In the South China Sea and ongoing discussions on regional security, the Philippines’ Defense Secretary, Gilberto Teodoro, stated that a unified military alliance akin to NATO is unlikely in Southeast Asia, given the diverse interests and alliances of the region’s countries. Speaking at a security forum in Manila, Teodoro highlighted the significant political and military complexity within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), asserting that the region’s differing alliances and interests make a NATO-like organization impractical at present. The statement reflects broader challenges within ASEAN as it grapples with increasing geopolitical pressures from both the United States and China.
The idea of a NATO-style military bloc in Southeast Asia has surfaced in recent discussions, with Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba having suggested an “Asian NATO” to promote regional security. However, Teodoro noted that ASEAN’s diverse affiliations with major powers like the United States and China present a formidable obstacle to any such organization, stressing that these relationships drive differences within ASEAN, limiting the ability to form a cohesive military alliance.
“We have a pre-ASEAN defense alliance with the United States. We continue to build alliances with like-minded countries,” Teodoro said. He pointed out that while the Philippines has deepened ties with the U.S. through several military agreements, other ASEAN countries maintain strategic partnerships with China, further dividing regional interests.
Prime Minister Ishiba’s call for an “Asian NATO” aimed to foster a coordinated regional defense strategy amid China’s expanding influence. Although Japan’s foreign minister clarified that this proposal was not targeted specifically at any single country, observers have interpreted the suggestion as a response to China’s growing assertiveness, especially in contested areas like the East China Sea and South China Sea. Nevertheless, the proposal has not found support among key regional players like India and the U.S., both of whom have expressed reluctance to endorse a formal military alliance for Southeast Asia, emphasizing diplomatic engagement and independent defense collaborations over binding alliances.
The reticence from regional powers reflects a broader diplomatic balancing act in the Indo-Pacific, where countries are increasingly wary of committing to one side amid the U.S.-China rivalry. While some nations prefer closer alignment with Washington, others, due to economic ties and geopolitical positioning, lean toward Beijing.
The South China Sea, a strategic waterway with rich resources and vital shipping routes, has been a flashpoint in the region for years, involving territorial disputes among ASEAN members like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia, alongside claims from China. Beijing’s expansive maritime claims—often referred to as the “Nine-Dash Line”—have led to a series of confrontations, particularly with the Philippines. This year, the confrontations have escalated, with the Philippines accusing China of aggressive actions near disputed areas.
Teodoro underscored the importance of ASEAN addressing these “expansive activities and admittedly illegal activities of China in the South China Sea,” proposing that ASEAN should take a unified stance on such issues. However, he stopped short of calling for a military response, instead advocating for diplomatic engagement and legal recourse to manage the tensions.
In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines, asserting that Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea lacked legal foundation. Despite the ruling, China has continued its activities in the area, and ASEAN has struggled to present a united front on the issue, with some member states hesitant to challenge Beijing directly due to strong economic dependencies.
ASEAN, established with a mandate to promote regional peace and stability, is caught between competing allegiances, making it challenging to reach a consensus on contentious issues like the South China Sea. While the Philippines has actively called for a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea, negotiations have dragged on, with China and ASEAN only agreeing to broad principles rather than concrete enforcement mechanisms.
The defense secretary’s call for ASEAN to address China’s “overstepping” reflects Manila’s ongoing frustrations with Beijing, and it is shared by other nations facing similar challenges with China’s maritime claims. However, despite shared interests in countering China’s assertiveness, ASEAN countries have taken varied approaches to the issue:
- The Philippines has taken a legal route, emphasizing the 2016 arbitration ruling and seeking U.S. military backing.
- Vietnam has expanded its maritime defense capabilities and seeks international partnerships to bolster its position.
- Indonesia has also resisted China’s claims over parts of its exclusive economic zone, though it avoids outright confrontation.
- Meanwhile, countries like Cambodia and Laos maintain close relations with Beijing, complicating any collective regional stance.
ASEAN’s political landscape is shaped significantly by the competing influence of the United States and China, each pursuing strategic partnerships to strengthen their presence in the Indo-Pacific. The United States, through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quad—an informal security dialogue with Australia, Japan, and India—aims to counterbalance China’s influence in the region. China, on the other hand, has strengthened economic ties with ASEAN countries through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), making it a valuable trade partner for many Southeast Asian nations.
For the Philippines, a long-standing ally of the United States, these developments present both opportunities and challenges. While the Philippines relies on U.S. military support for security in the South China Sea, it also faces the task of managing economic relations with China, its largest trading partner. Teodoro’s statements emphasize this complex relationship, as Manila seeks to balance its defense commitments with economic diplomacy.
The Quad has emerged as a key platform for defense and diplomatic coordination in the Indo-Pacific, with members increasingly engaging ASEAN countries through joint exercises, diplomatic dialogues, and infrastructure projects. However, unlike NATO, the Quad lacks a mutual defense clause and is not a formal alliance, instead functioning as a flexible coalition for addressing regional challenges.
Teodoro’s remarks reflect the Philippines’ recognition of the Quad as a complementary security structure but also highlight the challenges of incorporating ASEAN as a whole into such frameworks. Some ASEAN countries, wary of antagonizing China, have expressed reluctance to join the Quad, preferring to maintain independent policies that avoid aligning too closely with either the U.S. or China.
Instead, ASEAN countries are pursuing “minilateral” agreements—small-scale partnerships focused on specific issues—often involving only a subset of member states and external partners. Examples include trilateral maritime patrols in the Sulu Sea involving the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as defense agreements between the Philippines, Japan, and Australia. These smaller, issue-specific arrangements provide a pragmatic approach to security cooperation without requiring unanimous ASEAN consent, which remains challenging to achieve.
The Philippines has repeatedly urged ASEAN to expedite negotiations for a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, which could establish formal guidelines for interactions in disputed areas and reduce the likelihood of conflict. However, progress has been slow, with ASEAN and China yet to agree on binding measures.
The CoC proposal aims to create a predictable framework that includes dispute resolution mechanisms, norms for safe navigation, and rules prohibiting the construction of new structures on contested islands. Although a formal CoC would not be a defense pact, it represents a step toward more structured regional security governance. Teodoro’s remarks underline the urgency of a CoC as an alternative to a full-fledged military alliance, which would be politically and logistically challenging to establish in Southeast Asia’s current geopolitical climate.
