The Jiutian SS-UAV, unveiled as the world’s first “drone mothership,” promises to rewrite the rules of aerial warfare. But beneath the buzz lies a bloated concept riddled with flaws, more likely to fizzle than fly in real combat. Here’s why China’s latest military marvel could be a spectacular misfire.
At the 2024 Zhuhai Air Show, China took the wraps off the Jiutian SS-UAV—its most ambitious unmanned aerial vehicle to date. Standing for “ShenShou” or “Divine Beast,” the Jiutian was billed as the centerpiece of a future-facing PLA Air Force, capable of launching up to 100 kamikaze drones, missiles, and performing complex swarm operations over thousands of kilometers.
Chinese state media heralded it as the dawn of a new age in airpower. With a 7,000 km range, 12-hour endurance, and 15,000-meter ceiling, the Jiutian appeared tailor-made for long-range, high-intensity operations far from Chinese shores. Promotional videos depicted a sky-darkening swarm of drones overwhelming enemy fleets and missile batteries.
“This thing is a flying billboard,” said a senior Western defense analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity. “It’s not a stealth platform. It’s not maneuverable. It’s not fast. It’s trying to do too much and ends up doing nothing well.”
The first and most glaring issue? Survivability.
At 16 tonnes with an 82-foot wingspan, the Jiutian isn’t going to sneak up on anyone. It’s essentially a flying warehouse—a lumbering target for advanced radar systems and modern air-to-air weapons. There’s no meaningful stealth to speak of, no agile maneuvering, no self-defense systems that can protect it in a hot zone.
Tom Shugart of the Center for a New American Security summed it up bluntly: “It doesn’t appear to be particularly stealthy… [it’s] subject to destruction by enemy aircraft or air defenses before it gets close enough to release its drones.”
Fighter aircraft like the U.S. F-22 and F-35, or India’s Rafale, are built to spot and destroy exactly this type of high-altitude, slow-flying target. The Jiutian’s high flight ceiling is irrelevant when it’s within reach of missiles like the Meteor, AMRAAM-ER, or SM-6—all designed to kill threats at extreme distances and altitudes.
And let’s talk radar. With its size and structure, the Jiutian likely lights up radar screens like a carnival float. Even Taiwan’s upgraded F-16Vs, with AESA radars and long-range missiles, would have no trouble locking on.
Even if the Jiutian somehow escapes kinetic threats, electronic warfare is another fatal weak point.
Chinese media tout quantum-encrypted communications and AI-driven swarm coordination as its command backbone. But these are theoretical advantages—not battlefield-tested systems. Sophisticated jammers like the U.S. Next Generation Jammer or India’s D4 counter-drone suite can disrupt command-and-control links, rendering the Jiutian’s swarm inert.
In fact, it doesn’t even need to be shot down. If its swarm can’t be launched or coordinated due to jamming, the Jiutian becomes an expensive balloon floating over hostile territory.
And once the drones are in the air, they become targets themselves. The swarms are fragile, limited in range, and easy to intercept with the right tools—especially when defenders know what’s coming.
Let’s look closer at the drones themselves.
Reports indicate the Jiutian carries roughly 100 UAVs—most of them modeled on loitering munitions like the Shahed-136. While effective in limited roles, these kamikaze drones suffer from short range, light payloads, and vulnerability to electronic countermeasures.
Despite claims that they can be deployed en masse to saturate defenses, the range from a mothership at altitude is questionable. Energy required to glide or maneuver means they won’t fly far. Their real-world combat radius may fall well short of strategic value.
Moreover, they’re small and underarmed. You’re not taking out hardened targets or major naval assets with tiny warheads. Swarms work best against lightly defended targets or civilian infrastructure—not against modern militaries equipped with radar-linked gun systems, jammers, and lasers.
And once they’re launched? The Jiutian is effectively unarmed, relying on its slow retreat to safety. If any adversary is still awake and watching, this is where the fun ends—and the fireball begins.
China says the Jiutian has a 6-tonne payload, combining drones, air-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and 1,000 kg bombs. Let’s put that under the microscope.
100 drones, even assuming each weighs just 60–80 kg, account for over 6,000–8,000 kg.
