On April 24, 2025, in a move that sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles across South Asia and beyond, Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC)—its highest civil-military decision-making body—announced the suspension of the Simla Agreement of 1972, a landmark treaty that had governed the uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan for over five decades.
The timing was deliberate. Just a day earlier, India formally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in the wake of a brutal terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, which killed 26 civilians, including an international tourist. The attack, claimed by a Pakistan-based militant group, marked the deadliest such incident in the region since Pulwama in 2019. Within 48 hours, South Asia’s nuclear-armed rivals had plunged into a fresh diplomatic and strategic crisis.
Signed on July 2, 1972, in the serene hills of Shimla (then spelled Simla), Himachal Pradesh, the Simla Agreement was the product of intense post-war negotiations following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971—a conflict that not only split Pakistan but created Bangladesh. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met at Barnes Court (now the Raj Bhavan) to hash out the future of two adversarial nations grappling with deep mistrust and the scars of war.
The Simla Agreement aimed to chart a path for peaceful coexistence, focusing on bilateral resolution of disputes, respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal matters. It was a framework to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.”
But now, with both nations withdrawing from landmark treaties within days of each other, the region finds itself unmoored from one of the last remaining threads of diplomatic order.
To understand the weight of this moment, one must return to 1971.
Pakistan’s military crackdown on the Bangladesh Liberation Movement in East Pakistan led to an exodus of over 10 million refugees into India, creating a humanitarian catastrophe. India’s support for the Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) culminated in a short but decisive war. On December 16, 1971, over 93,000 Pakistani troops surrendered—the largest military surrender since World War II—paving the way for Bangladesh’s independence.
Bhutto, leading a broken and humiliated Pakistan, faced a precarious domestic situation. For Indira Gandhi, a triumphant war leader, the challenge was diplomatic: how to consolidate victory without humiliating Pakistan, especially with Cold War dynamics in play.
Despite domestic criticism—especially from opposition leaders like Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who decried the agreement as a missed opportunity to convert the ceasefire line into an international border—Gandhi opted for reconciliation. The result was the Simla Agreement: a compromise that placed bilateralism at its core, sidestepped a final resolution on Kashmir, and returned 13,000 km² of captured Pakistani territory as a gesture of goodwill.
Though succinct, the Simla Agreement was strategically profound. Its key provisions became the scaffolding of Indo-Pak diplomacy:
- Bilateral Resolution of Disputes: All disputes, including Kashmir, were to be resolved bilaterally—precluding third-party mediation. This provision has underpinned India’s rejection of UN or foreign involvement in Kashmir.
- Establishment of the Line of Control (LoC): The 1971 ceasefire line was formalised into the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir. While not an international border, it served as a de facto boundary.
- Mutual Respect for Sovereignty: Both nations pledged non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity.
- Non-Use of Force: Both sides committed to avoiding force or the threat thereof in settling disputes—an affirmation of the UN Charter.
- Normalization of Relations: The agreement sought to resume communications, cultural exchange, trade, and humanitarian cooperation, including prisoner repatriation.
- Unstated but Critical—Recognition of Bangladesh: Though not explicitly mentioned, the agreement cleared the path for Pakistan to eventually recognise Bangladesh in 1974.
For decades, these principles helped prevent full-scale wars, even as skirmishes, proxy conflicts, and diplomatic hostilities continued.
On April 22, 2025, a suicide bombing in the tourist town of Pahalgam killed 26 civilians, including one German national. The attack bore the signature of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based militant outfit banned by the UN but widely believed to operate with tacit support from sections of the Pakistani establishment.
India’s reaction was swift. On April 23, New Delhi suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a move with far-reaching ecological and political ramifications. Within hours, Pakistan retaliated by suspending the Simla Agreement and other unspecified bilateral accords.
Pakistan’s decision, while dramatic, is largely symbolic. The mechanisms envisioned in the Simla Agreement—especially regular high-level talks—have been dormant for years. The last formal dialogue collapsed in 2019 after the Pulwama terror attack, followed by India’s abrogation of Article 370, which revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special status.
