The Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II is one of the most ambitious military aviation programs ever undertaken, both in technological scope and in international scale. Conceived as a single, stealthy, networked fighter that could replace a wide range of aging aircraft across allied air forces, the F-35 has become the backbone of Western tactical air power planning for the 21st century. Yet alongside its operational promise, the program has also become synonymous with escalating costs, shifting timelines, and difficult budgetary trade-offs for governments that committed to it decades ago.
As production continues and new upgrades are introduced, partner nations are once again confronting a central question: how much will the F-35 ultimately cost, and how reliable are current projections in an era of inflation, supply-chain disruption, and evolving military requirements?
The F-35 Lightning II was designed to be more than just another fighter jet. From its earliest days as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, it aimed to consolidate multiple aircraft roles into a single family of jets that could serve the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, while also meeting the needs of allied air forces. By combining stealth shaping, advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and networked data-sharing, the F-35 was envisioned as a platform capable of dominating highly contested airspace against advanced adversaries.
The aircraft’s design reflects this ambition. Rather than focusing solely on speed or maneuverability, the F-35 prioritizes information dominance. Its sensors collect vast amounts of data from radar, infrared systems, and electronic intelligence sources, fusing that information into a coherent, real-time picture displayed to the pilot. This situational awareness allows F-35s to detect, track, and engage threats while remaining difficult to detect themselves, and to share that information seamlessly with other aircraft, ships, and ground forces.
This concept has reshaped how air power is expected to function in future conflicts. The F-35 is not just a shooter, but also a sensor and a command node, enabling other platforms—including fourth-generation fighters, naval vessels, and air defense systems—to operate more effectively. In theory, this multiplies the combat power of an entire force, even if the F-35 itself does not carry the largest payload or fly the fastest.
To meet the diverse needs of its users, the F-35 was developed in three main variants. The F-35A, the most widely produced version, is a conventional takeoff and landing aircraft operated primarily by the US Air Force and most international customers. The F-35B adds short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capability, allowing it to operate from smaller ships and austere bases, a feature essential for the US Marine Corps and the United Kingdom. The F-35C, with its larger wings and reinforced landing gear, is optimized for catapult launches and arrested landings from aircraft carriers and serves the US Navy.
Despite their differences, all three variants share a common avionics architecture, software baseline, and many internal systems. This commonality was intended to reduce costs through economies of scale and simplify upgrades across the fleet. In practice, however, accommodating such different operational requirements within a single program added technical complexity, contributing to development challenges and cost growth over time.
The United States remains by far the largest operator of the F-35, with plans to field more than 2,400 aircraft across its services. For Washington, the jet is central to maintaining air superiority against near-peer competitors and reassuring allies through forward deployment. The US Air Force’s F-35A squadrons are already operational worldwide, while the Marine Corps and Navy continue to integrate their variants into expeditionary and carrier strike operations.
Beyond the US, the F-35 has been adopted by a broad coalition of allies and partners. Core program partners such as the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Norway, Denmark, and Canada were involved early in development and secured industrial participation in return for their investment. These countries host manufacturing facilities, maintenance hubs, and supply-chain components that support the global fleet.
Foreign military sales customers have further expanded the program’s footprint. Nations including Japan, South Korea, Israel, Finland, Poland, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, and Singapore have selected the F-35 as their next-generation fighter, often citing interoperability with the US and NATO as a decisive factor. Israel’s customized F-35I “Adir,” which incorporates indigenous systems, highlights the platform’s adaptability within certain limits.
With more than 15 countries now operating or ordering the aircraft, the F-35 has become one of the most widely used advanced fighters in history. This scale brings strategic advantages, such as shared training, logistics, and operational concepts, but it also means that cost pressures reverberate across multiple defense budgets simultaneously.
From the beginning, the F-35 program was expensive. Development costs ran into the hundreds of billions of dollars, and early unit prices were far higher than originally anticipated. Over time, increased production rates helped bring down the flyaway cost of individual aircraft, particularly for the F-35A, which fell below $80 million in recent lots. Yet for partner nations, the price of the jet itself is only part of the story.
Total program costs include infrastructure, training, simulators, weapons integration, spare parts, and decades of sustainment. These long-term expenses have proven far more difficult to predict, especially as the program continues to evolve technologically.
