In recent years, the Indo-Pacific region has witnessed an intense rivalry between the United States and China in expanding their advanced fighter jet capabilities. While the United States and its allies have steadily increased their fleet of F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has responded with rapid advancements in its own fifth-generation stealth fighter, the J-20 Mighty Dragon.
However, the F-35 faces a persistent and significant challenge: a shortfall in operational readiness. Even as its numbers continue to increase, the jet’s maintenance and performance issues hinder its combat effectiveness, posing a pressing question about the F-35’s ability to sustain a high-tempo conflict in Asia.
The rivalry in advanced aviation underscores a deeper struggle for air superiority in the event of a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, particularly around Taiwan. As nations acquire advanced jets, the competition grows, and the stakes rise in a dynamic power struggle that could reshape the future of aerial warfare.
According to recent reports by defense intelligence firm Janes, China has significantly accelerated its production of the J-20 stealth fighter, which is rapidly becoming a cornerstone of its air power strategy. As of May 2024, twelve PLAAF air brigades have been equipped with J-20 aircraft, a marked increase signaling China’s commitment to building an advanced air force. Estimates suggest that China has now produced roughly 200 J-20 aircraft—still outnumbered by the extensive F-35 fleet, but enough to challenge the dominance of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific skies.
The PLAAF’s focus on expanding the J-20 fleet reflects China’s broader strategy to strengthen its military capabilities. By combining this state-of-the-art airframe with China’s established ground and naval anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, the J-20 represents an expanding threat to U.S. air operations in the region.
The F-35 Lightning II, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, is widely regarded as one of the most advanced and versatile fighters ever produced. The fighter is a critical asset for the United States and its allies, boasting advanced stealth capabilities that enable it to penetrate heavily defended airspace—a key asset in any hypothetical conflict with China, particularly around Taiwan. As of 2024, the F-35 operates as a central component of the U.S. military’s strategic efforts to counter Chinese A2/AD networks. The stealth technology and advanced sensor suite of the F-35 make it invaluable for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, as well as pre-emptive strike capabilities.
According to a study conducted by Chinese scientists earlier this year, the F-35 poses a more significant threat to China’s defense capabilities than the F-22 Raptor. This assessment is based on the F-35’s ability to gather and share battlefield data with other assets in real time, creating a cohesive intelligence network across allied forces. Such connectivity amplifies the effectiveness of both the F-35 itself and other assets it coordinates with, enhancing battlefield awareness and coordination.
Despite the technological edge the F-35 offers, its operational effectiveness is hampered by consistent maintenance and readiness issues. In a recent report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), it was revealed that the F-35 program suffers from persistent shortfalls in mission capability rates. The GAO assessment noted that while the U.S. Air Force has increased its budget for operations and maintenance over the past six years, the F-35’s readiness has seen only marginal improvement, failing to meet mission-capable goals in any year examined.
Between fiscal years 2018 and 2023, the Pentagon allocated $12 billion to operations and maintenance for the F-35, including $7.46 billion for the Air Force, $2.75 billion for the Marine Corps, and $1.87 billion for the Navy. Despite these investments, only about 55.7% of the fleet is combat-ready at any given time, a figure that falls short of the target readiness levels. Even with the launch of the “War on Readiness” program aimed at boosting operational capacity by 10% over a year, the program has seen only a modest 2.6% improvement.
These readiness issues are compounded by logistical challenges, such as delays in depot maintenance and an over-reliance on contractors. Access to critical repair data is often limited, leading to prolonged maintenance times. As a result, the F-35 fleet’s availability in a rapid-response situation remains questionable, raising concerns about the U.S. and its allies’ ability to sustain a high operational tempo in the event of a conflict with China.
The GAO’s recent report highlights that the F-35 is not unique in its readiness issues. Across all tactical aircraft within the U.S. Air Force, including the F-15E, F-22, and the A-10, mission-capable rates have frequently fallen below target levels. In 2023 alone, none of the fifteen tactical aircraft variants reached their mission-capable targets, with only the F-15C and F-16C achieving their goals in certain years. This trend indicates a systemic readiness problem that affects the broader fleet, complicating the USAF’s ability to respond quickly to emerging threats.
The F-35’s maintenance woes have also been attributed to long-standing issues with its F135 Pratt & Whitney engine. Some technological deficiencies have been resolved, but the overall impact on the fleet’s operational readiness remains a cause for concern. High costs and time-intensive repairs prevent the F-35 from maintaining the high availability rates needed for sustained operations in the Indo-Pacific.
The readiness challenges associated with the F-35 are increasingly relevant as military analysts predict a potential conflict scenario involving China in the next decade. Rising tensions over Taiwan add to the urgency, as analysts suggest that a rapid response by the United States and its allies could be critical to deterring or responding to Chinese military actions in the region. With only half of the F-35 fleet operational at any given time, concerns mount over whether U.S. forces would have sufficient capabilities on hand to respond effectively to a high-intensity conflict.
While the F-35 has continued to face operational and maintenance obstacles, the J-20 Mighty Dragon has made significant advances in terms of performance and capability. The PLAAF’s aggressive expansion of its J-20 fleet is a testament to China’s commitment to narrowing the technological and numerical gap with the United States. While still fewer in number, the J-20 poses a credible threat, particularly as China has demonstrated improved stealth capabilities, avionics, and weaponry with each new iteration.
Some analysts believe that the J-20’s stealth capabilities, while perhaps not as advanced as those of the F-35, are adequate for achieving tactical objectives within China’s A2/AD umbrella, where it can operate under the protective cover of ground-based missile systems. The J-20’s development also reflects China’s shift towards autonomous production, with domestic engines now powering the Mighty Dragon, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers and increasing control over supply chains—a potential advantage in a protracted conflict scenario.
Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, F-35 program executive officer, remains optimistic about efforts to improve the F-35’s mission-capable rate, despite current challenges. Speaking to Business Insider, he emphasized that the F-35 “is proven in combat and performing for 14 military services around the world today.” Schmidt noted that mission capability rates often improve when repair materials and spare parts are readily available.
Earlier this year, Schmidt told Congress that overcoming two remaining “top degraders” would elevate mission capability rates to above 70 percent. While he did not specify these issues, it is widely acknowledged that the F-35 has grappled with a range of maintenance challenges, including contractor reliance and data access for repairs. Schmidt and the Joint Program Office (JPO) continue to work with the Pentagon and industry partners to address these problems, but results have yet to materialize in a substantial way.
As tensions continue to simmer in the Indo-Pacific, the question of readiness and operational capability for both the F-35 and J-20 fleets is crucial. The U.S. and its allies maintain a numerical advantage with the F-35, but China’s ability to produce an increasingly sophisticated J-20 fleet, combined with the F-35’s readiness challenges, highlights a critical vulnerability. In the event of a military confrontation over Taiwan or another flashpoint, the United States may find its air superiority ambitions constrained by the F-35’s availability.
For the PLAAF, the Mighty Dragon continues to serve as a potent symbol of China’s growing influence in the region. While the J-20 remains numerically inferior to the F-35, its steady production and integration into the PLAAF suggest that China is positioning itself to challenge the U.S. for air dominance in the region. This arms race in fifth-generation fighter jets represents a broader strategic competition that will likely shape military alliances, defense budgets, and foreign policy decisions for years to come.
