On October 14, 2024, China conducted its “Joint Sword 2024B” military exercise, marking the fourth large-scale military exercise near Taiwan in just two years. The exercise, designed as a show of force, reaffirmed Beijing’s willingness to use military power if necessary to compel Taiwan into unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This exercise, however, carried a distinctive emphasis, focusing more on a potential blockade scenario rather than an outright invasion.
As tensions between China and Taiwan continue to escalate, “Joint Sword 2024B” has brought renewed attention to the possibility of China opting for a naval blockade as a means of pressuring Taiwan, rather than attempting a risky and potentially catastrophic invasion. The exercises also underline China’s strategic patience and its ability to exploit vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defenses, trade dependencies, and geopolitical positioning.
China’s government and state media claimed that the “Joint Sword 2024B” exercise was a direct reaction to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s speech during the Republic of China National Day celebrations. In his address, Lai expressed moderate sentiments, including his acceptance of the name “Republic of China,” a nod to historical continuity that sought to balance domestic and international expectations. Some analysts pointed out that Lai’s speech was relatively mild compared to previous statements that might have irked Beijing.
Nevertheless, China presented the speech as “provocative,” justifying the military drills as a response to what it framed as a challenge to its territorial integrity. However, this claim was quickly exposed as misleading. The planning for these exercises had clearly begun long before Lai’s speech, as demonstrated by the Chinese military’s naming of a previous drill in May, “Joint Sword 2024A,” implying that the follow-up in October was pre-scheduled rather than reactive. This suggests that China’s military exercises around Taiwan are increasingly driven by a broader strategic agenda, not mere responses to political statements or actions from Taipei or Washington.
In recent years, the frequency and scale of China’s military exercises around Taiwan have grown dramatically. “Joint Sword 2024B” is part of a pattern that showcases China’s increasing militarization of the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters. These exercises serve multiple purposes: testing and refining the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) operational capabilities, sending clear political signals, and, most significantly, preparing for various military contingencies.
The exercises have also evolved in complexity and scope. While previous drills focused on amphibious landings and aerial assaults, “Joint Sword 2024B” placed greater emphasis on maritime blockades. China’s Coast Guard (CCG), a key player in enforcing maritime control, played a central role in the exercise. With CCG vessels encircling Taiwan and patrolling near Taiwan-held islands close to China’s coast, Beijing underscored its readiness to choke Taiwan’s access to vital sea lanes in the event of a conflict.
A significant show of force came with the participation of CCG vessel 2901, the largest coast guard ship in the world, which dwarfs many naval warships. This move highlighted China’s intention to dominate any future confrontations involving naval assets by leveraging its maritime law enforcement capabilities in gray zone scenarios—conflicts short of full-scale warfare.
The central message from the “Joint Sword 2024B” exercise appears to be China’s growing preference for a blockade as its primary military option to force Taiwan into submission. A blockade offers China flexibility and control, allowing it to exert pressure on Taiwan over an extended period without immediately triggering a full-blown military conflict.
China’s military spokespersons indicated that the exercise simulated a scenario where Taiwan would be surrounded and cut off from critical resources. The drill reportedly practiced techniques for blocking Taiwan’s imports and setting up naval picket lines to prevent foreign intervention, most notably from the United States.
A blockade is a logical extension of China’s military doctrine, which has long sought to balance the use of military force with political and psychological pressure. A blockade could strangle Taiwan’s economy and create significant domestic unrest without the heavy human and material costs associated with an invasion. Furthermore, the ambiguity inherent in blockade tactics—such as “gray zone” operations involving the harassment of civilian shipping and selective enforcement of maritime exclusion zones—plays to China’s strengths in hybrid warfare.
For years, military analysts have debated whether China would attempt to invade Taiwan outright or opt for a blockade. In a widely cited analysis from June 2024, Brandon Weichert argued in The National Interest that many Western observers believe Beijing’s most likely course of action would be a surprise invasion—a “bolt-from-the-blue” strike designed to quickly neutralize Taiwan’s leadership and military defenses before external powers, especially the United States, could respond.
Yet, others contend that a blockade is a more attractive and practical option for Beijing. As military experts have pointed out, an invasion of Taiwan would be fraught with risks. Taiwan’s terrain, including rugged coastlines and mountainous interiors, presents formidable challenges for an amphibious landing force. Moreover, Taiwan’s military has been significantly bolstered by arms sales from the U.S., including advanced missile systems and fighter jets capable of resisting an invasion.
A blockade, on the other hand, would allow China to isolate Taiwan while avoiding direct confrontation with U.S. forces, at least initially. By cutting off Taiwan’s trade routes, particularly its energy supplies, which the island imports almost entirely from abroad, China could bring the Taiwanese economy to its knees. Taiwan’s dependence on global trade makes it particularly vulnerable to such a strategy.
A blockade also offers China a less risky path to achieving its long-term goal of reunification with Taiwan. Unlike an invasion, which would force Beijing to either succeed or fail outright, a blockade is a gradual form of coercion that allows for escalation or de-escalation based on the evolving political and military situation.
China could increase pressure incrementally by imposing various forms of maritime control, including declaring exclusion zones, conducting ship inspections, and firing warning shots. These actions could be ramped up or scaled back depending on how Taiwan, the U.S., and other international actors responded. Importantly, a blockade gives China time to exploit internal divisions within Taiwan. With the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s main opposition party, favoring closer ties with Beijing, a prolonged crisis could exacerbate political infighting and weaken Taiwan’s resolve to resist.
Beijing may also see a blockade as a way to manage U.S. intervention. While a direct invasion would likely provoke an immediate and forceful U.S. response, a blockade would place Washington in a dilemma. Should American forces intervene to break the blockade, they would risk sparking a broader conflict with China, potentially leading to a protracted standoff in the Taiwan Strait. In this scenario, China could rely on its gray zone tactics, using its larger and more numerous ships to harass U.S. naval forces, prolonging the standoff and testing American resolve.
The “Joint Sword 2024B” military exercise has shed new light on China’s potential strategies for Taiwan. While an invasion remains a possibility, the emphasis on blockade tactics suggests that Beijing may be leaning toward a more measured, less immediately destructive approach. A blockade would give China greater flexibility in controlling the pace of the conflict, avoiding the significant risks of a full-scale invasion.
However, this does not necessarily mean a blockade would be less dangerous. It could lead to economic collapse in Taiwan, heightened tensions with the United States, and an escalation into a broader conflict if not carefully managed. For Taiwan, the prospect of a blockade poses serious questions about its economic resilience and its ability to withstand prolonged isolation. For the U.S. and its allies, it raises concerns about how best to counter China’s use of coercion without triggering a larger war.
As Beijing continues its military buildup and Taiwan seeks ways to fortify its defenses, the Taiwan Strait will remain one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints. The “Joint Sword 2024B” exercise may well be a rehearsal for future actions, providing a glimpse of how China intends to assert its claims over Taiwan in the years to come. The hope is that cooler heads will prevail, and that military action can be avoided in favor of peaceful dialogue. But with each passing drill, that prospect seems increasingly remote.
