Chinese President Xi Jinping’s newly unveiled Global Governance Initiative (GGI) marks Beijing’s clearest statement of intent to reshape the international order, analysts say, as the world reels from intensifying great-power rivalry and the breakdown of postwar alliances.
Unveiled at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin on September 1, Xi’s initiative calls on nations to build a “fairer and more reasonable system of global governance” rooted in sovereign equality, multilateralism, and an “action-oriented” approach to global challenges.
Xi framed the proposal in sweeping historical terms, likening today’s geopolitical turbulence to the post-World War II upheaval that gave birth to the United Nations 80 years ago. He warned that Cold War thinking, hegemonism, and protectionism continue to cast a “lingering shadow” over global affairs, even as new threats emerge.
“History tells us that the more difficult the times, the more we must hold fast to the aspiration of peaceful coexistence and strengthen our confidence in cooperation and win-win outcomes,” Xi said in his keynote address.
For China, the GGI consolidates a decade of diplomatic activism under Xi — from the Global Development Initiative (2021) and Global Security Initiative (2022) to the Global Civilisation Initiative (2023). Together, these proposals articulate Beijing’s push for a multipolar order where developing nations wield greater voice, while the United States becomes one pole among many.
Yet questions abound: Can Beijing translate rhetoric into action? Will the Global South rally behind China’s leadership? And how will internal economic weakness and international distrust constrain Xi’s ambitions?
Xi’s choice of the SCO as the stage for announcing the GGI was telling. Founded in 2001 as a security bloc between China, Russia, and Central Asian states, the SCO has since grown to ten members, including India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. With its reach across Eurasia, the bloc gives China a platform to amplify its governance vision beyond the West-dominated order.
By invoking 1945, Xi sought to elevate the present moment to another inflection point. Just as the devastation of two world wars prompted the creation of the UN, he suggested, today’s turbulence — trade wars, pandemics, climate shocks, and new technological frontiers — demands systemic transformation.
“China is positioning itself as the defender of peace and as the key shaper of the new order it is proposing,” said Dylan Loh, assistant professor of public policy at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University.
Jonathan Ping, associate professor at Bond University, called the juxtaposition deliberate. “It frames today’s turbulence not as chaos, but as an opportunity for systemic transformation led by China,” he said.
Analysts note that Beijing views the current moment as uniquely favorable, especially as Washington pulls back from multilateral leadership.
Since returning to office in January, President Donald Trump has pursued an aggressively unilateralist agenda: slapping tariffs on allies and rivals alike, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, exiting the World Health Organization, and suspending most U.S. foreign aid.
Washington has also scaled back funding for European defense initiatives such as the Baltic Security Initiative, alarming NATO allies and deepening doubts about U.S. reliability.
“Xi is trying to equate the post-WWII disorder with the current disorder that he is implicitly blaming on the United States,” said Zachary Abuza, an expert on Asian security.
At a grand World War II parade in Beijing two days after the SCO summit, Xi again warned that humanity faced a stark choice between peace and war, dialogue and confrontation. “We will work hand in hand with people of all countries to build a community with a shared future for mankind,” he declared.
For Abuza, Beijing’s aim is not outright global hegemony but a system where Washington’s dominance is diluted. “The costs of global leadership are more than what China wants to pay. What it wants is a multilateral system where China and other developing countries check U.S. hegemony,” he said.
Observers stress that the GGI does not break entirely new ground. Instead, it consolidates earlier Chinese proposals into a more coherent package.
The Global Development Initiative emphasizes narrowing inequality, the Global Security Initiative promotes dialogue over military blocs, and the Global Civilisation Initiative stresses cultural pluralism as an alternative to Western universalism.
The GGI gathers these under five guiding principles: sovereign equality, respect for international law, multilateralism, putting people first, and an action-oriented approach.
“GGI offers something akin to a small roadmap of what a new order might look like,” Loh said. “Its value lies in bringing disparate strands of Chinese foreign policy into a more coherent package.”
