South Asian air warfare, multiple unverified but persistent reports from Turkish defense circles have claimed that Pakistan deployed the KORAL electronic warfare (EW) system, developed by Turkish defense contractor Aselsan, to gain temporary air superiority over the Indian Air Force (IAF) in a recent cross-border aerial confrontation.
If true, this would mark a pivotal milestone in Pakistan’s ability to conduct electronic suppression and disruption missions, signaling a paradigm shift in how regional powers conceive and execute modern warfare. Not only would this imply the first combat use of KORAL outside Turkish operations in Syria and Libya, but it would also underscore the evolving nature of multi-domain warfare in South Asia—where electromagnetic dominance is increasingly decisive.
The alleged incident, which reportedly occurred during a nocturnal clash over disputed airspace near Kashmir, paints a dramatic picture. Turkish sources assert that Pakistan employed the KORAL system to jam, deceive, and blind Indian airborne and ground-based radar systems just before unleashing a coordinated aerial assault using J-10C multirole fighters, armed with China’s PL-15 beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles.
“In the pitch-black darkness of night, Indian pilots began to panic after suddenly losing radar contact and being unable to communicate with either their base or each other,” a Turkish-language defense report alleged. “They became disoriented, and were rendered easy targets.”
No fewer than six IAF aircraft—including three Rafale fighters, a Su-30MKI, a MiG-29, and a Mirage 2000—were reportedly downed or forced to retreat, with radar logs and satellite tracking from open-source intelligence (OSINT) circles suggesting unusual patterns of mid-air losses and abrupt disappearances. The loss of three Rafales, in particular, would be a staggering blow for India, both symbolically and operationally, given the platform’s perceived superiority.
Officially, New Delhi has neither confirmed nor denied the claims, but during a Bloomberg TV interview at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, India’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan conceded that the IAF had sustained undisclosed losses, saying cryptically, “We suffered attrition. Details will emerge in due course.”
Developed by Aselsan, the KORAL system is a truck-mounted electronic warfare suite composed of two core elements: the KORAL-ED (Electronic Support) for signal detection, classification, and analysis, and the KORAL-ET (Electronic Attack) for active jamming and deception of enemy radar systems.
Its operational range—reported to exceed 150 km—allows it to function as a standoff EW platform, capable of disrupting radar and communications networks across borders without exposing itself to direct kinetic threat.
Turkey’s next-generation version, KORAL/NG, incorporates AI-driven signal processing, wideband jamming, IFF spoofing, and full-spectrum electronic deception. It is compatible with NATO standards and includes robust NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection, allowing it to operate even in highly contaminated environments.
According to open-source defense analysts, KORAL has been successfully tested in real-world combat environments in Syria and Libya, where it disrupted Russian-made radar systems like the Pantsir-S1, demonstrating a capability to electronically neutralize even advanced, mobile air defense assets.
The reports have sparked alarm in New Delhi, where defense experts warn that such EW dominance could tilt future air engagements irreversibly in Pakistan’s favor—especially during night or all-weather operations, where reliance on radar and avionics is highest.
“Imagine being blind, deaf, and mute in enemy territory,” said retired IAF Group Captain Mohan Suri. “That’s what a system like KORAL does. It strips you of situational awareness. Your radar’s dead, comms are jammed, terrain warnings fail. You’re a flying coffin.”
According to sources in Indian military aviation, some downed aircraft showed signs of avionics failure prior to their disappearance, suggesting potential electronic sabotage or jamming-induced system failure. Pilots may have lost GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) coverage, VHF/UHF comms, transponder identification, and even weather radar data—leaving them disoriented in rugged terrain.
Pakistan’s alleged use of the KORAL system—if validated—reflects a larger strategic shift toward “deterrence by denial.” Rather than matching India’s large force structure, Pakistan has increasingly focused on disruptive technologies that can deny the adversary its core combat capabilities.
