China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has once again put the spotlight on its most advanced stealth fighter, the J-20 “Mighty Dragon,” during the recent “Justice Mission 2025” military drills around Taiwan, fuelling fresh debate over the island’s ability to detect and counter Beijing’s fifth-generation combat aircraft. Through carefully curated imagery and suggestive messaging, Beijing has implied that the J-20 operated close to Taiwan without being detected by its air defence network—an assertion that has been met with scepticism by Taiwanese officials and analysts, even as it underscores growing anxieties about the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait.
The controversy erupted after the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command released a video on the second day of the two-day drills. The footage showed a J-20 flying low over a landscape that some observers claimed resembled southern Taiwan, particularly the area around Pingtung. The implication was striking: China’s stealth fighter may have penetrated close to, or even into, areas monitored by Taiwan’s advanced air defence systems without triggering any public alert.
Adding fuel to the speculation, Lu Li-shih, a former lieutenant commander in the Taiwanese navy, shared a comparison image on Facebook juxtaposing a screenshot from the PLA video with satellite imagery of Pingtung County. “J-20 fighter jets in Pingtung!” he wrote, pointing to what he described as a resemblance between the terrain in the video and that of southern Taiwan. The post quickly gained traction, particularly among pro-China social media accounts, which amplified the claim as evidence of Taiwan’s supposed vulnerability.
On X, an account named “PLA Military Updates” mocked Taiwan’s military readiness, claiming that PLAAF J-20s had flown within 10 kilometres of Taiwan’s coast without being detected. Another Chinese account wrote that after the J-20 “captured the beautiful scenery of the treasure island,” it returned safely to base while Taiwanese authorities “continued to play ostrich.” Such messaging fit neatly into Beijing’s broader information campaign aimed at projecting confidence and technological superiority.
Despite the online frenzy, the claims remain unverified. The EurAsian Times and other outlets have noted that they could not independently confirm whether a J-20 flew close to Pingtung. At the time of writing, neither Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) nor China’s Ministry of National Defence had officially confirmed the alleged flight. Supporters of the claim argue that the absence of any Taiwanese alert regarding J-20 activity near Pingtung is itself telling, given that Taipei routinely publicises the movements of other PLA aircraft.
If the claim were true, it would be deeply unsettling for Taiwan. Pingtung is one of the island’s most sensitive military regions, hosting several key facilities. These include Pingtung Air Base, the largest air base in Taiwan by area; the Jiupeng base, which serves as Taiwan’s primary missile and rocket research and testing site; the Dahanshan radar station, a critical early-warning installation; the Joint Operations Training Base Command; and mechanised infantry brigade barracks. The idea that a Chinese stealth fighter could approach such a concentration of assets undetected would represent a significant intelligence and operational concern for Taipei.
At the same time, Taiwan has highlighted instances that underscore its own surveillance capabilities. During the drills, the Republic of China Air Force (RoCAF) tracked several Chinese aircraft, including the J-16, regarded as the most advanced variant of the Flanker series. In one widely discussed incident, a Taiwanese F-16V “Viper” tracked a J-16 using its AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod, releasing imagery that demonstrated its ability to monitor PLA movements—albeit with key parameters obscured.
Military analysts responding to that incident argued that it showed Taiwan could still pose a serious challenge to the PLAAF, despite its numerical disadvantage and lack of a fifth-generation stealth fighter. Precision tracking, integrated air defence, and familiarity with the local battlespace could, they argued, allow Taiwan to inflict meaningful losses in a conflict scenario. However, the alleged undetected operation of the J-20, if accurate, would complicate that calculus.
Many analysts view the PLA’s video release less as proof of an operational breakthrough and more as a deliberate act of information warfare. Beijing has increasingly relied on grey-zone tactics—actions that fall short of open conflict but are designed to intimidate and erode confidence—to pressure Taiwan’s democratically elected government and signal resolve to the United States and its allies. By hinting that its stealth fighters can operate freely near Taiwan, China reinforces a narrative of inevitability and technological dominance.
Taiwanese officials and experts have pushed back strongly against the claims. Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), said the video was actually filmed in Guangdong province on the Chinese mainland, an area with terrain that can resemble southern Taiwan. His comments, reported by the South China Morning Post, reflect Taipei’s broader effort to downplay the psychological impact of PLA messaging.
The J-20 has nevertheless been a prominent feature of PLA exercises simulating blockade and encirclement operations around Taiwan since August 2022. Its repeated appearance in such drills signals Beijing’s intent to integrate stealth platforms into joint, multi-domain operations aimed at achieving rapid air and information superiority in a crisis.
In a candid assessment aired on Taiwanese television, former air force lieutenant general Chang Yen-ting acknowledged limitations in Taiwan’s ability to detect stealth aircraft like the J-20. He said Taiwan lacks the advanced radar technologies—such as quantum radar—that are often touted as potential counters to stealth. “We only have phased array radar for aircraft detection, also known as Doppler radar,” he explained, noting that such systems are optimised for conventional aircraft rather than low-observable platforms. “So for the J-20, we cannot detect it,” he said, adding that the defence ministry would have announced any confirmed detection.
Chang also warned against reading too much into PLA disclosures. “How many sorties of J-20s [has the PLA] made? How close to Taiwan were they? We don’t know,” he said, arguing that China should avoid revealing too much about the aircraft’s capabilities during exercises. He noted that the presence of US forces in and around Taiwan means any exposure risks giving Washington valuable intelligence on the J-20’s electromagnetic signature.
From an operational perspective, a stealth fighter operating undetected would offer China a clear advantage in a conflict. In a potential invasion or coercive campaign, J-20s could detect and engage Taiwanese fighters before being seen themselves, gaining a decisive first-strike edge. Armed with long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles, the aircraft could conduct beyond-visual-range engagements while remaining largely invisible to older radar systems. It could also play a key role in suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), targeting radar sites, air bases, and high-value assets such as airborne early warning aircraft and aerial refuelling tankers.
The J-20’s strengths extend beyond stealth alone. The aircraft is believed to feature advanced sensor fusion and data-processing capabilities, allowing it to integrate information from other fighters, drones, early warning aircraft, satellites, and electronic warfare units. “Information has now become the deciding factor,” J-20 chief designer Yang Wei has said, emphasising the importance of gaining and denying information through AESA radars, data links, stealth, and electronic countermeasures.
The latest claims are also not unprecedented. In January 2023, PLAAF Captain Yang Juncheng of the elite “Wang Hai” brigade claimed he had flown over Taiwan, describing how he could see the island’s coastline and mountains from his cockpit. China has also announced J-20 flights through strategically sensitive and heavily monitored waterways such as the Tsushima Strait and the Bashi Channel, asserting that these sorties went unreported by regional militaries.
Yet even within China, some experts have questioned the wisdom of flying stealth aircraft too close to Taiwan outside of wartime conditions. Former PLA instructor Song Zhongping argued that the J-20 does not need to approach the island so closely, as doing so increases the risk of detection by US and Taiwanese forces. “The PLA wouldn’t do so just for show,” he said, stressing that stealth aircraft must minimise exposure to prevent adversaries from learning their electromagnetic characteristics.
As debate continues, the episode highlights the murky intersection of military capability, perception management, and psychological pressure in the Taiwan Strait. Whether or not the J-20 truly slipped past Taiwan’s defences, Beijing’s messaging has achieved one clear objective: keeping questions about Taiwan’s air defence resilience—and China’s growing power—firmly in the regional and global spotlight.