A Chinese concept paper released shortly after Xi’s speech identified three deficiencies in the current order: underrepresentation of the Global South, erosion of the UN Charter’s authority, and the failure to address emerging issues like climate change, artificial intelligence, and outer space governance.
In Beijing’s telling, the GGI aims to strengthen the UN system, not replace it, but with reforms that tilt power toward developing countries.
Support for the GGI surfaced at the Tianjin summit, with leaders of Belarus, Pakistan, and Iran voicing approval. Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith endorsed it in a bilateral meeting with Xi, while Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim signaled support during talks in Beijing.
But analysts caution that enthusiasm across the Global South will be uneven.
“This term is itself contested,” Loh noted. “Some states are comfortable with China’s leadership, others will hedge, and some remain wary of Beijing’s growing influence.”
Jonathan Ping agreed. While China’s messaging resonates with countries seeking alternatives to Western-dominated systems, others may see it as self-serving.
For instance, Beijing’s insistence on sovereign equality rings hollow to some Southeast Asian neighbors, given China’s defiance of a 2016 international tribunal ruling rejecting its expansive claims in the South China Sea.
“It’s rather rich for the Chinese to call for adherence to international law,” said Abuza, pointing to Beijing’s partnership with Russia and rejection of arbitration under UNCLOS.
The optics of Xi sharing a stage with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un at the September 3 parade only underscored Western skepticism. Both leaders remain internationally isolated — Putin for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kim for his nuclear weapons program.
Even as Beijing projects confidence abroad, internal challenges complicate its global push.
“Although Beijing is always trying to project strength, Xi has to cope with enormous economic weaknesses, a decline in domestic consumption, rising capital flight, an enormous demographic challenge, and opaque politics without a clear transition mechanism,” Abuza said.
China’s economy has slowed sharply, with youth unemployment spiking and property markets struggling. Its population has entered long-term decline, raising fears about sustaining growth and innovation.
These structural weaknesses, analysts say, mean Chinese foreign policy is driven as much by insecurity as ambition.
Anchoring the GGI in the SCO reflects Beijing’s view of the bloc as a testing ground for alternative governance ideas. Xi told SCO leaders that the organization should “play a leading role and set an example” in implementing the initiative.
But the SCO’s ability to lead global governance reform remains limited. Its membership spans rivals such as India and Pakistan, diverse political systems, and countries with competing foreign alignments.
“Beijing is positioning the SCO as a platform to export its governance vision beyond Eurasia,” Ping said. “But its internal fragmentation and limited institutional capacity constrain its effectiveness.”
Still, China has a track record of building parallel institutions. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), launched in 2016, operates alongside the World Bank and IMF. The BRICS grouping has also grown into a geopolitical forum aimed at challenging Western dominance.
“Today, Xi sees the SCO, alongside BRICS, as vehicles to lead a global reordering and establish a multilateral system,” Abuza said.
In many ways, the GGI crystallizes the contradictions of China’s global ambitions.
On one hand, Beijing is offering a vision of fairness and reform that resonates with many developing countries disillusioned with Western-led institutions. By consolidating its earlier initiatives into a single banner, it presents itself as a coherent alternative voice.
On the other hand, the initiative lacks concrete mechanisms and resources. It remains unclear how China intends to implement its lofty goals, and whether it can overcome skepticism about its intentions.
“GGI is more about timing and positioning than novelty,” Loh observed. “It’s a signal that China is serious about reforming the system, but whether it can lead and deliver remains an open question.”
Xi Jinping’s Global Governance Initiative is China’s boldest attempt yet to redefine the terms of international order. By invoking the spirit of 1945, Xi is presenting China not as a disruptor but as the rightful heir to the postwar system — a system now in need of reform to reflect the rise of the Global South.
Whether Beijing can turn this vision into reality will depend on three tests: rallying sustained support from diverse developing nations, managing contradictions between its rhetoric and behavior, and overcoming domestic weaknesses that threaten to undercut its leadership.