In recent years, Pakistan has aggressively expanded its EW capabilities through both indigenous development and foreign procurement. Institutions such as DESTO (Defence Science and Technology Organisation) and NESCOM (National Engineering and Scientific Commission) are believed to be spearheading efforts in GNSS jamming, cyber-electronic warfare, and integrated EW networks.
In the air, JF-17 Block III fighters now come equipped with integrated digital EW suites. Older PAF aircraft like the Mirage ROSE series have been retrofitted with modern ECM pods, and Pakistan also operates Chinese and American external jamming systems, including the ALQ-131.
Ground-based EW platforms, mobile jammers, and drone countermeasures are now staples in Pakistan Army units near the Line of Control, while cyber units reportedly target Indian C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) infrastructure during skirmishes.
The elephant in the room remains Pakistan’s increasingly intimate defense relationship with Turkey. Over the past decade, the two countries have signed multiple military cooperation agreements, including the supply of Bayraktar combat drones, training aircraft, and most notably, the Babur-class corvettes, derived from Turkey’s MILGEM program and fitted with the ARES-2N EW suite.
While neither Islamabad nor Ankara has officially confirmed a KORAL transfer, the deepening ties—coupled with the system’s proven export capability—make it plausible that KORAL or a derivative version may have been either formally delivered or operated in proxy by Turkish specialists during combat.
In an era of network-centric warfare, having access to a sophisticated EW system like KORAL—capable of spoofing, jamming, and data exfiltration—offers a tremendous first-strike advantage.
KORAL’s battlefield history adds weight to its perceived effectiveness. In Libya, Turkish forces reportedly used the system to neutralize Russian-made Pantsir S1 air defense systems fielded by General Haftar’s Libyan National Army. Similarly, in Syria, KORAL helped suppress hostile radar coverage, enabling Turkish drones to operate freely in contested airspace.
Its mobility—mounted on high-speed 8×8 tactical trucks—allows it to be rapidly deployed and redeployed, making it difficult to target or eliminate. Its ability to function as a non-kinetic SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) asset gives it outsized influence in shaping the electromagnetic environment of the battlefield.
As of June 2025, there is no open-source confirmation of KORAL’s presence in Pakistan’s inventory. The Pakistani military has refused to comment, and Turkey maintains plausible deniability. Still, defense watchers point out that such systems are often covertly deployed and cloaked under layers of operational secrecy and export control ambiguity.
Social media and independent OSINT accounts continue to circulate satellite images, intercepted comms, and radar logs they claim corroborate the system’s use. Some suggest that Turkish personnel may have assisted in its operation, as a “combat validation” test under real-world conditions.
Notably, Aselsan has long marketed KORAL to non-NATO customers, and its versatility has made it a leading choice among militaries seeking a counter to Western or Russian radar and comms systems.
For India, the implications are stark. The IAF has invested heavily in French Rafales, Russian Sukhois, and indigenous platforms like the Tejas, but has not placed equivalent emphasis on comprehensive EW defenses.
While India possesses platforms like the DRDO’s Uttam AESA radar, Samyukta EW system, and Netra AEW&CS, analysts warn these are insufficient against a well-coordinated EW assault backed by next-gen jamming technologies.
Furthermore, India’s tri-service C4ISR integration remains a work-in-progress, and its military-civil aviation spectrum management is often fragmented—making coordinated responses to high-intensity EW attacks more difficult.
India’s response to the incident, so far, has been one of strategic silence, but internally, sources suggest the IAF has launched a high-level audit of its EW vulnerabilities, with a view to overhauling its electromagnetic warfare doctrine.
In today’s high-tech battlespaces, war is often decided before the first missile is fired—in the silent, invisible spectrum of electronic signals.
If Pakistan has indeed acquired and deployed KORAL, it signals a seismic shift in regional military balances—one in which electromagnetic dominance, not just superior aircraft or pilot skill, dictates the outcome of engagements.
