Dr. Laxman Singh Dev
The Islamic Republic of Iran is undergoing a period of intense turmoil marked by severe economic distress and deep social unrest. Since September 2022—coinciding with the death of Mahsa Amini and the nationwide protests that followed—the Iranian economy has faced sharp instability. The exchange rate of the US dollar, which stood around 300,000 rials per dollar at that time, has since fluctuated dramatically, reaching nearly 140,000 rials per dollar last week. Alongside currency volatility, the prices of essential commodities have continued to rise at an estimated annual rate of around 40 percent, creating widespread economic anguish among ordinary Iranians and steadily eroding purchasing power and living standards.
At the same time, economic hardship is compounded by strict enforcement of Islamic sharia-based laws that regulate social and personal life. Restrictions on women—such as prohibitions on riding bicycles in public, limitations on singing or performing, and the continued enforcement of mandatory hijab laws—have become major sources of frustration. These controls feel increasingly incompatible with the aspirations of a younger generation that has grown up with smartphones, Instagram, and other digital platforms, exposing them to global lifestyles and ideas. For many young Iranians, the combination of rising economic pressure and rigid social restrictions has led to a growing desire not merely for reform, but for fundamental change in the existing system.
Yet economic hardship alone does not explain the depth of frustration visible across Iranian society. Parallel to inflation and unemployment is a system of social regulation rooted in strict interpretations of Islamic law and enforced through legal, moral, and security institutions. Rules governing personal behavior—especially those affecting women—have become powerful symbols of state authority. Mandatory hijab laws, restrictions on women riding bicycles in public spaces, and prohibitions on women singing or performing independently are not merely cultural regulations; they are experienced as daily reminders of limited autonomy. For many Iranians, particularly in urban areas, these controls feel increasingly disconnected from lived reality.
The tension becomes sharper when viewed through a generational lens. Iran’s younger population has grown up in a digital environment that the architects of the political system never anticipated. Despite censorship, filtering, and periodic internet shutdowns, smartphones, VPNs, Instagram, Telegram, and other platforms have exposed young Iranians to global norms, lifestyles, and debates. They are not only consuming foreign culture but comparing systems—asking why freedoms taken for granted elsewhere remain restricted at home. This comparison has created a quiet but profound cultural shift. Even those who remain religious often question whether state-enforced morality truly reflects faith or merely power.
This generational divide is not simply about rebellion or secularism. It is about expectations. Young Iranians expect choice in education, career, expression, and personal life. They expect competence in economic management and transparency in governance. When these expectations collide with rising prices and rigid social codes, frustration transforms into alienation. For many, the issue is no longer reforming policies within the system but questioning whether the system itself is capable of adaptation.
What is striking is how economic grievances and cultural dissent have begun to merge. Earlier protests in Iran were often localized and issue-specific—fuel prices, wages, or subsidy cuts. Today, economic complaints increasingly carry political and social undertones. Inflation is no longer seen as a technical failure but as evidence of a governance model that prioritizes ideological conformity over economic efficiency and public consent. When citizens are asked to endure hardship while also surrendering personal freedoms, patience wears thin.
The state, for its part, continues to emphasize resistance, moral order, and ideological continuity. It retains significant instruments of power, including security forces and institutional networks. It has survived sanctions, wars, and protests before. Yet the present moment differs in character because dissatisfaction is not confined to a particular class or region. It spans students, professionals, workers, and even sections of the traditional middle class. The narrative that economic sacrifice is justified by moral or ideological goals no longer resonates as strongly, especially among those who see no clear future reward for their endurance.
This does not mean Iran is on a predetermined path toward collapse or revolution. Societies under pressure often oscillate between change and retrenchment. But it does suggest that the old equilibrium—economic strain combined with strict social control—has become unstable. The younger generation’s demands are not framed only in political terms; they are deeply social and cultural, rooted in everyday life. They concern how people dress, move, speak, sing, and exist in public spaces, as much as how much they earn.
In this sense, Iran’s current turmoil is not simply about prices, currency, or laws. It is about a widening gap between a system built for a different historical moment and a society that has moved on cognitively, culturally, and technologically. Whether this gap is bridged through reform, repression, or gradual transformation remains uncertain. What is clear is that economic hardship has stripped away many justifications for social rigidity, exposing underlying tensions that can no longer be dismissed as temporary unrest. Iran is not only facing an economic crisis; it is confronting a question about the compatibility of its governing framework with the aspirations of its own people.
Amid growing public anger and heightened international attention, Iranian authorities appear increasingly cautious about the scale of enforcement by the moral police. Fearing wider backlash, enforcement actions related to hijab violations have reportedly become more selective, with visible targeting of high-profile figures such as actresses, public personalities, and other celebrities. These actions are widely seen as symbolic, intended to reassert authority while avoiding mass confrontations that could further inflame public sentiment.
At the same time, protests have continued in different parts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with demonstrators expressing anger over economic hardship, social restrictions, and political repression. The government has largely responded through security measures and the use of force in an effort to contain unrest. In Tehran, residents have managed to mobilize collective action by persuading shopkeepers in the historic Grand Bazaar to close their businesses in solidarity with protesters—an act that carries both economic and symbolic significance, given the bazaar’s historic role in Iranian political movements.
For many Iranians, the current wave of protests marks a turning point rather than a sudden rupture. There was a period in the past when living standards were relatively stable and the rial was stronger, allowing many citizens to tolerate or overlook restrictive social policies. Over recent years, however, the prolonged depreciation of the national currency and persistently high inflation have steadily eroded household security. As economic pressure has intensified, tolerance for strict Islamic regulations governing daily life—especially those affecting women—has sharply declined, pushing more people onto the streets with demands for meaningful reform.
Within this broader movement, there is also a visible debate about Iran’s political future. Some protesters and diaspora voices have called on Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former monarch Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to assume a leadership role and return to Iran as a unifying figure. This idea, however, has sharply divided public opinion. One group argues that restoring any form of monarchy would repeat past mistakes and believes Iran should move instead toward full democratization with elected institutions and civilian rule. Another, smaller but vocal group—disillusioned with the current system and nostalgic for Iran’s pre-revolutionary era—views the monarchy as a symbol of national unity and ancient Iranian grandeur, and favors a royal heir as head of state.
While these divisions reflect differing visions for Iran’s future, they also underscore a shared reality: economic decline and prolonged social restrictions have fundamentally altered public patience. What was once endured is now openly challenged, and the question facing Iran is no longer whether change is needed, but what form that change should take.
*Dr. Laxman Singh Dev – Iranologist and Expert on Middle Eastern Affairs
