Egypt has taken significant steps to deepen its involvement in the geopolitically crucial and conflict-ridden Horn of Africa, a region long marked by internal strife, external interventions, and deep-seated rivalries. Egypt’s decision to arm Somalia and deploy troops in the country has triggered heightened tensions, particularly with its historic rival, Ethiopia.
The deployment is seen as a part of broader strategic moves in response to Ethiopia’s new port agreement with Somaliland, a deal that has sparked diplomatic rows and risks further destabilization of the already fragile region. This article examines the underlying causes of Egypt’s increased engagement in the Horn of Africa, its potential consequences, and the path forward for de-escalation.
Egypt’s recent military presence in Somalia can be traced back to Ethiopia’s long-standing struggle to secure access to the sea, a vital economic and strategic necessity. As the most populous landlocked country in the world, Ethiopia has had to rely primarily on the port of Djibouti for its maritime trade since the Ethiopia-Eritrea war (1998–2000) rendered Eritrean ports inaccessible. This dependence has been a source of vulnerability for Ethiopia, prompting its leaders to explore alternative routes.
On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia announced a landmark port deal with Somaliland, a self-declared independent republic in northern Somalia that broke away in 1991. In exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence, Ethiopia secured the right to establish a naval base along its coast, giving Addis Ababa an invaluable strategic foothold on the Red Sea. While the agreement offered Ethiopia a much-needed solution to its maritime challenges, it immediately provoked a diplomatic crisis with Somalia, which still claims sovereignty over Somaliland. For Mogadishu, Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland was nothing short of a violation of its territorial integrity.
The diplomatic rift that followed saw Somalia quickly turn to Egypt for support, seeking to balance Ethiopia’s growing influence. The alignment between Mogadishu and Cairo is driven not only by the immediate crisis over Somaliland but also by Egypt’s broader strategic interests in countering Ethiopian ambitions in the region, particularly regarding the Nile.
At the heart of Egypt’s interest in the Horn of Africa is its historic rivalry with Ethiopia over the waters of the Nile. The Nile River, which provides over 90% of Egypt’s fresh water, is vital to the country’s survival. Egypt has long feared that any upstream control of the river could threaten its access to this critical resource, and this fear has been exacerbated by the construction of Ethiopia’s massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile.
The GERD has been a major point of contention between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan for over a decade. While Ethiopia views the dam as essential for its energy needs and economic development, Egypt sees it as an existential threat, fearing that it could significantly reduce the flow of water downstream. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute have repeatedly stalled, and Egypt has occasionally threatened military action to protect its water rights.
Against this backdrop, Egypt’s deployment of troops to Somalia and its strengthening of ties with Mogadishu are seen as part of a broader strategy to encircle Ethiopia and exert pressure on Addis Ababa. In August 2024, Egypt formalized its military alliance with Somalia, signing a defense agreement that paved the way for the deployment of Egyptian forces in the country. Cairo’s involvement in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (which is set to replace the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) is another indication of Egypt’s growing influence in the region.
The deployment of up to 5,000 Egyptian troops to Somalia marks a significant escalation and is viewed by many as a direct challenge to Ethiopia’s security. The prospect of Egyptian forces stationed on Ethiopia’s border has raised alarms in Addis Ababa, which perceives Egypt’s actions as part of a broader effort to undermine its position in the region.
Ethiopia’s reaction to Egypt’s military involvement in Somalia was swift. In the days following Egypt’s deployment, Ethiopia formalized its recognition of Somaliland’s independence, becoming the first country to do so officially. Addis Ababa also quickly moved to establish diplomatic relations, sending an ambassador to Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital. This bold move solidified Ethiopia’s partnership with Somaliland and signaled its determination to protect its interests in the region.
At the same time, Ethiopia faces significant internal challenges. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government is grappling with ongoing instability in multiple regions, including Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara, where armed insurgencies and ethnic conflicts continue to undermine the central government’s authority. The country’s involvement in Somalia, where Ethiopian troops have played a key role in supporting the Somali government against the jihadist insurgency led by al-Shabaab, is now being challenged by Somalia’s call for Ethiopia to withdraw its forces.
Should Ethiopia pull back from Somalia, the vacuum left behind could embolden militant groups like al-Shabaab, which seeks to establish an Islamic state that includes not only Somalia but also parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The potential for further instability is compounded by longstanding territorial disputes between Somalia and its neighbors, which could easily flare up if the situation deteriorates.
Adding to the complexity is the involvement of Eritrea, Ethiopia’s northern neighbor. Eritrea, which was once a key ally of Abiy Ahmed in his fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), has recently shifted its stance and is now aligning more closely with Egypt and Somalia. This emerging alliance poses a new challenge to Ethiopia, raising the specter of a broader regional conflict.
The rising tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over Somalia and Somaliland come at a time of heightened instability across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is already embroiled in a border dispute with Sudan over the Al-Fashaga region, an agricultural area that both countries claim. The dispute has led to sporadic clashes, and there are fears that it could escalate further, particularly if Egypt were to lend its support to Sudan.
Egypt and Sudan have already forged a close military partnership, largely driven by their shared concerns over Ethiopia’s GERD project. Egypt has provided military aid to Sudan’s armed forces and participated in joint exercises, signaling a willingness to stand together against Ethiopia. While Sudan is currently mired in its own internal conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Al-Fashaga dispute remains a potential flashpoint that could draw Egypt further into the region’s conflicts.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland has created new tensions with Djibouti, which has long been Ethiopia’s primary maritime gateway. Djibouti’s economy is heavily reliant on port revenues generated by Ethiopian trade, and the prospect of Ethiopia shifting its commercial operations to Somaliland threatens to undercut Djibouti’s financial stability. This economic rivalry adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile situation.
The interplay of these various conflicts, alliances, and rivalries raises the very real prospect of proxy wars in the Horn of Africa. Egypt, which has a long history of using proxy forces to advance its interests, could choose to support anti-government groups within Ethiopia as a way to weaken Addis Ababa’s position. Such a move would only deepen the instability in Ethiopia, a country that is already facing multiple internal insurgencies.
The danger of further destabilization is not limited to Ethiopia. Any significant deterioration of the security situation in the Horn of Africa could have ripple effects across the region, threatening the stability of Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The Horn’s strategic location, which includes critical shipping routes through the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, makes it a region of vital importance not only to its immediate neighbors but also to global powers like the United States, China, and the European Union.
Despite the growing risks, there remains a pathway to de-escalation in the Horn of Africa. Both Egypt and Ethiopia would benefit from a reconsideration of their strategies and a focus on diplomatic solutions rather than military confrontations.
For Ethiopia, one potential solution would be to continue its access to the sea through Somaliland without insisting on formal recognition of Somaliland’s independence. This approach could help ease tensions with Somalia while still providing Ethiopia with the maritime access it needs.
Egypt, for its part, should seek to address its concerns over the GERD through multilateral platforms such as the United Nations and the African Union, rather than through direct military involvement in Somalia. History has shown that unilateral actions by Egypt have often exacerbated regional tensions rather than resolved them.
The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) must also play a central role in mediating the conflicts in the region. By facilitating dialogue between the key stakeholders, these organizations can help ensure that regional issues are addressed by the regional states themselves, reducing the risk of external powers inflaming the situation.
The Horn of Africa’s many challenges can only be solved through a concerted effort by all parties to prioritize peace and stability over narrow geopolitical interests. As the region stands at the brink of further conflict, the decisions made in the coming months will be critical in determining whether it spirals into chaos or finds a way forward toward lasting peace.
