China’s decision to proceed with the establishment of a major military drone manufacturing facility in Bangladesh marks a significant inflection point in South Asia’s evolving defence-industrial and geopolitical landscape. Valued at Tk608 crore—approximately US$55.3 million, The project embeds Beijing deeper into the Bay of Bengal security architecture while testing India’s strategic comfort zone along its eastern flank.
Approved by Bangladesh’s finance ministry, the government-to-government agreement designates the Bangladesh Air Force as the implementing authority, with technology transfer from China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) International. CETC is a state-owned conglomerate with an expansive global footprint in radar systems, electronic warfare, secure communications, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) electronics, supplying defence technologies to more than 110 countries.
Formally titled “Establishment of Manufacturing Plant and Transfer of Technology (ToT) for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)”, the project allocates Tk570.60 crore—roughly US$51.9 million for the importation and installation of manufacturing infrastructure and associated technologies. The remaining funds cover domestic expenditures, including site development, training, and ancillary logistics. Disbursements will be spread across four fiscal years, beginning with Tk106 crore—around US$9.6 million in the current budget cycle.
While official documentation refrains from naming specific platforms, converging industry and security assessments suggest the production line will prioritise the Wing Loong II family of medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) combat drones. Often compared to the US-made MQ-9 Reaper, the Wing Loong II is a combat-proven system that combines intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and precision-strike roles, and has been exported widely across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
The announcement has triggered unease in New Delhi, where strategists increasingly interpret Chinese defence projects in Bangladesh as part of a broader pattern of incremental strategic encirclement. India’s concern is amplified by Bangladesh’s geographic proximity to its vulnerable northeastern corridor, a region connected to the Indian mainland by the narrow Siliguri Corridor and long viewed as strategically sensitive.
The geopolitical resonance of the drone factory is further magnified by political recalibration in Dhaka following the 2024 transition of power. Interim leader Muhammad Yunus has accelerated economic and defence engagement with Beijing, culminating in multi-billion-dollar agreements during his March 2025 visit to China. These moves reflect a broader effort by Bangladesh to diversify partnerships and assert strategic autonomy amid intensifying great-power competition.
Academic Md Obaidullah of Daffodil International University noted that India’s response has been inconsistent. “India has adopted a contradictory approach: resisting Chinese military sales to Bangladesh but failing to present itself as a credible alternative,” he said, highlighting what many analysts describe as structural deficiencies in New Delhi’s regional defence diplomacy.
Dhaka’s leadership, however, has adopted a deliberately cautious public tone. Finance Adviser Salehuddin Ahmed declined to comment directly on the drone factory or potential fighter jet acquisitions, stating, “I will not comment on the establishment of a drone plant or the import of fighter jets… Let everything be finalised first.” The remark signalled an attempt to manage regional sensitivities without derailing Bangladesh’s strategic objectives.
Taken together, these decisions frame the drone factory not as a discrete industrial project but as a strategic signal. Bangladesh appears to be recalibrating its defence sovereignty, supply chains, and external alignments as competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.
For China, the willingness to transfer UAV manufacturing technology reflects a calculated effort to anchor long-term defence-industrial dependence while projecting influence into the Bay of Bengal. This maritime space has grown in strategic importance due to energy shipping routes, submarine chokepoints, and its proximity to India’s eastern seaboard.
From Bangladesh’s perspective, the factory aligns with its Forces Goal 2030 modernisation blueprint, which emphasises indigenous sustainment, reduced lifecycle costs, and greater operational autonomy. Historically, the Bangladesh Air Force has relied heavily on imported platforms and foreign maintenance pipelines, limiting flexibility and increasing long-term expenses.
CETC’s role goes beyond basic assembly. Its core competencies in sensor fusion, secure datalinks, and electronic warfare architectures offer Bangladesh the opportunity to integrate UAVs into a broader network-centric battlespace, rather than operating them as isolated reconnaissance assets. This represents a qualitative leap in capability, particularly in ISR and maritime domain awareness.