However, symbolism in geopolitics can be consequential.
Pakistan’s move signals an official pivot away from bilateralism, paving the way for renewed attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue—at forums like the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), or through diplomatic overtures to China and the Gulf states.
India, meanwhile, maintains that Kashmir remains a bilateral and internal matter, citing the same Simla Agreement Pakistan just suspended.
The most immediate concern is the status of the Line of Control. Pakistan’s suspension could be interpreted as a signal that it no longer sees the LoC as a stabilising mechanism. Historically, such ambiguity has led to misadventures—most notably, the Kargil War in 1999.
While India’s military posture in Kashmir has grown stronger, any erosion of LoC sanctity increases the risk of border skirmishes, sniper fire, and militant infiltration, especially with the summer months approaching.
Following the announcement, Pakistan shut down the Wagah border, suspended bilateral trade, and imposed airspace restrictions on Indian carriers. These measures hurt Pakistan more than India, especially at a time when its economy is grappling with IMF constraints, rising inflation, and energy shortages.
Cultural and people-to-people exchanges—already at historic lows—are likely to freeze entirely. Visa regimes may harden, and even limited sports diplomacy (like cricket tours) seems off the table for the foreseeable future.
From a legal standpoint, the Simla Agreement lacks rigid enforcement clauses. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), suspension requires proof of a “fundamental change of circumstances”—a high bar that Pakistan’s move may not satisfy.
India can now argue that Pakistan has reneged on its international commitments, reinforcing its narrative of Pakistan as an unreliable partner. This could aid India’s efforts to rally global support, especially among Western democracies concerned about terrorism and nuclear escalation.
Ironically, the suspension may provide India with strategic flexibility. Without the Simla Agreement as a constraint, New Delhi may feel emboldened to:
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Step up counter-terrorism operations, including cross-LoC strikes.
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Revive claims over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) more aggressively.
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Reassess other bilateral pacts, such as visa liberalisation and cultural treaties.
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Use international platforms to highlight Pakistan’s internal instability and continued use of terrorism as statecraft.
The diplomatic high ground that the agreement once conferred on Pakistan—allowing it to claim commitment to dialogue—is gone. Now, India alone can claim fidelity to peace frameworks, enhancing its global standing.
Despite its ambition, the Simla Agreement was never fully implemented. Key factors undercut its success:
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Mistrust: The legacy of partition, wars, and conflicting national narratives made sustained dialogue nearly impossible.
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Terrorism: From Kargil (1999) to Pathankot (2016) to Pulwama (2019) and now Pahalgam (2025), terrorism repeatedly disrupted progress.
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Ambiguity on Kashmir: The lack of clarity on Kashmir’s status allowed for differing interpretations, which both sides exploited politically.
Over the years, attempts to renew the spirit of Shimla—Agra Summit (2001), Composite Dialogue Process, Ufa Declaration (2015)—all collapsed under the weight of realpolitik and violent flashpoints.
With both nations entrenched in hardline positions, the path forward is murky. Confidence-building measures (CBMs), like the 2021 LoC ceasefire agreement, are unlikely to hold without backchannel diplomacy—something currently off the table.
Track-II diplomacy, involving retired officials and civil society actors, may try to keep communication lines open. But without political will and public support, such efforts lack teeth.
China’s increasing role in Pakistan’s strategic calculus, through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and diplomatic alignment, further complicates the Indo-Pak dynamic. It adds a third dimension to a historically binary rivalry.
The Simla Agreement, born in the aftermath of one war, was meant to prevent another. It symbolised a fragile hope that dialogue could replace conflict, and that South Asia could chart a course distinct from Cold War rivalry and religious extremism.
That hope now stands suspended—literally and metaphorically. But history suggests that treaties between India and Pakistan, no matter how noble, have never been enough on their own.
For peace to return, more than papers and signatures are needed. Trust, leadership, and a shared vision for a stable subcontinent remain elusive. Until then, the shadow of the Shimla Agreement will loom large—not as a relic of diplomacy, but as a reminder of what might have been.
