regional investments and alliances.
China’s economic ambitions in Syria have been central to its Middle East strategy. Through the BRI, Beijing envisioned bolstering infrastructure connectivity, developing energy projects, and securing access to vital trade routes. Key industries, such as oil exploration and reconstruction, underscored Syria’s significance to China’s broader economic agenda.
However, the political upheaval following Assad’s overthrow has cast uncertainty over these ambitions. Critical projects have stalled, and China’s cautious approach to the region’s instability has limited its willingness to deepen economic commitments.
Despite these challenges, China’s economic presence remains significant. Syria’s strategic location and potential for post-conflict reconstruction present opportunities for Beijing to collaborate with other regional actors, particularly Gulf nations, to stabilize and rebuild the country.
Beyond economic goals, security concerns are a major driver of China’s interest in Syria. The presence of Uyghur militant groups, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), highlights Beijing’s fears of instability spilling into its Xinjiang region.
For decades, TIP and its affiliate, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), have operated in Syria, aligning with HTS and other Islamist factions. These groups aim to “liberate East Turkistan,” posing a direct challenge to Chinese sovereignty.
The fall of Assad has emboldened TIP’s rhetoric. In a video released on December 8, TIP fighters vowed to expand their struggle into Xinjiang, targeting cities like Urumchi and Kashgar. Adding to China’s concerns, Syria’s new leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa has appointed officials linked to ETIM, further complicating diplomatic ties.
This convergence of regional and domestic security threats underscores China’s delicate position. Beijing must navigate its relationship with Syria’s new government while addressing the risks posed by Uyghur militants operating in the region.
The collapse of Assad’s regime has unraveled established alliances and power structures in the Middle East. For China, this upheaval presents a dual challenge: managing its regional interests while counterbalancing the diminishing influence of Iran and Russia—key partners in the Syrian conflict.
China’s partnerships with Gulf Arab states provide a potential pathway to influence Syria’s reconstruction and stabilization efforts. By collaborating with nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Beijing can reinforce its economic and strategic foothold while contributing to broader regional stability.
This approach aligns with China’s broader Middle East policy, which emphasizes non-interventionism, economic engagement, and multilateral diplomacy. However, the region’s volatility—exacerbated by conflicts in Yemen, Gaza, and Lebanon—poses ongoing risks to Beijing’s ambitions.
Syria’s post-Assad reconstruction offers significant opportunities for China to assert its influence. As a leading global investor in infrastructure, Beijing is well-positioned to play a pivotal role in rebuilding the country’s war-torn cities, transport networks, and energy infrastructure.
Collaborating with Gulf nations, whose financial resources align with Syria’s reconstruction needs, could enhance China’s regional partnerships and open new markets. Such initiatives would also counterbalance the waning influence of Russia and Iran, reinforcing Beijing’s role as a stabilizing force in the Middle East.
However, instability and the ongoing presence of militant groups remain significant obstacles. Beijing’s reluctance to engage deeply in conflict-prone areas reflects its cautious approach to risk management, limiting its willingness to commit substantial resources to Syria’s reconstruction.
As the Middle East grapples with shifting alliances and escalating tensions, China’s ability to navigate these complexities will shape its standing in the region. The fall of Assad underscores the need for Beijing to adopt a more proactive role, leveraging its economic influence and diplomatic ties to foster stability.
China’s burgeoning partnerships with Arab states provide a foundation for this engagement. Investments in energy, trade, and infrastructure have strengthened Beijing’s ties with Gulf nations, positioning it as a key player in regional affairs. By extending this approach to Syria, China can contribute to rebuilding efforts while securing its strategic interests.