Financially, the project’s structure—Tk608 crore spread across four years—reflects Beijing’s preference for scalable defence investments that bind recipient states into extended technical cooperation without triggering the political shockwaves associated with single, high-profile acquisitions. Such an approach deepens institutional dependence while maintaining a relatively low political profile.
Strategically, situating drone manufacturing in Bangladesh provides China with logistical depth and export optionality. A facility in South Asia offers a geographically central hub from which Beijing could service regional markets in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and potentially the Middle East, leveraging Bangladesh’s competitive labour costs and improving industrial base.
The drone factory also complements China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative-linked investments in Bangladeshi ports, power plants, and transport corridors. Together, these projects reinforce dual-use synergies that blur the line between civilian infrastructure development and latent military utility, a pattern observed in several Belt and Road partner states.
China is already Bangladesh’s largest arms supplier, accounting for an estimated 11 percent of global Chinese arms exports between 2019 and 2023. This relationship has been underpinned by sales of submarines, surface combatants, combat aircraft, and missile systems. By embedding production rather than merely exporting finished platforms, Beijing elevates its relationship with Dhaka from transactional arms sales to structural defence-industrial integration.
Such integration raises the strategic cost for Bangladesh should it later seek to pivot away from Chinese systems, as supply chains, training pipelines, and upgrade paths become increasingly intertwined. In regional terms, the move signals that the Bay of Bengal is no longer a peripheral theatre but a core node in China’s Indo-Pacific defence diplomacy.
If the Wing Loong II becomes the primary production focus, it would introduce a significant shift in Bangladesh’s airpower profile. The drone boasts an endurance of up to 32 hours, a payload capacity of around 480 kilograms, and compatibility with precision-guided munitions such as BA-7 air-to-ground missiles and LS-6 glide bombs. These capabilities enable persistent surveillance and precision strike missions previously absent from Bangladesh’s operational inventory.
Such attributes are particularly relevant for maritime patrol over Bangladesh’s expansive exclusive economic zone, supporting efforts to counter piracy, illegal fishing, and grey-zone coercion. The platform’s electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar sensors allow all-weather, day-night operations—an important advantage in the monsoon-affected Bay of Bengal.
Cost considerations further favour Chinese UAVs. Lower acquisition and sustainment costs allow Bangladesh to field meaningful fleet sizes rather than symbolic numbers, especially when domestic production reduces foreign exchange outflows and supports incremental upgrades tailored to local requirements.
For India, opposition to the drone factory reflects deeper anxieties over China’s expanding military-industrial footprint along its periphery. The prospect of armed MALE UAVs operating from Bangladeshi soil raises concerns about surveillance reach, electronic intelligence collection, and the broader implications of Chinese-origin systems operating close to India’s northeastern states.
Yet Dhaka’s frustration with India’s defence engagement record complicates this narrative. Several Indian initiatives, including a US$500 million line of credit pledged in 2019, have progressed slowly, undermining New Delhi’s credibility as a defence partner. Bangladesh’s earlier decision to opt for Chinese-origin JF-17 fighters over India’s Tejas was driven largely by delays and uncompetitive terms rather than ideological alignment.
As Md Obaidullah observed, attempts to block Chinese military hardware without offering viable alternatives risk pushing Dhaka further toward Beijing. India’s accelerated domestic investments in indigenous UAVs and counter-drone systems address internal needs but do little to shape outcomes in neighbouring states.
Beyond platforms, CETC’s involvement introduces sophisticated electronic warfare and network integration dimensions that could reshape Bangladesh’s ISR ecosystem. For India, concerns extend beyond individual drones to the systemic implications of integrated UAV and electronic warfare architectures operating nearby.
As the factory moves toward anticipated operational status by late 2026, its symbolic weight may prove as consequential as its physical output. More than a manufacturing site, it signals Bangladesh’s assertion of defence autonomy in a contested strategic environment—and underscores how industrial decisions are increasingly inseparable from geopolitical alignment in South Asia.