Canada’s experience illustrates the challenge. In 2022, Ottawa finalized plans to purchase 88 F-35A aircraft to replace its aging CF-18 fleet, framing the deal as a $19 billion investment that would secure Canada’s air defense and fulfill its commitments to NORAD and NATO. At the time, the government emphasized that the cost was well understood and manageable.
By early 2026, that picture had changed significantly. A review by Canada’s Auditor General placed the projected cost at approximately $27.7 billion, an increase of nearly $8.7 billion, or close to 50% above the original estimate. Crucially, the review noted that some major expenses—such as certain infrastructure upgrades and weapons purchases—were not fully captured in the headline figure, suggesting that the final cost could climb even higher.
Several factors underpin this cost escalation, and they are not unique to Canada. Inflation has affected defense programs worldwide, driving up labor costs, raw material prices, and the expense of complex electronics. Global supply-chain disruptions, exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and the lingering effects of the pandemic era, have increased the price of components and delayed deliveries.
Infrastructure requirements have also been a major driver. Operating the F-35 demands far more than standard hangars and runways. Bases must be equipped with secure facilities to handle sensitive data, advanced simulators for training, specialized maintenance equipment, and hardened shelters to protect high-value assets. As planning moved from high-level estimates to detailed implementation, the true scale of these requirements became clearer—and more expensive.
Risk management has added another layer of cost. Governments have increased contingency funds to account for currency fluctuations, potential delays, future upgrades, and technical uncertainties. While these buffers are designed to prevent unpleasant surprises later, they inflate upfront projections and fuel political debate over affordability.
Delivery delays have compounded financial pressures. Even when aircraft are built, they cannot be handed over until they meet all contractual and certification requirements. Issues related to software integration, testing, and security clearances have at times slowed acceptance, leading to completed jets being held back.
The F-35’s reliance on a global supply chain means that a delay in one component can ripple through the entire production line. Labor shortages, quality control issues, and sequencing challenges have all affected delivery schedules. For partner nations, this uncertainty complicates planning for pilot training, base activation, and the retirement of older aircraft.
As a result, many air forces have been forced to extend the service life of legacy fighters such as the F-16, F/A-18, or CF-18. Keeping these aircraft operational longer than planned requires additional spending on maintenance, spare parts, and upgrades—costs that were not always anticipated when F-35 procurement decisions were made.
Another structural challenge lies in the program’s approach to modernization. The F-35 continues to be developed even as it is produced and fielded, with new software blocks and hardware upgrades introduced over time. Aircraft delivered earlier may require retrofits to bring them up to the latest standard, adding to long-term costs.
This evolutionary model allows the jet to stay relevant against emerging threats, but it complicates budgeting. Costs are spread over decades, and governments must commit not only to buying the aircraft but also to continuously upgrading it. For finance ministries and auditors, this makes it harder to define a clear “total cost” at the outset.
Despite the financial challenges, few partner nations have seriously reconsidered their participation. The strategic stakes are high. The F-35’s ability to operate seamlessly with US forces is a cornerstone of allied defense planning, particularly in regions such as Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In Canada’s case, US officials have indicated that any reduction in F-35 capability could have implications for joint air defense arrangements, potentially requiring greater American involvement in Canadian airspace.
For smaller air forces, the F-35 offers access to capabilities that would be difficult or impossible to develop independently. Stealth, sensor fusion, and secure data-sharing are increasingly seen as essential rather than optional in modern conflict, especially as potential adversaries invest heavily in advanced air defenses.
The latest cost increases underscore a broader reality: the F-35 program is not a static purchase but a long-term commitment to a complex, evolving system. While unit prices have stabilized or even declined in some cases, overall program costs continue to rise as inflation, infrastructure needs, sustainment, and upgrades are factored in.
For governments, the challenge is balancing the undeniable military advantages of the F-35 against the political and fiscal pressures of rising defense spending. For the program itself, maintaining credibility will depend on greater transparency, more stable delivery schedules, and clearer communication about long-term costs.
As the F-35 fleet grows and matures, its role as the backbone of allied air power seems secure. Yet the debate over its affordability is unlikely to fade. Instead, it will remain a defining feature of how nations assess the true price of maintaining technological and strategic superiority in an increasingly contested world.