A single PL-12E missile weighs around 200 kg.
A 1,000 kg bomb is…well, a tonne.
Any serious mix of these rapidly exceeds six tonnes. The only way the Jiutian achieves full range is if it’s flying near-empty. A full load means limited range. Full range means limited armament. You can’t have both.
The U.S. Global Hawk, by comparison, maxes out at a fraction of this payload—yet it’s proven, reliable, and built specifically for intelligence roles. The Jiutian is trying to combine strike, support, and surveillance in one giant UAV. It’s not clear it can do even one well.
Let’s say the Jiutian actually works as advertised—flies out, drops its drones, delivers a few missiles, and returns home.
In a real war scenario—over Taiwan, the South China Sea, or near Guam—its survivability is near zero. It’s too slow to evade, too big to hide, and too vulnerable to trust with high-value missions.
Deploying it would require escorts, airspace dominance, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)—a massive logistical footprint that defeats the idea of a low-risk, unmanned strike platform.
If it’s meant for lower-intensity conflicts, then why the heavy weapons and complex drone swarms? A Reaper or TB2 could do the job for a fraction of the cost and complexity.
China’s defense PR machine has been working overtime. The Jiutian has been splashed across CCTV, state newspapers, and online propaganda channels. It’s being positioned as a symbol of Chinese technological ascendancy—especially ahead of sensitive political anniversaries.
- But look past the CGI, and a familiar pattern emerges.
- The J-20 stealth fighter? Hyped as an F-22 killer, still struggling with engines.
- The H-20 stealth bomber? Announced years ago, still unseen in public.
- Carrier-based stealth drones? Promised, delayed, and still not deployed.
The Jiutian feels like more of the same: a spectacle for deterrence and prestige, not a reliable weapon for warfare. It’s designed to impress on PowerPoint, not prevail in combat.
China isn’t wrong to bet big on drones. The Ukraine conflict has shown that small, cheap UAVs can play outsized roles. From ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) to direct attacks, drones are reshaping modern warfare.
But here’s what Beijing may be ignoring: counter-drone tech is evolving just as fast.
India’s D4 system, field-tested in 2025, wiped out over 50 drones during Operation Sindoor using a mix of jamming, radar, and kinetic kill systems. Israel’s Iron Beam, the U.S. DE M-SHORAD lasers, and even Taiwan’s Sky Sword systems are all being fine-tuned to neutralize mass drone threats.
And that’s not even counting cyber tools. AI-driven swarms require data links, machine learning coordination, and communication—an electronic warfare feast.
In effect, the more drones you pack into a mothership, the more catastrophic a single jamming incident becomes. The Jiutian is trying to weaponize quantity. But modern militaries are prepared to counter it with smarter, cheaper, faster responses.
Ultimately, the Jiutian isn’t just a platform—it’s a reflection of China’s broader military strategy. Anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) doctrine emphasizes denying U.S. forces access to regional hotspots. In theory, the Jiutian supports this by extending strike range without putting pilots at risk.
But the real-world math doesn’t add up. If the Jiutian needs a secure corridor to approach a target, it’s useless in contested zones. If it needs fighter escorts and electronic warfare cover, it’s no longer a cost-effective UAV—it’s a resource hog.
Compare that to emerging Western concepts like DARPA’s Gremlins (recoverable drone swarms launched from C-130s) or the U.S. Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray (a stealth tanker for carriers). These platforms emphasize survivability, recoverability, and networked warfare. The Jiutian, by contrast, is expendable by design—without being cheap or numerous enough to accept the losses.
China’s Jiutian SS-UAV is an ambitious project, no doubt. It showcases an evolving approach to drone warfare and highlights how far Chinese aerospace engineering has come in the last decade. But ambition doesn’t equal effectiveness.
Under scrutiny, the Jiutian’s flaws multiply:
- Vulnerable to interception.
- Easily jammed.
- Burdened by weight and range tradeoffs.
- Dependent on fragile swarm logic.
- Overhyped by state media.
- Unproven in battle.
This so-called “drone mothership” looks less like the future of warfare and more like a cautionary tale about overreach. The West—and especially Taiwan—should watch it closely, but there’s no reason to panic.
