The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) decision to publicly showcase a simulated air-to-air confrontation between its J-16 multirole fighters and the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Rafale jets marks a notable shift in Beijing’s military communication strategy, reflecting growing confidence in China’s aerospace combat ecosystem and a deliberate effort to shape regional threat perceptions through controlled transparency.
Broadcast nationwide by state-run China Central Television (CCTV), the tabletop war-gaming exercise held in Xuchang, Henan province, departed sharply from the PLAAF’s traditional operational opacity. Rather than revealing a routine training event, the broadcast signalled that information dominance and narrative management are now viewed by Beijing as integral components of modern airpower competition, alongside kinetic capability.
The scenario, which pitted eight J-16 fighters against six Rafales, was not framed as a simple aircraft-versus-aircraft duel. Instead, it was designed to stress-test an entire “kill-chain” architecture encompassing sensors, data fusion, command-and-control networks, electronic warfare and long-range missile employment under simulated high-intensity combat conditions.
By choosing the Rafale—often described by Western air forces as a benchmark “omnirole” fighter—the PLAAF implicitly acknowledged the platform’s credibility as a peer adversary. At the same time, the selection highlighted India’s role as a central strategic variable in China’s evolving Indo-Pacific airpower calculus.
“This is part of our effort to enhance joint operations and test tactics against foreign forces,” a PLA spokesperson said during the CCTV broadcast. The carefully worded remark avoided explicitly naming India as an adversary, yet underscored Beijing’s intent to normalise preparation for conflict scenarios involving advanced Western-designed platforms.
Former PLA instructor and military analyst Song Zhongping reinforced the signalling dimension, noting that “PLA war games are usually highly classified, but this broadcast sends a message about China’s confidence in its capabilities.” His remarks framed the disclosure as a deliberate act of strategic communication aimed at both domestic audiences and regional rivals.
The timing of the broadcast, aired in late December 2025, added to its geopolitical resonance. It came against the backdrop of unresolved Sino-Indian border tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where both sides have steadily reinforced forward-deployed air assets since the 2020 clashes. In this context, the simulation reads less as abstract analysis and more as calibrated deterrence messaging.
Rather than predicting an imminent conflict, the exercise appears intended to convey that the PLAAF’s numerical mass, missile reach and networked warfare concepts are now sufficiently mature to challenge—and potentially overwhelm—India’s most advanced imported combat aircraft. The public framing subtly conditions regional audiences to accept that any future air confrontation along the Himalayan frontier would likely be shaped by Chinese sensor networks, missile engagement envelopes and battle-management systems rather than traditional notions of platform parity.
From a deterrence perspective, the simulation suggests that India’s qualitative edge, embodied by the Rafale, could be progressively eroded in a prolonged conflict. China’s emphasis on scale, redundancy and digitally enabled command structures implies an ability to impose cumulative operational pressure across multiple axes simultaneously.
The Xuchang event reportedly involved around 20 units drawn from across the PLA and its military academies, reflecting an institutional push to break down service and organisational silos in favour of integrated, data-driven experimentation. Unlike live-fire drills, which are constrained by safety, cost and political risk, the tabletop format allowed repeated high-risk engagement sequences—such as beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile exchanges, electronic attack saturation and command-node attrition—without the escalatory signalling associated with real aircraft sorties.
Footage released by state media showed PLA officers manipulating digital representations of J-16 and Rafale formations across large multi-screen command displays, visually reinforcing the PLAAF’s emphasis on information-centric warfare rather than platform-centric dogfighting. According to CCTV, the simulation incorporated artificial intelligence algorithms capable of dynamically adjusting “enemy” behaviour, forcing planners to adapt tactics in real time rather than rely on scripted outcomes.
“The J-16 versus Rafale confrontation represents a clash between critical nodes of both nations’ air combat systems,” a CCTV narrator said, framing the engagement as a systems-of-systems contest. Chinese aviation expert Fu Qianshao added that the simulations use “real data” to test tactics, suggesting that radar performance, missile kinematics and electronic warfare parameters were modelled using intelligence-derived inputs rather than generic assumptions.
The eight-to-six numerical ratio used in the scenario closely mirrors real-world force disparities. China operates more than 200 J-16s, while India fields just 36 Rafales. This alignment reinforces PLAAF doctrine emphasising mass, redundancy and attrition tolerance as decisive factors in sustained high-intensity conflict.
Derived from the Russian Su-30 lineage, the Shenyang J-16 has evolved into what Chinese analysts describe as the backbone of the PLAAF’s non-stealth air superiority force. It combines long endurance, heavy payload capacity and advanced sensor integration, optimised to exploit China’s growing inventory of long-range air-to-air missiles. Central to this is the PL-15, whose estimated range of 200–300 kilometres places it among the longest-ranged operational BVR weapons in service.
“The J-16 is now making headlines despite the rise of more advanced jets like the J-20, because it forms the backbone of our air superiority,” Chinese commentator Wang Mingliang said, highlighting its role in sustaining continuous high-tempo operations.
The Rafale, by contrast, reflects a design philosophy centred on balance rather than brute force. It integrates agility, sensor fusion and survivability through systems such as the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite, designed to reduce detection and disrupt enemy targeting. Western analysts have long praised its versatility. “The Rafale’s strength lies in its balanced design—it’s not just a dogfighter but a true multirole platform,” Royal United Services Institute analyst Justin Bronk has previously observed.
India’s Rafales are further enhanced by customised avionics, Hammer standoff weapons and integration with Israeli systems, making them particularly relevant for high-altitude operations along the Himalayan frontier. Yet economics of scale remain stark. China’s ability to field hundreds of J-16s allows it to absorb losses and sustain missile expenditure rates that would quickly strain India’s limited Rafale fleet.
Missile costs further shape this dynamic. The PL-15 is estimated to cost roughly USD 1–2 million per unit, while the Meteor—widely regarded as the Rafale’s key BVR weapon—is assessed at over USD 2.5 million. In a prolonged conflict, volume-fire advantages could prove decisive.
Regional analysts have largely interpreted the publicised simulation as a calibrated show of force rather than a precursor to imminent conflict. Collin Koh of Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies described it as “a show of force,” noting that by pitting the J-16 against the Rafale, China is signalling readiness for scenarios involving India—and potentially other theatres where French-supplied fighters operate.
Indian commentators have sought to downplay the implications. Retired Air Marshal Anil Chopra argued that the broadcast was “more propaganda than preparation,” citing multinational exercises in which Rafales have performed strongly against superior numbers.
Beyond bilateral dynamics, the exercise feeds into a broader Indo-Pacific contest in which airpower underpins deterrence, crisis stability and escalation control. For India, it reinforces concerns over fleet size and sustainability, intensifying pressure to accelerate additional Rafale procurements, advance indigenous programmes such as the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, and improve missile and sensor integration across the IAF.
For China, the Xuchang simulation demonstrated confidence not only in its aircraft but also in its digital training infrastructure, which allows rapid iteration of tactics without the diplomatic fallout of live exercises near contested borders. As war-gaming increasingly migrates from physical airspace to digital command centres, the PLAAF’s rare glimpse into its high-stakes simulations underscores a strategic reality: in future air conflicts, perception management and systems integration may matter as much as individual aircraft performance.
